

SENSATIONAL MEMOIRS

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SECRET DIARY

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Design by artist S. Kurbatov

Beria L.P.

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This diary was never intended to be published. Few knew about its existence. Its original was to be destroyed on Khrushchev's personal order, but the photocopies were saved by secret supporters of Beria to see the light of day half a century after his assassination. Very personal, extremely frank (it's no secret that even extremely cautious and "closed" people sometimes trust the diary of thoughts that they would never dare to express out loud), notes by L.P. Beria for 1941-1945. allow you to look "behind the scenes" of the Great Patriotic War, revealing the background of the key decisions that predetermined the Victory of the USSR.

The closest associate of Stalin, in fact, the second person in the country, during the war years, Beria was not only the "right hand" of the Leader, but also his "watchful eye" - Stalin had all the information, primarily thanks to his People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, who sometimes went to the front even in makeup. In addition, being Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Beria personally led almost the entire defense industry, and his contribution to the Victory cannot be overestimated. Giving all his strength to work without a trace, Lavrenty Pavlovich admitted in his diary: "I won't survive the Second War ..."

MAJOR HISTORICAL SENSATION! An invaluable document that sheds light on the decisive events of the Stalin era! The first scientific edition of the military diaries of L.P. Beria with a preface and commentary by Sergei Kremlev, author of the best-teller Beria. The best manager of the 20th century.

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Publisher's Preface

The publication of the personal diaries of L.P. Beria during the war years (from the end of 1941 to the end of 1945) is a continuation of the publication of his personal diaries for 1938-1941.

The publication entitled "Stalin Does Not Believe in Tears" covers the period from the moment when Stalin suggested that Beria move from Tbilisi to Moscow and change the post of 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia to the post of First Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yezhov. It is very likely that with a close prospect, Yezhov will be replaced in the chair of the people's commissar.

That publication ended in the last days of 1941, when the winter counteroffensive of the Red Army was successfully developing near Moscow.

In the preface of the publisher to the diaries of the pre-war period and the first half of the war, I spoke in detail about how, unexpectedly for myself, I became the owner of an electronic copy of the diaries as a result of the courtesy of the mysterious "Navi Lavrentievich", who had a photocopy of the original diaries of L.P. . Beria. In this preface, I will summarize the essence of the events of that time.

Of course, when these diaries were offered to me, my first reaction was to doubt the authenticity of the text, although those photocopied sheets that

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"Pavel Lavrentievich" showed me, at first glance they betrayed Beria's hand.

To my natural question, is it possible to examine the authenticity of photocopies, my interlocutor answered as follows:

— I understand that this question worries you in the first place, but I'm sorry, it doesn't bother me. Take what I give you, if you wish, and compare the chronology, psychology, factology, and whatever you like, in the manuscript with known historical facts. And decide for yourself whether it is authentic or not. You may publish this manuscript with any reservation you may have about its authenticity. You can publish it as your own literary work, or treat it as someone else's literary hoax, as you wish. There will be no disclosure of incognito, because you see me, dear Sergei Tarasovich, for the first and last time. I have one condition: study it carefully, prepare it for publication and try to publish it ...

Then "Pavel Lavrentievich" smiled and added:

— By the way, regarding copyright, if you publish it... So, consider that we transfer all copyright to you. However, it cannot be otherwise if you are the publisher of the diaries.

We parted, as I guessed - forever, and for me a period of "confusion and vacillation" began. Familiarization with the texts convinced me that I had a rare luck. However, doubts remained. However, as I began to work seriously with the texts of the diaries, doubt was replaced by an ever-increasing interest.

I hope he will be able to say the same after reading the military diaries of L.P. Beria and the reader.

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During the war years, Beria carried the burden of responsibility second in severity and significance after Stalin, holding the posts of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, member (and since 1944 Deputy Chairman) of the State Defense Committee and People's Commissar Internal Affairs of the USSR (until the spring of 1943, the NKVD was merged with the NKGB). Accordingly, the contribution of Lavrentiy Pavlovich to our victory turned out to be outstanding. At the same time, almost immediately after the end of the war, he became the curator of a new vitally important problem for Russia - nuclear.

The currently published diaries of L.P. Beria for 1941-1945. begin with the New Year's Eve entry of December 30, 1941, and end with December 1945, when the author of the diaries was released from

duties of People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR so that he could focus on nuclear affairs.

1941

30/HP-41

Well, the year is over. Who thought a year ago that this would happen. Nobody thought, and I didn't think. And when it started, who thought it would go like this. Nobody thought either. And how the hell did it go. It's good that at least now they have recovered a little. We are going well..

And how much work now. He got to Leningrad, he got Minsk, he got Kiev, he got to Moscow, he took Kharkov, he took Zaporozhye, Crimea should be recaptured, but also not immediately.

Well, I didn't reach the Caucasus, but I still took a lot. And everything is in ruins now, when we rebuild? And you have to take it back.

This is a year to our border and a year to Berlin. Conclusion: it will not be possible to fight for less than two years. And if more? Hard.

What's good, we realized that we set the system

On December 15, 1941, a successful counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow began. Solnechnogorsk was liberated on December 12, Klin on December 15, Kalinin on December 16, and Volokolamsk on December 20. On December 24, 1941, the Bryansk Front was restored by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

On December 226, 1941, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation began. On December 29, Feodosia was liberated, on December 30, Kerch (on the same day, the troops of the Western Front liberated Kaluga). Unfortunately, the Crimean plans in 1942 still remained plans. Instead of an offensive from the Kerch bridgehead in May 1942, the Crimean Front collapsed, and as a result, on July 4, 1942, Sevastopol was abandoned.

strong. Beaten, beaten, not beaten. Koba says, for one beaten they give two unbeaten. And now we are all broken.

How much work went into the wind. As we planned. Two or three years and another life. They would even raise meat. Group B' would be raised. How many planes we make, and they will be shot down. And how much could be done for the civilian fleet. They would fly from village to village.

How many roads could be built. For six months, whole canals across the country were dug by hand, but the tanks still passed.

I myself would have shot the whole bastard, so unless you shoot everyone. Koba said that Lenin said, if anything destroys us, it is bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is still x..y with him. Skinning could have ruined us. There is no one worse than a skinner. And give a man a job, he will do it, and he will thank you. And you also thank him. If deserved.

Winter is cold everywhere, and factories have to work. This year it is necessary to raise all production. Give me tanks, give me planes, give me machine guns and give me machine guns. People will give if you organize them.

The bastards seem to have already weeded out. Whoever wanted to betray, betrayed, who wanted to stay with the Germans, stayed. And we can deal with agents. Now the main thing is to help people work, and they themselves are eager to do it.

So it's far from Victory, and we've already won. Koba said, Victory will be ours. And for whom?

I would like to get to Tiflis now. Until Victory is no longer

I'll get there."

1 That is, the production of consumer goods.

2 Unfortunately, this forecast by L.P. Beria did not justify himself. Our failures in the Caucasus became the reason that he ended up in Tbilisi much earlier than the Victory came, already at the end of August 1942.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Diary entry made by L.P. Beria on the penultimate day of the first year of the Great Patriotic War, as it should be for a New Year's Eve entry, not only summed up some results of the past year, but also looked into the future. At the same time, as we see, L.P. Beria looked at the situation less rosy and more realistic than I.V. Stalin. Stalin hoped to make 1942, if not the last year of the war, then the year of the expulsion of the invaders from the territory of the USSR, Beria was not going to fight for less than two years.

He had already completely reorganized himself on a military footing and himself formulated his task as he saw it: "Now the main thing is to help people work, and they themselves are eager to do it." In these words, Beria's style was vividly expressed: always and in everything to rely on people. Of course, after you've tested people in practice. In 1942, this approach L.P. Beria to management matters will serve the country in good stead more than once.

Beria helped many people work. At first glance, no one helped him - he stood too high for this. However, it can be said that a lot of people helped to carry out the tasks of Stalin and Beria's Motherland.

Millions of them in the Soviet rear produced weapons and ammunition at factories in the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia, the production of which was supervised by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and a member of the GKO Beria.

Tens of thousands of fighters and commanders of special detachments of the NKVD in the enemy rear carried out reconnaissance and sabotage work on his orders.

And hundreds of foreign intelligence officers of the NKVD provided their people's commissar, and hence Stalin, with accurate operational and strategic information.

The year 1941 brought many disappointments, but ended with the victories of the Soviet troops.

1942 promised to be a turning point. However, no one knew yet what he would become in practice.

1942

2/1-42

The population begins to return to Moscow in an unorganized manner. In October they fled, now they are filtering back. It is clear that the fright has passed, but in Moscow living space and feeding is easier. Already tens of thousands of people are coming, even on foot. Why are they needed here. A working person is assigned to his workplace, and this cf..n only breeds panic. Then thousands of saboteurs can leak out. Agency of course.

Koba agrees, it is necessary to expel. Agreed with Alexander! that we will interact. I tell him, you, brother Pushkin. work with me as a gendarme, otherwise you compose all reports and reports. "Not reports, but poems. Laughs. He is an intelligent person, this

Shcherbakov Alexander Sergeevich (1901-10.05.1945), party leader, Colonel General (1943), in 1938-1945. First Secretary of the Moscow Regional and City Committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, since 1941 Secretary of the Central Committee.

AS. Shcherbakov was also the head of the Soviet Information Bureau, whose reports in the early days of the war, for obvious reasons, greatly embellished the state of affairs. So, November 26, 1941

The Soviet Information Bureau reported that during the five months of the war, Germany lost: about 6 million killed, wounded and captured; 19 thousand guns, more than 15 thousand tanks, about 13 thousand aircraft. At the same time, Soviet losses were announced as follows: human losses - 2 million 122 thousand people, in addition: 12,900 guns, 7900 tanks, 6400 aircraft. Our official losses were comparable to real ones, but Germany's losses were sharply inflated in all respects.

eleven

hour is immediately visible. Andrey! appreciates him too. Not because you are a brother-in-law, but for the cause.

I think we will work with him. Previously encountered less, but now I have to do nothing.

1/1-42

Hands reach what they reach, what they don't reach. Well who reminded Rogov?. Gotta fix it. The navy views special officers even worse than the army. Gouging. Naval reconnaissance is working well. Fuck your traditions. The best people were given to you, the Red Navy men were handsome even more than my border guards. Heroes! Bogatyrs, gold. And you command this gold this way. Oktyabrsky" generally zasr..net. All right, we will quickly strengthen and improve this matter °.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

When the NKVD was divided in February 1941 into the NKVD of Beria and the NKGB of Merkulov, the Special Departments of the NKVD (military counterintelligence) were transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense.

! Andrey Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, member of the Politburo, first secretary of the Leningrad City Committee of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Beria is not entirely accurate. Brothers-in-law are married to two sisters, but only A.A. Zhdanov was married to the sister of A.S. Shcherbakov.

Ivan Vasilyevich Rogov (1899-1949), head of the Main Political Directorate of the Navy, Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy.

"Oktyabrsky (real name Ivanov) Filipp Sergeevich (1899-1969), admiral, from March 1939 to April 1943 commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Naval specialization is katernik (torpedo boats). One of the leaders of the defense of Odessa and Sevastopol. Figure

ambiguous.

On January 10, 1941, by the Decree of the State Defense Committee, the Third Directorate of the NKVMF was transformed into Special Departments and transferred to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR.

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us the USSR and the People's Commissariat of the Navy. With the beginning of the war, in July 1941, the people's commissariats united, the NKGB became part of the NKVD. The special departments of the army were also returned to the structure of the NKVD, and the naval special departments until the beginning of January 1942 remained part of the People's Commissariat of the Navy. On January 4, 1942, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Navy I.V. Rogov sent Stalin a cipher with sharp criticism of the department of the Third (counterintelligence) directorate of the Black Sea Fleet. Stalin addressed the cipher to Beria with a visa: "Vol. Beria? Your opinion? I. Stalin. And soon the Third Directorate of the NK VMF was transferred back to the NKVD of the USSR.

It is believed that this was not done immediately insofar as the Navy demonstrated a higher combat readiness than the army (the advertised "Readiness No. 1"). However, just at the Black Sea Fleet on the night of June 21-22, 1941, noisily, with the brightly lit Primorsky Boulevard, the end of major naval exercises was celebrated. So combat readiness had nothing to do with it.

Simply, as can be seen from the entry in the diary, due to the "heap of cases and the turmoil of events" of the first half of the military year, the naval special officers were not remembered. And when they remembered, they immediately returned to the NKVD, which was more than reasonable. The fleet also needed independent control, and it was carried out within the framework of the state's activities by the Special Departments of the NKVD and, additionally, the People's Commissariat for State Control of Mekhlis (which, by the way, worked very actively).

12/1-42

We keep going, that's good. Koba sets the task of advancing and not giving the Germans a respite. He says that they prepared badly for the winter, and we have now pulled up reserves and we need to grind the German until he comes to his senses. We are advancing. They are retreating, spending their reserves, and we will accumulate them by spring and strike on all fronts at once. He says they have no reserves, they will roll to Minsk and further.

Then he asks: "How, Comrade Beria, people

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we will prepare for spring, and the industry will give them weapons"?

I say, Comrade Stalin, the factories are only mastering the program, when it was the hardest time they worked like at the front, but right away you need to have qualifications. Experienced workers went to the front, the reservation does not save, anyway, a lot has gone. The machines have children, they need to learn. Conclusion: we can ensure the accumulation of weapons for reserves on all fronts only by the summer. And that is limited.

He says before?

I say, but earlier you can provide two or three hits, but better one. While the expenditure is high, it is necessary to ensure the offensive. So far, it has not been possible to accumulate. We give everything to the front at once.

Look at George! Friend George hesitated, then confirmed. Then I told George, we are pulling one strap, let's blow one. Comrade Stalin has enough advisers for the offensive even without us. And I would not attack before August. Have my guys dug up thousands of kilometers of defense? So long as you can attack, and then sit down on the defense lines and wait. He will definitely hit, he has nowhere to go. If we ourselves attack in the summer, we can again

Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov, member of the State Defense Committee and secretary of the Central Committee.

2In the USSR, during the war, 10 sapper armies were formed (in different periods), a number of which were commanded by employees of L.P. Beria: M.M. Tsarevsky (2nd sapper army), Ya.D. Rapoport (3rd sapper army), G.D. Afanasiev and S.N. Kruglov (4th sapper army), A.N. Komarovskiy (5th sapper army), L.E. Vlodzimirsky and A.A. Andreev (9th sapper army), M.M. Maltsev (10th sapper army), S.P. Grechkin. For example, the 5th sapper army A.N. Komarovskiy began the construction of the Stalingrad and Don defensive lines already in October 1941, after leaving Kharkov on October 25, and by mid-January 1942 she completed it. 200 thousand people, 500 cars and 500 tractors worked on the construction.

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crap.. be. He maneuvers better than us, and if he gets around, it will suck again.

George agreed, but he says, you see, Koba wants to take as much as possible while there is an offensive impulse. I say offensive impulse is good, until you get a sopatka. We have three divisions on the offensive, and five armies took and were surrounded.

Georgy says "That's when it was." And I tell him, it didn't go away. May repeat. And then while a rush, and then a breakthrough. And then we will rush again. Only something began to improve, it is necessary to strengthen.

OK let's see.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Work on the preparation of the diary of L.P. Beria for the publication turned out to be grateful to me in the sense that I had to deal with the questions in more detail: "How did Stalin think about the course of hostilities in 1942 and why did this move really turn out to be different from what Stalin intended it to be? And who's to blame?"

I will not forgive the reader for diverting him for a long time from the text of the diary itself in order to give my detailed review of the situation at the beginning of 1942. The fact is that without this review it is hardly possible to understand both some of the entries in the diary and some essential moments of relations between Beria and Khrushchev, Khrushchev and Stalin, etc.

The analysis also allows us to reasonably assume the presence in the diary not only of 1941, but also in the diary of 1942 of later lacunae (that is, omissions of the text) made already during archival storage in order to falsify history in favor of Khrushchev. To understand the full validity of such an assumption, one must peer into the general situation of those days.

In addition, I hope that the analysis I have undertaken will enable the reader to better know the realities that

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which characterized the course of events in 1942, and the role of L.P. Beria.

The standard myth introduced since the Khrushchev era is as follows. Encouraged by the success of the December counter-offensive near Moscow and its seemingly good development, Stalin decided that in 1942 it was possible to attack along the entire front and, if not completely defeat Germany, then drive the Germans out of the territory of the USSR.

However, Stalin - as the myth claims - incorrectly determined the direction of the main German attack in 1942. He believed that the Germans would again go to Moscow, while Hitler decided to strike in the direction of the Caucasus, aiming at the oil of Maykop, Grozny and Baku. .

Stalin decided to pre-empt the Germans and, in particular, ordered an attack on Kharkov in the spring of 1942 from the area of the so-called Barvenkovsky ledge, which was formed during our successful Izyum-Barvenkovsky operation and remained after the stabilization of the Soviet-German front. The troops of the South-Western direction were to advance (commander Marshal Timoshenko, member of the Military Council Khrushchev).

The offensive failed, and the brilliant strategist Khrushchev suggested that Stalin go on the defensive. However, stubborn Stalin drove the troops to death, which resulted in the Kharkov catastrophe, and then the German breakthrough to Voronezh, to the Great Bend of the Don, to Stalingrad, to the North Caucasus and the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.

In the Brezhnev era, this matter was not particularly spread, and with the onset of the "holy" Yeltsin-Putin-Medvedev "freedom", the myth was somewhat changed.

Now the unrealistic plans of the incompetent amateur Stalin are no longer opposed by the brilliant strategist Khrushchev, but by the brilliant commander Zhukov. Unlike Stalin, he allegedly proposed not an offensive, but a plan for active defense (something like what was implemented by the summer of 1943 in the area of the Kursk Salient). Stalin did not listen to Zhukov and we got the Kharkov catastrophe, etc.

According to Zhukov (given already in the posthumous (!)

The strategists now also record Nikolai Voznesensky, "the future victim of Beria's intrigues," who allegedly declared in January 1942 that we now "do not have the material capabilities sufficient to ensure the simultaneous offensive of all fronts."

In general, Voznesensky, unlike Beria (and Malenkov), appeared very infrequently at Stalin's, especially in 1942. He could only meet with Zhukov at a meeting with Stalin on February 15 and 26, 1942, and then Zhukov left for his front headquarters, appearing in Moscow only in the second half of March, when the main plans were already outlined. So the words of Voznesensky in the transmission of the "posthumous" Zhukov do not look reliable.

Now, to this "perestroika" myth, they sometimes muffledly add that Khrushchev, who was a member of Timoshenko's Military Council, should still be indirectly blamed for the Kharkov catastrophe. There is even a certain story in circulation... Like, after Khrushchev's inglorious return to Moscow, Stalin supposedly accepted him alone, seated him on a hard lonely stool, and then, silently sucking on his cooled pipe, approached Khrushchev and silently knocked him out. ashes from a pipe on the bald head of a brilliant strategist.

This, of course, is nothing more than an idle anecdote. But, as they say, a fairy tale is a lie, but there is a hint in it ...

The name of Beria is not actively dragged into this "mythology" of 1942, and it would not be so easy to do this, because Beria's opinion on purely military topics was not very much asked. And when they asked, they didn't really take it into account. However, it is believed that the "executioner" also provoked Stalin (Beria all his life - in the presentation of "advanced historians" ~ did just that).

In reality, everything happened a little differently ...

The Soviet offensive, which started very successfully in December 1941, developed in January and February, and in some places even in March. By April 1942, the Bryansk Front was restored.

But already at the beginning of 1942, it was necessary to determine the strategy for the new year. However, it was developed not by a one-time volitional decision of Stalin, but by the method of successive approximations, taking into account the situation - including

how this situation was presented in the minds of the Soviet leadership.

And, alas, it seemed not quite right, but Stalin was not to blame for this.

On the one hand, the Soviet military intelligence, the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army, blundered. According to her, the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front amounted to 4.5 million people, while the real losses were 6-7 times less. It is unlikely that Stalin believed in all these millions (they were hardly believed in the GRU), but even if he dumped half of them into lies, the picture still turned out to be optimistic. And she wasn't. Here the Red Army in the operations of 1941 lost only 3 million people irretrievably. It was a real number.

Beria's intelligence had more discreet data. They could alert the Soviet military leadership, but you always want to believe in the good! And the "good" was reported to the GRU General Staff. In addition, the GRU was "their own" department for the marshals, in contrast to the NKVD of "this Beria", who "pokes his head into all holes". Today, Marshal Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff, is also listed as an opponent of active operations in 1942 (and this is not a myth). No doubt, Boris Mikhailovich was a cautious man, but after all, the GRU was in the General Staff, and his boss did not declare that the data of his subordinates were, at best, an irresponsible lie, and at worst, a conscious disinformation, and build strategy on these data is at least imprudent. This is on the one hand.

On the other hand, the front commanders themselves did not quite correctly assess the situation. At the beginning of the year, the Headquarters turned to the fronts with a proposal to present their views on the further conduct of the war in the winter of 1942 and beyond.

So, ALL FRONTS SUGGESTED TO ATTACK! Of course, they all asked for reserves, but commanders ask for reserves in all wars and in all armies. The mindset of a military leader is always focused on "Give" and not on "Take!". And Stalin understood this.

Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts (commanded by Army General K.A. Meretskov and Lieutenant General

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M.S. Khozin) considered it possible to jointly defeat the 18th German Army and unblock Leningrad. The Kalinin Front (commanded by Colonel-General I.S. Konev) intended to defeat the German 9th Army and advance on Smolensk or Velikiye Luki. Commander of the troops of the Western Front ... However, we will not talk about this yet. First, I will inform you that, as noted in the preface to Volume 5(2) "The Headquarters of the Supreme Command. Documents and materials 1942" series "Russian archive. Great Patriotic War" (p. 9), "disagreement with the plan of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief" to attack on all fronts was expressed only by Zhukov (supposedly supported by Voznesensky). Zhukov "offered to advance only in the western direction, where the enemy had not yet had time to restore the combat capability of his troops." In other areas, Zhukov allegedly predicted failure and "big, unjustified losses." Military historians from the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation refer to the posthumous edition of Zhukov's memoirs dated 1990. And now, as the marshals say, one more introductory one... the following is also reported:

"The commander of the troops of the Western Front, having reported to Stalin on the defeat of 15 infantry and one tank division of the enemy, insisted on the further development of the offensive to the west. However, this idea was unrealistic. The "destroyed" 16 German divisions continued active resistance, and the armies of the right wing of the front (Western. - S.K.), having exhausted their forces, actually stopped..."

But who was in command of the Western Front at that moment? Who was engulfed by the next hat-tossing moods? Yes, that's just it, that the Western Front was commanded by an army general ... G.K. Zhukov.

That is, not only Stalin, but also the rest of the high military command, including Zhukov, was seized with a certain euphoria in the winter of 1942. And that was not all! "Mykyta" Khrushchev has not yet entered the business!

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After the defeat near Kiev and the abandonment of Ukraine, the actions of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine N.S. Khrushchev, Stalin fell sharply. However, there were not enough personnel, Khrushchev was considered a devoted person and was appointed a member of the Military Council of the South-Western direction to the commander of the direction, Marshal Timoshenko.

Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko also fought not very successfully and, naturally, wanted to be rehabilitated. That's where "ice and fire" came together! The "ice" was the phlegmatic marshal, and the "flame" was the undoubtedly impulsive Politburo member Khrushchev.

Therefore, as even historians from the Institute of Military History admit, "The Military Council of the South-Western Direction with particular perseverance proposed to shift the main efforts to the south-west and conduct a major offensive operation here in order to liberate the Donbass and reach the Dnieper."

As subsequent events showed, it is precisely in this special persistence of the Military Council of the South-Western direction, the spring of which was the ambitious Khrushchev, that the origins of the future Kharkov catastrophe are found.

At this point, I temporarily interrupt my analysis and return the reader to the diary entries of L.P. Beria, having previously warned that in due time I would develop the topic in another commentary.

22/1-42

Churchill (so in the text. - S.K.) returned home '. Zakordonnye agents handed over valuable data on his trip. Sending a report to Kobe. The main thing is that they are not going to open a second front. They will supply something, and then not much. There will be no major actions with Japan.

Conclusion: we can expect everything from Japan, until the howl

On January 117, 1941, the Prime Minister of England, W. Churchill, returned to London from a trip to the USA (on December 22, 1941, he arrived in Washington together with Lord Beaverbrook).

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us. And the Germans will advance strongly, all the reserves from the west will be transferred here and hit in the spring or summer. The question is where. If they are not fools, they will go to the Donbass and the Caucasus. They have Ukraine, but there is little sense, the factories are standing. And he desperately needs coal and oil. And if he goes to Moscow, then we have strengthened, the second time he will not succeed!

We have completely liberated the Moscow region. When will we liberate Kievskaya? Hell knows. And when Minsk? Go far.

30/1-42

Hitler gave a speech in Berlin. He said that he did not know how this year would end and when the war would end. Who knows?

Did the Germans announce that Marshal Reichenau had died from the blow? Yes, he died from our blow. That's how we hit! Our marshals are like crap ... they are, but they live. And these lived weak. It turns out that Russian fools are stronger than German ones.

'Very interesting! Stalin and the entire high command of the Red Army, in assessing the right direction of the German strike, thought exactly the opposite. They considered the most probable new attack on Moscow, while Hitler sanctioned the Blue plan to conquer the Caucasus.

On January 217, 1942, it was announced in Berlin that Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau (1884-17.1.1942) had died on the Soviet-German front "of apoplexy." The son of a general, a participant in the First World War, Reichenau joined the Nazis early, was the author of the text of the military oath to Hitler. In 1940, after the victory in France, he became a field marshal; commander of the 6th Army (later commanded by Paulus). On November 30, 1941, Hitler appointed Reichenau to replace Field Marshal Rundstedt as commander of Army Group Centre. And on January 12, 1942, Reichenau had a heart attack at the headquarters of his group in Poltava, and on January 17 he was evacuated to Leipzig. On the way he died in a plane crash.

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3/H-42

George! was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction? We got on well with him while we were fighting for Moscow. I called and said: "Lavrenty, prepare weapons for the reserves, soon I will give the Fritz a heat" *. I told him: "Something you are all going to give the Fritz heat, we will not get enough of all of you.

Mykyta is also going to give heat. He sits with Comrade Stalin and describes everything to him, how he will throw the Fritz to the Dnieper. Georgy was silent, sniffing. Apparently he wants to attack.

Spoke with Mykyta. Burning with desire. He says: "Comrade Stalin is very hopeful for me." He will not find a place for himself, then he will leave, then he will arrive. He boasts, I will liberate Kharkov, and by autumn I will take Ukraine from the Fritz. I tell him, "Good afternoon. But keep in mind that they still have a lot of strength. Waving his hand.

So far, things are going well.

12/L-2 Medvedev returned*. Well done, he took away 33 heroes, and brought 230 heroes. Conducted 50 combat operations

ÿG.K. Zhukov.

The appointment took place on February 1, 1942, while leaving Zhukov in command of the Western Front.

These words foreshadowed heavy fighting in the area of Vyazma and Rzhev.

"Medvedev Dmitry Nikolaevich (1898-1954), in 1941 – captain of the State Security Service (equivalent to an army lieutenant colonel), then Major of the State Security Service, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of four orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner, commander of partisan special detachments of the NKVD "Mitya" (1941-1942) and "Winners" (1942-1943). Detachment Dm. Medvedev's "Mitya", numbering 33 fighters, crossed the front line on September 7, 1941. This was the first special detachment of many sent to the deep rear of the Germans. Before Medvedev's detachment, small groups went there. In January 1942, Medvedev returned to Moscow, having lost 8 people killed and 16 wounded (of which 12 returned to duty) and destroyed 423 soldiers and officers, as well as 2 generals.

22

radios. Other groups did well too. The Germans are being beaten and there is good damage. The main thing is that they should be aimed at the railway. And so well done! I am sending a message to Kobe, people should be rewarded and rewarded from the bottom of their hearts. Deserved. Medvedev will be given the Order of Lenin.

Ponomarenko! remained idle, now he persuades Koba to lead the partisans. And he says to me: "You, Comrade Beria, must rely on party activists"

I tell him, I rely on faithful people. If he is there, sitting with the Germans, but remains a party activist, my people rely on him. And if you, comrade Ponomarenko, have a man in Moscow or Kuibyshev, how will I rely on him near Minsk. Sopit, offended.

H..yya that's all. They surrendered Belarus (so in the text. - S.K.) mud..ki, and now they scratch their eggs. I am throwing a strong battle group behind the front, headed by a proven person with experience. They grow in place. Medvedev grew 7 times in 4 months. And they do not have detachments but a party meeting. Listened and decided. Give me people here who are ready to go there. I will prepare them, then I will send them. And you need merit! Comrade Stalin, we have done.

I told my people, politely send to x..y. They do not understand, send impolitely. We don't need a market, we need a result.

'Ponomarenko Panteleimon Kondratievich (1902-1984), party and statesman, in 1938-1947. 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus, in 1942-1944. Head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement.

23

13 1-42

The headquarters of the Moscow district moves to Moscow!. We should come and say happy new home. After all, I am a member of the Military Council there. Ha!?

18/11-42

I got used to it a long time ago, Lavrenty is there, Lavrenty is here. Lawrence there, Lawrence here. Either rifles, then tanks, then cannons, then give cadres to the army, then deal with motors. If Koba didn't call any day, it's all the same how I spin like a squirrel in a wheel.

Day, night, one x..y. Night in Moscow, but day in Siberia. In the Urals, the press flew, find Lavrenty. The train was lost, Lavrenty, let your guys take care of it. Vyacheslav failed, Lavrenty come on. Voznesensky did not help, Lavrenty help. Help Lazarus, help Georgy, help Shcherbakov, and Koba goes without saying. If you didn't pick up people everywhere, lie down and die.

It's hard, it's hard everywhere. The Germans were driven away from Moscow, we are advancing, but there is also a lot of chaos. It can be better. War, but not everyone has responsibility. Bochkov? co-

"The headquarters of the Moscow Military District was relocated to the city of Gorky on the basis of the order of the NPO No. 0444 dated 11/26/41. Only part of the apparatus remained in Moscow. From February 15, 1942, the headquarters of the MVO, by order of the NPO No. was again transferred to Moscow to his former "place of residence" along Osipenko Street, 53.

*It is not known whether a member of the Military Council of the MVO LP visited. Beria to the headquarters of the Moscow Military District at Osipenko, 53, after the headquarters returned to Moscow, but, ironically, it was here that he was under arrest in an underground bunker after June 26, 1953. It is possible that he was shot dead here (since the execution of Beria was extrajudicial, it cannot be called an execution) – much earlier than December 23, 1953 (the date of the official execution).

3Bochkov Viktor Mikhailovich (1900-1981), in the Red Army from 1919. in 1922 he was transferred to the border troops, from December 25, 1938 in the central office of the NKVD of the USSR, from August 7, 1940 to November 13, 1943 - the prosecutor of the USSR, then in the central office of the NKVD-MVD of the USSR. In May 1959, he was retired and worked at design institutes in Moscow.

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reports that again high mortality in the northern camps. Get 200 grams of bread. We have to figure it out. In the Urals, bread is bad, there are deaths there and in the cities. Hard. But still there is a way out, find it. That's what you were made for. No, they still skimp. Even war does not fix. And the camp will not fix. Only a bullet can.

In December, the working movement of trains from Kozhva to Vorkuta was opened. Almost five hundred kilometers. Big deal. And people are dying. Not the front, but still dying. Maybe this year, if we don't finish it, then at least we'll drive it out of our territory. The opportunity is there if you press hard. They went to Moscow in 4 months, and now we won't reach it in a year. If we press, we'll get there. But there are a lot of assholes.. There are almost no traitors and pests, some have been cleared out, some have defected themselves. And damn ... there are enough bows. And why are they better? They let the plane into Gorky. Then they let me into Moscow", now to Gorky. It worked out well, but he could do things. Fuck knows where he could get.

1On the night of February 3-4, 1942, a German bomber was let through to Gorky with impunity solely due to the sloppiness of the command of the Gorky Air Defense District. The plane was found 210 km from the city, but not a single anti-aircraft battery covering Gorky fired a single shot. Dobryansky, the commander of the Gorky air defense divisional district, the military commissar of the district Egorov and the chief of staff of the Savko district got off with 10 days of house arrest with a deduction of 50% of the content for each day of arrest. The blunderer captain, on duty at the air defense command post, by order of Stalin (NGO Order No. 082 of 02.06.42) went to court.

2 No doubt, this refers to the unpunished admission to Moscow on May 15, 1941 of an off-schedule German Yu-52 aircraft, which calmly landed in Moscow at the Central Aerodrome.

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The first soot plant was launched in Komi. Well done! It will be easier. This year we will advance, just the road is a spoon for dinner.

At Dalstroy? bad with fuel. Let them develop a gas generator park. Chock there is good, made of larch, so let them ride on firewood. I spoke with Koba, he promised to help put this matter forward. He said that it should be introduced everywhere, gasoline is needed

front?°.

23/P-42

Koba issued an order for the Day of the Red Army. Now he said more carefully than at the Parade. He simply said that the day was not far off when all over Soviet Earth

After the start of the war, the production of soot on the basis of helium-bearing gas fields of the Komi ASSR was recognized as a priority in relation to the production of helium. Soot was badly needed for the tire and rubber industries in general. In 1941, a decision was made to build 12 carbon black plants with a total capacity of 12,000 tons of carbon black per year. Commissioning dates: the first six by March 1, 1942, the rest - by July 1, 1942. The first Ukhta soot was obtained in February 1942.

See also entry dated December 20, 1940. in the publication "Stalin does not believe in tears" and a commentary to it.

2 Dalstroy - Main Directorate for the Construction of the Far North "Dalstroy" of the NKVD of the USSR. The main tasks were to ensure the extraction of gold and tin in the Kolyma and the economic development of the northern regions of Eastern Siberia.

By the end of 1942, out of 4014 cars and 856 tractors of Dalstroy, 1006 cars and 116 tractors were gas generators, that is, they worked on combustible gas produced from local raw materials (including wood chocks) in a gas generator installed on a car or tractor.

On February 23, 1942, NPO Order No. 55 was issued with congratulations on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the Red Army - the first of four orders of this kind in that war.

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le the Red Banners will fly again. Said correctly, but who knows when they will fly again. He himself says that it would be unforgivable myopia to believe that with the Germans finished.

Well said that Hitlers come and go. Do we need this in agitation for captured Germans?

Through agents came an analysis of the situation in Germany. The morale of the population is strong. Old people grumble, they grumble everywhere. The young are devoted to their Fuhrer. The British believe that the Germans will advance in the summer and will have significant success.

Maybe they will. Last year he didn't throw everything at us, he thought he would beat us anyway. And this year he needs us to break the blood from the nose. Everything in the west will be cleaned up and thrown at us. Romanians and Hungarians too. Slovaks will plug the holes in the rear. Mussolini also promises to give. X ... evo we will be this year. But now, how not (as in the text. - S.K.) advance, we are beaten. Even if at first they fill the face, we will still give back.

In the order of the NPO No. 55 dated February 23, 1942, in particular, it was said: "The day is not far off when the Red Army with its mighty blow will drive back the brutal enemies from Leningrad, clear the cities and villages of Belarus and Ukraine from them, Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia and Karelia, the Soviet Crimea will be liberated, and red banners will again fly all over the Soviet land.

Despite the obvious improvement in the situation of the USSR, this statement was already less capricious than the statement of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief at the parade on November 7, 1941: "A few more months, another six months, maybe a year, and Nazi Germany should burst under the weight of its crimes" .

2 It was in NPO Order No. 55 of February 23, 1942 that the famous words of Stalin were first heard: "The experience of history says that the Hitlers come and go, but the German people, but the German state remains."

27

2/Sh-42

Koba finally decided on Kulik. It was time. Mud..k she is not Kulik. Only on the basis of an old friendship with Koba did he leave. Still got off lightly. Koba endures for a long time, it could be shorter. She is a bastard and she is a bastard. You won't change.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Marshal Grigory Ivanovich Kulik (1890-1950) - a figure rather odious than attractive. Artillery warrant officer during the First World War, he, together with Stalin, participated as commander of the artillery of the 10th Army in the defense of Tsaritsyn in 1918.

In 1926-1930 and 1937-1941. Kulik incompetently headed the Artillery Directorate (Main Artillery Directorate) of the Red Army, commanded a division, a corps. Since the beginning of the war, he received a number of responsible tasks at the front, invariably and more and more failed, and on February 16, 1942, for the failure in Kerch in November 1941, he was deprived by the Supreme Court of the USSR of the titles of Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union and all awards. He was also expelled from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and removed from the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

NPO order No. 0041 dated March 2, 1942 about Kulik (it was called "Order about G.I. Kulik") was written, no doubt, personally by Stalin from the first to the last word. Stalin in particular wrote:

"... During his stay at the front, Kulik systematically drank, led a depraved lifestyle and abused the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union and deputy. People's Commissar of Defense, was engaged in self-supply and plundering state property for drinking from state funds ... "

See comment below.

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What is characteristic, even in the case of serious sins, but not betrayal or outright crime, the offenders were called in orders, nevertheless, "comrade" ("Comrade Namer ..."), and Stalin simply wrote "Sandpiper". The former old comrade completely lost his trust and was no longer his comrade.

However, Stalin gave Kulik another chance. On March 17, 1942, he was awarded the rank of major general, and in April 1943 even the rank of lieutenant general, he was given command of the 4th Guards Army, but he could not cope with it either. Kulik was again demoted to major general and was no longer allowed to approach the front.

Talentless as a commander, Kulik was also mediocre as a person. Guilty of his own fate, he blamed Stalin and ended up being arrested in 1947 and shot in 1950.

In 1956 - clearly in defiance of the memory of I.V. Stalin - Kulik was rehabilitated by the Khrushchevites, and in 1957 even posthumously reinstated in the ranks of Marshal of the Soviet Union and Hero of the Soviet Union.

8/1042

Came back from Koba. Everyone thinks how to attack. I decided that we would attack for sure. But still thinking. He looked at the map, then he said: "These assholes of the intelligentsia are so bad, whining, how a little better, they are ready to kiss your ass. What to do with them? So we did not understand why, but he said correctly. He then said at the parade. Rotten people. And nel

In a speech delivered on November 7, 1941 on the Red Square of the tribune of the Mausoleum in front of the participants in the Red Army parade, Stalin, among other things, said this: "The enemy is not as strong as some frightened intellectuals portray him. The devil is not as scary as him

paint..."

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without them, and it is impossible to give will. There are, of course, people with a rod there too (Perhaps they meant "with a rod"? - S.K.). But rarely. They love themselves very much, but it is necessary to love the work.

10/11-42

I agreed with Koba that I appointed Arkady as deputy? Ivan? firmly stuck at the front, became a uniform commander. There is a lot of work in the People's Commissariat, but in fact Arkady is pulling. Koba said: "But so that Comrade Maslennikov is not offended, let him remain your deputy for the time being."

Didn't argue. Then there was not a single deputy, now there are two, but one is acting,"

It is difficult to say whether L.P. knew. Beria's statement by K.S. Stanislavsky: "One must love the theater in oneself, and not oneself in the theater." In any case, Beria's thought echoes the thought of Stanis

lavsky.

? Apollonov Arkady Nikolaevich (1907-1978), one of the heads of state security agencies, colonel general. Since 1932 in the OGPU. In 1939 he graduated from the Military Academy. Frunze. Since March 11, 1942 – Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR for the troops.

3Maslennikov Ivan Ivanovich (1900-1954), one of the leaders of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR and commander, General of the Army, Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1932, he served as head of the combat training department of the Border Guard Department of the NKVD of Georgia. From January 21, 1939 - First Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of the BSSR, then - Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR for the troops. From the beginning of the war - at the front, commanded armies, hero of the battle for Moscow, from August 8, 1942 commander of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front, in 1943 commander of the North Caucasian Front, from April 1944 - commander - blowing by the 3rd Baltic Front. Long-term colleague of L.P. Beria.

*From March 11, 1942 to June 6, 1943, Beria had two deputies for the troops: Apollonov and Maslennikov. Only in June 1943, Chekist Maslennikov, who became a major front-line commander with the outbreak of war, was formally transferred to the Red Army.

thirty

1411-42

Summarized the data on the Poles Anders'. Did you send a report to Kobe? Panfilov? and Zhukov also report that they are behaving boorishly?. This is understandable, otherwise they can not. When a Pole is alone

he can as a person. And if their army, then you won't understand, people or drunken sheep. Well, to hell with them, this is Koba's business. It's my job to report.

Koba approved the proposal for a book on priests.

On July 130, 1941, after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the government of the USSR and the London government in exile restored Soviet-Polish diplomatic relations. In the Soviet Union, the formation of the Polish army began from among Polish prisoners of war and other Polish citizens who were on Soviet territory. On August 6, 1941, General Vladislav Anders was appointed commander of the army. By March 1, 1942, there were 3,090 officers, 16,202 sub-officers and 40,708 soldiers in the army, in total - about 60 thousand people

lovek.

If the NKVD had shot all the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian Polish prisoners of war before the war, it would be unlikely, firstly, that officers and sub-officers would have been found so quickly and en masse for Anders' army. Secondly, it would be unlikely that there would have been so many anti-advisers and Russophobes in Anders' army, and there were quite a few of them.

March 214, 1942 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria sent to the chairman of the GKO I.V. Stalin a report on the formation and moral and political state of the Polish army Anders. See also entry dated 25 April 1943 and note 2 to it.

3Panfilov A.P. (1898-1966), one of the leaders of military intelligence, major general of tank troops, from November 1941 head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army and until March 1942 authorized by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the High Command of the Red Army for formation on the territory of the USSR Polish army of General Anders.

"Zhukov G.S., Major of State Security, Deputy Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR A.P. Panfilov, since August 1942. Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the High Command of the Red Army for the formation of the Polish army on the territory of the USSR.

See comment below.

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He said I almost became a priest myself, so you suggested correctly. Why give such a powerful tool to the enemy. Let them serve the cause, at least they will come in handy for something useful.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

This is how Anders's Poles behaved on Soviet territory in the spring of 1942.

From the minutes of the meeting of the mixed Soviet-Polish commission on the formation of the Polish army dated March 28, 1942: "March 21, 1942 in Yangi-Yul (Uzbek SSR. - S.K.) a Polish soldier killed a 9-year-old child. On March 20, 1942, in Yangi-Yul, a group of Polish soldiers arbitrarily cut down 4 poles and damaged the radio transmission line..."

From the report of the Plenipotentiary of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the command of the Red Army to Stalin and Molotov dated March 1942: authorities. Colonel Gelgud, Chief of Staff of the Division February 14 of this year. demanded from the chairman of the district executive committee in the mountains. Kermine (Uzbek SSR, - S.K.) immediate repair of bridges, roads, threatening in case of non-compliance with the requirements of "responsibility under the laws of wartime" ... The division commander, General Shishko-Bogush ... arbitrarily took under epidemic hospital the building of the operating school at the Kermine station.

At the time of Jalal-Abad (Kyrgyz SSR. - S.K.), soldiers of the 5th Infantry Division in the collective farm named after Telman and Voroshilov arbitrarily occupied the premises of clubs and stables, cut off and took away 132 pillars that strengthened the dam.

On the Stalin collective farm, the Poles cut down 350 fruit bushes. From the freight yard of the railway station

On March 110, 1942, Beria informed Stalin about the opening of Orthodox churches by the Germans in the occupied territory and proposed a number of counter-propaganda measures, in particular, the publication of the book-album "The Truth about Religion in the USSR". The book was published by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1943 with a circulation of 50,000 copies.

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The missions stole 13 cubic meters of boards, 12 cubic meters of special wood, 2 crates of glass and 700 kg of hay. From the fields of the collective farm. On October 10, Polish soldiers arbitrarily took away 20 wagons of straw ... "

Examples can be continued.

18/0142

Koba received Anders today. The general asks to increase the number of heroes that are rushing to Iran, to fight with the Tehran whores. Koba agreed. He says that he told Anders, we hope that those of your soldiers who remain in the USSR will win the right to be the first to enter the Polish land. I am surprised at Comrade Stalin. He knows the Poles as flaky (so in the text. - S.K.), but he hopes. These zasr..ntsy will fight for whoever you want. Just not for the Russians. I told him so. He says "Nothing, Comrade Beria. Our job is to tell them. The story of the lady is forgetful, but it's not scary. It is important that she has good secretaries. And we'll be good secretaries."

Then he says, I have read your report on the Poles, Comrade Beria.

Well, you can still conduct politics. The main thing is to look with open eyes. With the Poles, it is no different. Okay, they'll forget, we won't. We are good secretaries.

On March 118, 1942, Stalin received Generals Vladislav Anders and Leopold Okulitsky (then chief of staff of the Anders army, in 1944 commander of the anti-Soviet Home Army, on June 21, 1945, at a trial in Moscow, sentenced to 10 years in prison, died in 1946). Anders insisted on increasing the number of Polish troops being withdrawn to Iran. Stalin then agreed to the withdrawal to Iran of that part of the Anders army, which exceeded the contingent of 44 thousand people. However, in the end, just in time for the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, Anders' entire army fled in an organized manner from the USSR (in the sense of being evacuated) to Iran.

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28/Sh-42

Reported to Kobe data on the atomic energy of uranium. There were only George and Vyacheslav. He said that there is evidence that it is possible, due to the fission reaction of 10 kg of uranium, to obtain a bomb with a force of 1600 tons of tol. We need whole factories, they are expensive.

He asks: "Is the data accurate?" I say that the sources have not failed yet, then the data are cross-sectional. Have we been following this line for more than a year now? Will we intensify, Comrade Stalin has prepared a letter for you.

He said don't send anything yet, the matter seems to be important, but there is no time. They, too, have written on the water with a pitchfork, but we still can't pull it right now, we don't have enough tanks and planes, and it's still not known how things will go in the summer. Do you think I want to throw hats. No, I know it's hard, but people need hope. Now it's like the first five years. Then they didn't do it, but they said they did it. Did you lie? No! Because the main thing was achieved, the matter was moved from the dead point, industrialization began. And then they moved too. They survived the hardest when they could falter. And now, whatever one may say, our top will be. Not this year, but next. As we work and fight, so be it.

Says wait with your atom. But don't give up on this matter, Lavrenty, let's breathe a little easier and begin to figure it out. While gathering information, I will also consult with someone. Up howl

On March 128, 1942, Stalin was the last to receive Malenkov (21.50-00.05) and Beria (from 23.55 to 00.05). Molotov was also constantly in the office from 18.30 to 00.05.

"Already on January 27, 1941, the 5th department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR sent an operational letter to the deputy of the New York residency G.B. Ovakimyan with the tasks of scientific and technical intelligence on the problem of uranium-235.

34

we kind of wanted to start this business, for power plants.

They spoke for a short time.

I must tell Fitin!, let him activate.

30/11-42

I said goodbye to Mykyta. Did they persuade Koba and Timoshenko? Will they prepare a strike? Mykyta said: "I'm going to do big things. So we strike, the devils will be sick, and Hitler is completely finished. I'm waiting in Kharkov."

You get to this Kharkov, friend Mykyt.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

The time has come to continue the analysis of the situation begun in the commentary to the diary entry of January 12, 1942.

If we turn to the journal of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office, we will see that on March 27 and 30, 1942, Stalin held two meetings with Timoshenko, Khrushchev, Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky and Major General Falaleev, Commander of the Southwestern Air Force .

On March 27, the meeting went on for a long time, from 20.10 to 22.35, also with the participation of Molotov and Malenkov.

1Fitin Pavel Mikhailovich (1907-1971), lieutenant general (1945). In 1932 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Mechanization and Electrification of Agriculture. In March 1938, he was sent to the NKVD bodies on a party recruitment basis, at first - to study at the Central School of the NKVD. From February 1941 to June 1946 he was the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR (foreign intelligence). In October 1953, he was transferred to the reserve "due to incomplete official compliance." Since 1959, director of the photographic plant of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies.

2See comment below.

The Plan of the Kharkov Offensive Operation was submitted to the Headquarters by the Military Council of the South-Western Direction, headed by Timoshenko and Khrushchev, on April 10, 1942.

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On March 30, everything went quickly - in about 15 minutes. That is, it was the day of Stalin's final decision.

And on March 30, events unfolded like this. At first, only Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky and Falaleev entered Stalin at 20.00. Five minutes later, Timoshenko and Khrushchev entered, and five minutes later, Molotov. At 20.20, all six participants in the meeting left Stalin's office. The nature of the Soviet military operations for the spring and summer of 1945 was determined.

It must be said that Timoshenko and Khrushchev had very far-reaching plans back in the winter of 1942. As the authors of the preface to volume 12(12) inform us, "The General Staff during the... war. Documents and materials 1942" of the series "Russian archive. Great Patriotic War" (p. 8), in the South-Western direction, it was planned to advance the advancing troops to a depth of 300-350 kilometers with the exit of bunk beds. Dnieper".

However, "the General Staff did not agree with such grandiose plans," and Tymoshenko's real successes by the spring of 1942 turned out to be much more modest.

But they were real successes. Below I will give very interesting, in my opinion, testimonies of Oleg Dmitrievich Kazachkovsky (b. November 3, 1915) who is still alive (God bless him). A physicist by training, from April 1946 he took an active part in the Soviet Atomic Project, from 1973 to 1987 he was the director of the Physics and Energy Institute in Obninsk, and during the war he fought as an officer of the artillery regiment of the Reserve of the Main Commando - vaniya and later published memoirs about his war years. This, of course, is a view of events "from below", but this is the view of a developed, intelligent and honest participant in events.

Oleg Dmitrievich writes:

"When a victory was won near Moscow and Rostov was recaptured (by Timoshenko's troops. - S.K.), and after that the successful Izyum-Barvenkovskaya operation was carried out, it seemed that a turning point had come in the war. It was expected that by spring

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reserves are being withdrawn, and the general offensive will be resumed. Yes, and Stalin, in his speech on the day of the Soviet (more precisely, the "Red" - S.K.) Army, promised that 1942 would be the year of the expulsion of the occupiers from our land.

And now the spring of 1942... We are in the area of Old Saltov, which lies to the east of Kharkov. Kharkov itself is in the hands of the Germans. Preparations are underway for a major offensive... A lot of tanks, mostly of English production - "Matilda"... Our newest fighters have appeared. They freely catch up with enemy planes and shoot them down before our eyes..." and so on.

As you can see, the command of the South-Western Direction had objective grounds for optimism. Yes, and the Barvenkovsky ledge was very successful. Therefore, as the volume of the Russian Archive mentioned above notes (p. 9), although the planning of the war for the summer and autumn of 1942 was completed by the General Staff by mid-March, "at the insistence of the command of the South-Western direction, which offered to carry out a major offensive operation in May, work on the plan continued. (I note that Hitler more or less decided on his plans, too, approximately in these terms - by the end of March.)

March 30, 1942 Timoshenko and Khrushchev left for the front. On April 10, they submitted a plan for the Kharkov operation to the Headquarters. And today it is alleged that Shaposhnikov allegedly again recommended to Stalin to refrain from holding it, as "fraught with serious negative consequences."

This is hardly true. Thus, the authors of the preface to Volume 5(2) "The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Documents and materials 1942" series "Russian archive. Great Patriotic War" (p. 13), referring to the position of Shaposhnikov, they refer to "Memoirs ..." by G.K. Zhukov and write about some "joint meeting of the GKO and the Headquarters at the end of March 1942", which was allegedly attended by "except Stalin ... K.E. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko, B.M. Shaposhnikov, G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

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But this is hardly true either. Such meetings were held, as a rule, in Stalin's office, but the Journal of Cabinet Visits did not record a meeting of this kind at the end of March. Actually, the last time Zhukov was with Stalin on March 20, and then left for the front,

But even on March 20, 1942, the composition of the conferences was different, not to mention the fact that by March 1942, Stalin actually did not involve Voroshilov in the discussion of serious purely military issues.

No, the plan of the Kharkov operation was not bad - in itself. Two factors could prevent success - the level of implementation of our plan and the real plans of Hitler. The first could be revealed only after the start of the offensive, and the second was unknown to Shaposhnikov. So if Shaposhnikov did not agree, it was not because of his brilliant foresight, but because of his eternal caution. But, as you know, those who do not take risks do not drink champagne, but mineral water!

Therefore, it is quite possible to understand Stalin, who, seeing the discord between the General Staff and Timoshenko, ordered the General Staff to consider the attack on Kharkov an internal affair of the command of the South-Western direction. There was a reason for this. Two fronts of the direction - South-Western and Southern - received good reserves and were determined.

That is, in April and early May 1942, there was no particular fear for the success of the offensive against Kharkov.

And here I will interrupt my analysis again in order to return to it already in the commentary to the diary entry of May 17, 1942.

4/TU--42

Hands reached to arrest the Starostins. The ball was driven great, people turned out to be shit. They made intellectuals out of themselves. They seemed to be given everything they could give. How many champions are in the rear of the Germans howl

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no, how athletes fought near Moscow !, and these little self-seekers and speculators are also traitors. Slap would, but why. Koba said, move this crap away from Moscow, otherwise let it stink." The intellectuals cannot live without crap.

Paul? complains that the ability to obtain information from embassies has been reduced. When everyone was in Moscow and in peacetime, there was a stream. Now it's worse." I told him that he had to fight well. We will expel the Germans from the Country, again the information will flow. So, friend Pavel, you will work better, it will soon be easier to work.

He said: "Yes, I understand, Comrade General Commissar." And the bastard grinned.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

In the archives of the NKVD, an extremely curious message by Beria No. 444/B dated March 19, 1942 was deposited, concerning famous football players, the brothers of the Starostins - Nikolai, Andrei and Peter (see the collection of documents "Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKVD-NKGB- GUKR "Smersh", 1939 - March 1946. Under the general editorship of Academician A.N. Yakovlev, M., International Fund "Democracy": Materik, 2006 "document No. 216, pp. 340-341).

This message fully explains why two of the three brothers (Andrei and Nikolai) also fell into the "victims of the Stalin-Beria arbitrariness."

Idle languages claim that passionate de bolel

This refers to OMSBON - a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes of the NKVD of the USSR. More details in the comment below.

2See comment below.

3Fitin P.M. in 1942, head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR.

The diplomatic corps was transferred from Moscow to Kuibyshev.

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The manager of the football teams of the NKVD "Dynamo" Beria could not stand the beauty and color of the trade union team "Spartak" of the Starostin brothers. Therefore, they say, using the military situation, and rolled them into Siberia. As if in 1942, Beria had nothing but life to see how Dynamo beat the "bloodless" Spartak during the USSR Football Championship (which, of course, was not held in 1942).

In fact, everything was more banal and sadder. Here is a significant part of a very specific message from Beria on March 19, 1942:

*Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN

The NKVD of the USSR has materials testifying to the pro-fascist attitudes and hostile work of athletes Starostin Nikolai Petrovich, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, chairman of the Moscow city society "SPARTAK"; Andrey Petrovich Starostin, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, director of the SPORT and TOURISM factory, and Petr Petrovich Starostin, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, director of the SPARTAK Production Combine.

In 1937-1938. the investigation into the case of the liquidated spy organization, created by an employee of the German embassy in Moscow von Hervard among workers of physical culture and sports, established the involvement of STAROSTINY Nikolai and Andrey in this organization zation.

The arrested members of this organization Steblev V.N., Ryabokon V.N. and Krivonosov S.G. the investigation showed that Starostin N.P. was associated with Hervard and carried out his tasks of a spy nature ...

In the course of further development, information was obtained (it.d. - S.K.) ...

... At the time of the tense military situation near Moscow, Starostin Nikolai and Andrey, spreading defeatist moods among their entourage, were preparing to stay in Moscow, hoping to take a leading position in "Russian sports" if the city was occupied by the Germans.

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Starostin Andrei among those close to him said:

"The Germans will occupy Moscow, Leningrad. The occupation of these centers is the end of Bolshevism, the liquidation of Soviet power and the creation of a new order...

The Bolshevik idea, which drew me into the party in 1929, has by now completely disappeared, not a trace remains of it."

Special events (easier - listening. - S.K.), held in November 1941, recorded the following statements by Starostin Nikolai and members of his family:

Starostin N.: "The 11th day of the German offensive, well, in a week they will be here. We need to hurry up with the apartment and arrange everything."

"... if you take rooms, then only from the Jews, because they will not come here anymore."

Wife: "... Golitsyno is located 10 kilometers from Moscow, Lyalechka (Starostin's daughter) is going to learn German, I will also learn, otherwise the Germans will come, and I don't even know how to speak ..."

Starostin: "Yes, life is beginning to be interesting."

Wife: "It was interesting in 1917, they fought for life, and now they are destroying everything."

Starostin: "What was interesting then?"

Wife: "The overthrow of tsarism."

Starostin: "And now communism is being overthrown."

Wife: "I'd rather..."

...Starostins started accumulating material assets (currency, gold) and accumulating food supplies.

It has been established that the Starostins are associated with an extensive group of plunderers of socialist property in the system of the Industrial Cooperatives...

...Using his connections among individual leading Soviet and economic bodies, Nikolai Starostin, receiving large bribes, illegally booked persons to be mobilized into the Red Army, and organized registration in Moscow of a class alien and criminal element.

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The NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to arrest Starostin N.P. and Starostin A.P.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General Commissar of State Security BERIA.

And now more about OMSBON. In this really special military unit of the NKVD, people were sent according to a special selection and - exclusively volunteers. The backbone of the OMSBON, a powerful center of reconnaissance and sabotage work of the NKVD, was made up of students and the best workers of Moscow enterprises.

At that time, the patriotic color of Soviet sports also gathered in OSMSBON. Boxers Nikolai Korolev (he became an adjutant of the famous Dmitry Medvedev) and Sergey Shcherbakov, speed skater Anatoly Kapchinsky (died in the German rear while in the detachment of Dmitry Medvedev), weightlifter Nikolai Shatov, rower Alexander Dolgushin, discus throwers Leonid Mitropolsky and Ali Isaev, cyclist Viktor Zaipold, gymnast Sergei Korzhuev, gymnast Sergei Kulakov, wrestler Grigory Pylnov, skier Lyubov Kulakova, a group of Dinamo Minsk footballers, runners-stayers Znamensky brothers...

The fighters of the OMSBON took an active part in the battle for Moscow. They conducted reconnaissance and carried out sabotage in the German rear (Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya also served in the OMSBON), fought as part of line units.

After the war, competitions were held in the Soviet Union in memory of the dead outstanding athletes: the prestigious All-Union Athletics Memorial named after the Znamensky brothers, competitions for prizes named after A. Kapchinsky. The anti-Soviet "Rossiyaniya" does not need the memory of these heroes, the fighters of the OMSBON Beria. But the "repressions of Beria" in relation to the Starostins are remembered.

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9/1U-42

Kovalev shot himself! They reported that in train, I remember him from Batumi. Yes, it didn't work out well for him. They didn't believe the man, but that's how he is. Bright memory to him, and a lesson to me.

Just in case, he gave instructions to inform more often about the situation with Tymoshenko. I do not want Mykyta to disgrace himself again. It is better to fix it in time than to tear your hair out later. Moreover, Mykytei has nothing to tear.

19/1U-42

It's time for the summer, it's easier with heating. The main thing is that it will soon be easier with coal. I'm tired of patching up these Trishka caftans over the winter. He goes to Uralmash, transfer to Izhevsk, goes to Kuibyshev, transfer to Stalingrad, where tank production has begun. Koba distributed the duties to everyone, but still Lavrenty take the rap. Zae..ali?.

Now we need to strengthen the line on the British and the east. They will open a second front for us, we will fight ourselves, let Koba not hope. We must have good channels, then the German can go to the Caucasus,

Most likely, we are talking about Alexander Antonovich Kovalev (1899-8.4.1942), one of the leaders of the border guard. The son of a peasant, he joined the party in 1918, fought, from January 1921 he was transferred from party work to the bodies of the Cheka, from December 1922 - in the border troops. In 1926 he served as the head of the 37th Batumi frontier detachment of the OGPU. The last position was the head of the Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR (since 01/21/1938). When Beria divided the GUPVV on March 8, 1939 into six Main Directorates, he did not receive any new appointment and on May 15, 1939 he was transferred to the reserve with direction to the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. During the war, he was denied conscription into the army, and he shot himself on the train on the way to Moscow.

See comment below.

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they will intensify work on Baku from Iranian territory and it may be bad. I think to immediately strengthen the eastern direction. I will send Paul to Iran!

We have a lot of intelligence in Pavlov. What am I, Christ?

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

The State Defense Committee was formed as a part of: I.V. Stalin (chairman), V.M. Molotov (Deputy Chairman), L.P. Beria, V.M. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov.

In February 1942, N.A. Voznesensky, A.I. Mikoyan and L.M. Kaganovich. In 1944, Voroshilov was withdrawn from the membership of the GKO.

In general, the distribution of duties in the State Defense Committee (GKO, GOKO) according to the GKO Decree of February 4, 1942 was as follows.

V.M. Molotov was supposed to exercise control "over the implementation of the decision of the GOKO on the production of equipment."

G.M. Malenkov was supposed to personally control the implementation of the decisions of the GOKO on rocket mortars and, together with L.P. Beria – "implementation of the decisions of the GOKO on the production of aircraft and engines" and "on the work of the Red Army Air Force (formation of air regiments, their timely transfer to the front", etc.).

Obviously, we are talking about Pavel Matveyevich Zhuravlev (1898-1956), one of the talented leaders of Soviet intelligence. Always worked in legal residencies under diplomatic cover. In May 1942, he was sent to Tehran as the chief resident of foreign intelligence under the cover of the post of 1st secretary of the Soviet embassy in Iran (since October 1943, he worked in the same mission and in the same positions in Cairo).

Presumably, a hint of the apostle Paul in Jesus Christ. As for Pavlov, Beria really had Pavel Sudoplatov, Pavel Fitin, Pavel Zhuravlev in intelligence, not counting Pavel Meshik and Pavel Artemiev (commander of the Moscow Military District) in the inner circle of the People's Commissar.

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Personally on L.P. Beria was entrusted with control over the production of weapons and mortars; on N.A. Voznesensky - for the production of ammunition, and A.I. Mikoyan - "for the supply of the Red Army (clothing, food, fuel, money and artillery)..."

In reality, from the beginning of the war, Beria was engaged not only in issues officially assigned to him by the Decree of the State Defense Committee, but also in charge of those issues that were officially listed as, for example, N.A. Voznesensky.

And soon L.P. Beria was transferred - at the request of the tank builders themselves, whom he helped a lot - and issues of tank building. Not without reason among the first leaders and workers of the Atomic Problem of the USSR there were so many former tank builders (suffice it to recall V.A. Malyshev, B.G. Muzrukov, P.M. Zernov, L.N. Dukhov, A.M. Petrosyants, designers - the future Heroes of Socialist Labor V.F. Grechishnikov and D.A. Fishman).

However, Beria began to deal directly with "atomic" affairs already during the war.

Outstanding-role L.P. Beria in ensuring the Victory in the Great Patriotic War has not been officially evaluated to this day. But sometimes one has to face amazing attempts to exalt the efforts of others to the skies. Soviet leaders, whose real merits were actually much more modest than those of Beria.

So, in the monograph by S.A. Kostyuchenko "How the tank power of the Soviet Union was created" (in 2 books, book 2nd, M., AST Publishing House LLC; St. Petersburg, Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2004), on p. 10 I read with surprise: "In the very first weeks of the war, Nikolai Voznesensky (and now another position has been added to his duties as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Commission - First Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee) urgent business..."

That's how it is, Stalin did not have any of his employees idle - especially during the war. However, neither in the first weeks, nor in the first months of the war, Nikolai

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Voznesensky was not even a member of the GKO. He became one only from February 1942!

ON THE. Voznesensky from March 10, 1941 was the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. From the same March 10, 1941, N.A. Voznesensky passed M.Z. Saburov until December 1942, the duties of Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, which Voznesensky carried from 01/19/38 to 03/10/41. At the same time, Voznesensky was never a deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee, much less the first!

So in one phrase S.A. Kostyuchenko - I don't know, unintentionally or maliciously - seriously distorted the historical truth. This is L.P. Beria in 1944 became the second deputy chairman of the GKO - on a par with V.M. Molotov.

However, in the case of L.P. Beria, the falsification of historians is, although sad, but a common story.

14/U-42

We spent the whole night at Koba's. The question about Vyacheslav has been finally resolved, so far only Koba, Vyacheslav, I, Georgy and Golovanov know. Well, the time has come. That in clear weather it was impossible on the plane, and now you can hell knows where. Vyacheslav well done?. It seems that everything was agreed on, I reported that everything had been checked ten times, the pilot was reliable.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

The surname "Golovanov" and comparison of dates make it possible to decipher the entry dated May 14, 1942 quite reliably.

May 19, 1942 V.M. Molotov went on a long and

Golovanov Alexander Evgenievich (1904-1975), pilot, Air Chief Marshal (1944), from February 1942 commander of the Long-Range Aviation (ADD) at the Headquarters of the High Command.

See comment below.

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extremely dangerous air travel through England to the United States of America. Previously, members of the Politburo were forbidden to fly airplanes - in peacetime. Now Molotov had to fly twice in wartime many thousands of kilometers over the north of occupied Europe, over the seas and oceans on an outstanding in its flight characteristics, but not very reliable high-altitude bomber Pe-8 (TB-7).

At that time, even the United States did not have such giants (the diameter of the wheel was one and a half meters!). Pe-8s in August 1941 bombed Berlin, Danzig Koenigsberg, but not everyone returned from the flight, including due to technical problems.

Deciding on such a flight was an undoubted civil feat on the part of Molotov. Great responsibility also lay with Golovanov and Beria.

The aircraft (an ordinary serial Pe-8) was to be piloted by a former polar pilot, Major Endel Pusep, Hero of the Soviet Union, an Estonian by nationality. He had already flown to England in a Pe-8, and part of the route was familiar to him. I must say right away that Pusep and his crew coped with the task brilliantly.

It must be assumed that Stalin thought and hesitated a lot before authorizing the extremely risky flight of his deputy for the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. from the Anglo-Saxons opening a second front already in 1942.

Judging by the diary entry of May 14, 1942, everything was finally decided on the night of May 14-15, when from 2:55 to 3:05 Stalin remained in the office only with Molotov, Malenkov and Beria.

Most likely, they also discussed the same issue on May 11, when from 2:35 to 2:40 only four of them also remained in the Kremlin office.

Judging by the entries in the journal of visits to the office of I.V. Stalin, Stalin called Golovanov on this issue several times (May 8, 10, 11), but, as E. Pusep later recalled, the flight was delayed due to the weather. Maybe,

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it was not only the weather, but also Stalin's doubts. Finally, on May 15, Golovanov reported that he was ready to take off, and on May 19, Molotov flew away.

On May 20, the commander of the ADD visited Stalin three times (a very rare case!), apparently reporting on the progress of the flight. Already on this it becomes clear how worried the Supreme.

On May 21, Molotov arrived in London.

On May 26, 1942, Molotov and Eden signed the Soviet-British alliance treaty.

On May 29, 1942, Molotov flew to Washington.

171/U-42

It is already clear that a catastrophe is in Crimea!. Prepared prepared and crap..lis. Damn..s. The troops have learned to fight a little, but the generals are still sitting. I reported to Kobe that something was wrong in the Crimea. You can fall hard. He said I'm on Mehliis? Hope.

Things have also gone wrong for Tymoshenko and Mykyta. They boasted boasted, convinced Koba, and You-

On May 18, 1942, Manstein launched an offensive against our large forces concentrated on the Kerch Peninsula for an offensive in order to divert the Germans from Sevastopol and then ensure the liberation of the Crimea. However, the mediocre command of the Crimean Front (Generals Kozlov and Vechny) and the incompetence of L.Z. Mekhlis was brought to May 20 instead of success to the tragedy of the Crimean Front. Losses in killed and wounded amounted to more than 160 thousand people. 350 tanks, 3.5 thousand guns and mortars, up to 400 aircraft were lost. 2Mekhlis Lev Zakharovich (1889-1953), party and statesman, army commissar of the 1st rank (1939), in May 1942 deputy people's commissar of defense, head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, at the same time deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar of State Control - Ia. After the Crimean catastrophe, he was removed from the posts of Deputy People's Commissar and Head of GlavPUR, but later he was again a member of the Military Councils of the fronts. The figure is ambiguous, but within the framework of the history of the Great Patriotic War, it is almost exclusively negative.

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walks too x..evo. No matter how they failed. It's useless now.'

It is not yet clear whether there will be a second front or not. There is still time, but these mudd..ki will pull to the last. And it would help us a lot. It sucks that you don't know what to count on (so in the text. - S.K.). With the second front one thing, without it another.

Maybe Vyacheslav will achieve ??

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

I conclude my analysis of the circumstances of the Kharkov operation of Timoshenko and Khrushchev, which began in the commentary on the diary entry of January 12, 1942 and continued in the commentary on the diary entry of March 30, 1942.

On May 12, 1942, our attack on Kharkov began quite successfully. Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, wrote in his diary that day:

"The enemy is conducting strong attacks near Volchansk and against the 8th Army Corps of the 6th Army; his goal is Kharkov. The enemy advances with the support of several hundred tanks (in both areas) and has significant initial successes..."

There were indeed successes. During the first three days of the offensive, two strike groups of the Southwestern Front broke through the defenses in bands of up to 50 km each and moved forward in the area

Volchansk at 18-25 km, and from the Barvenkovsky ledge - at 25-50 km.

Oleg Dmitrievich Kazachkovsky, a well-known physicist (and artilleryman during the war), later recalled:

See comment below. See commentary on the entry dated May 14, 1942.

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"... At first everything went according to plan... Having broken through the German defenses, our troops advanced twenty kilometers in 2-3 days. The chimneys of Kharkov factories are already envious (! - S.K.). It was possible to go further, because the resistance of the enemy weakened ... "

Halder made disturbing notes until May 17, and then wrote: "It can be considered that the crisis, although not completely, is already almost over." On the other hand, a crisis of our offensive began, which quickly turned into a catastrophe.

As you know, in those same days we received a catastrophe on the Crimean Front, and now the Kharkov one has also occurred. Losses in killed, captured and missing amounted to 171 thousand people, wounded - 106 thousand people. The deputy commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, generals A.M. Gorodnyansky, K.P. Podlas, A.F. Anisov, F.G. Malyarov, L.V. Bobkin, D.G. Egorov, F.N. Matykin, Z.Yu. Kutlin, I.V. Vasiliev, brigade commissars I.A. Vlasov and A.I. Popenko.

Actually, then the state of affairs did not turn out to be catastrophic on the scale of the entire Soviet-German front (it became extremely aggravated only by the autumn of 1942). But two major failures at the same time, and even in anticipation of two successes, it was too much.

The guilt of the command, and especially Mekhlis as a representative of the Headquarters in the Crimea, was obvious. The guilt of Timoshenko and Khrushchev, if you look at their actions from a purely military point of view, was, in my opinion, far from being so obvious.

By the way, from the same Oleg Dmitrievich Kazachkovsky, I found a completely unexpected explanation of why our attack on Kharkov, which had begun so successfully, could unexpectedly stall. Guard Major Kazachkovsky writes:

"And then ... one complicating circumstance appeared. At the reached line there were German food depots prepared for the forthcoming offensive. Everything was there

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whatever your heart desires, including schnapps. Here are ours, as they said, and were not slow to celebrate their success accordingly. What an offensive after that! The Germans pulled up reserves and launched a counterattack with large forces. I had to go on the defensive..."

Well, this reason could also be significant. But here the Military Council of the South-Western Direction had nothing to do with it at all! Here it is necessary to blame the racial "Vankism", which for centuries was brought up in a certain part of the Russian people by the "Russian" tsars.

One way or another, a catastrophe also befell us near Kharkov. Nevertheless, I repeat, I would not really blame not only Timoshenko, but even Khrushchev for this, if we keep in mind the purely military aspect affairs.

Here I just found a scythe on a stone. There was a fatal and not foreseeable by either side clash of their offensive plans. And the point here is not that Stalin allegedly incorrectly determined the direction of Hitler's main blow. That factor just played against us

uncertainty, which can fail even the most experienced and brilliant commander in a war!

This is especially evident when looking at the map.

Stalin set the goal of the spring offensive to liberate Kharkov and a significant part of Ukraine while moving to the West in the general direction of Smolensk. Then, especially if the allies opened at least overwhelming, but real hostilities in Europe, it would be possible to develop success in the summer. At the same time, Stalin could well have imagined a German attack on Moscow - a lot spoke for this.

In addition, there were circumstances that had long been hushed up. Firstly, in order to divert attention from Operation Blau, the OKH developed Operation Kremlin (a false attack on Moscow), and this was not just paper disinformation - the deployment of German troops made it possible to think that the Germans were going to attack Moscow in earnest. In addition, on June 20, 1942, we captured a plane with the head of the operations department of the 23rd Panzer Division, Major Reichel, who had with him

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"extremely important (wording in the diary of the head of the OKH, General Halder. - S.K.) orders" for the "Blau" operation. This happened already, however, after the collapse of the Kharkov operation, but even before the start of the German offensive. And those were the real plans!

Most likely, Stalin had them in mind when he said on November 6, 1942, at a solemn meeting in Moscow dedicated to the 25th anniversary of October, the following:

"Recently, a German officer of the German General Staff fell into the hands of our people. This officer found a map with the designation of the plan for the advancement of German troops in terms of time. This document shows that the Germans intended to be in Borisoglebsk on July 10 of this year, in Stalingrad on July 25, in Saratov on August 10, in Kuibyshev on August 15, in Arzamas on September 10, in Baku on September 25 September..."

From what was said, Stalin concluded that the main goal of the German summer offensive was to bypass Moscow for a subsequent strike on it. He spoke in this way even when the Germans struck the main blow in the south, reaching Stalingrad, Rostov, Ordzhonikidze and Novorossiysk.

But Hitler decided to carry out - as the main one - Operation Blau to seize the Caucasus. And his plan was very clever! The first strike was supposed to be delivered from Kursk to Voronezh, creating the false impression of turning north towards Moscow - in order to keep our reserves from being transferred to the south.

Then Hitler and Keitel intended to reach Voronezh, bypass it without getting involved in battles for the city, and, at the maximum speed of tank formations, rush to the large bend of the Don at Kalach, and from there ensure the main movement to the North Caucasus to Stavropol, to the Maykop oil fields, Grozny and, finally, Baku.

In addition, Hitler intended to secure an attack on Stalingrad in order to cut off the movement of ships along the Volga, as well as an attack on Novorossiysk and further on Tuapse and Batumi to finally deprive Russia of oil.

As Soviet authors noted in the 1970s, the main

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The subtlety of the German plan was considered precisely the rapid turn of large tank forces from Voronezh to the south. Looking ahead, I note that where it is thin, it breaks there. Alas, further analysis is beyond the scope of the commentary, but it should be noted that in May 1942 the Germans were lucky in the sense that their plan, without assuming this in advance, somehow cut off the plans of Timoshenko and Khrushchev.

The Germans did not launch a general offensive at the end of May - Operation Blau began only on June 28, 1942. However, the deployment of their formations preparing for Operation Blau turned out to be very beneficial for striking at the base of the Soviet strike and forming the Izyum "bag". In fact, the Germans, one way or another, planned to liquidate the Barvenkovsky ledge, which was inconvenient for them, during Operation Friederikus by the forces of the 1st Panzer and 6th Armies before the start of the general offensive. The start of Operation Friederikus was planned – even before our offensive – for May 18, 1942.

That is, I repeat, here the Russian "spit", without knowing it, found a German "stone". We struck first, not knowing that the Germans had already prepared to deliver a two-sided strike under the base of the Barvenkovo ledge.

Although Oleg Kazachkovsky, whom I mentioned more than once, fought in that war not as a marshal, but as a major, he knew how to think and analyze, like any intelligent scientist. Therefore, it is worth giving his later assessment of the events in which he was a participant:

"... apparently, our command did not take into account that the Germans also intended to launch a massive offensive ... right here, in the south. Large operational reserves were concentrated here... The global balance of forces in this area, as it later became clear (emphasis in bold italics mine. - S.K.), was far from in our favor."

That's exactly what - "how then ...". It is easy to be a strategist, seeing the battle not just from the outside, but also from a distance of decades, when all plans are known, when mountains of scientific monographs and memoirs are written on both sides...

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Yes, in the course of our offensive Timoshenko did not catch in time the turn of the situation in favor of the enemy. Yes, the General Staff already considered it necessary to curtail the offensive and go on the defensive in threatened areas, but Timoshenko did not heed the recommendations and convinced Stalin that he was about to take Kharkov, and there ...

But, firstly, if the General Staff was so far-sighted, it could urgently send reserves to Timoshenko, convincing Stalin of that. After all, it was about the fate of the most important operation!

Secondly, it "later" it became known that the Germans were also going to attack and that they had many troops here preparing for their own offensive. And then it was unknown neither to Timoshenko, nor to Vasilevsky with Shaposhnikov and Zhukov, nor to Stalin.

Yes, in real time, when no one in the Soviet Headquarters knew this, Timoshenko could be considered the main culprit of the disaster, which Stalin did. But to throw all the blame on the allegedly "talentless" Timoshenko and "even more talentless Stalin" today, decades later, when everything is already known?

Sorry, but this does not smack of scientific analysis, but of its profanation or deliberate falsification.

However, we were talking about Commander Timoshenko. And what about Khrushchev? After all, he was only a member of the Military Council. He could only advise, but did not prepare operational orders.

And here we can finally return to the diary of L.P. Beria.

Apart from a few very stingy and not very decipherable entries, the diary does not contain any detailed assessments of the current situation in the Kharkov region, and this is alarming. Khrushchev's lacunae are not excluded here.

It is possible that Khrushchev's "censors" retained a number of secondary records to mask the removal of a number of important records highlighting Khrushchev's role in the failure of our attack on Kharkov.

But was it negative and significant? Well, Tymoshenko from a historical distance is very strictly su

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can't eat. Why condemn Khrushchev severely and lay the blame for the Kharkov catastrophe on him? It seems to be nothing!

And if so, did the Khrushchevites need to clean up something in Beria's diaries during the analyzed period?

So, I think that there was a need, because the role of Khrushchev in the failure of our attack on Kharkov turned out, as I understand it, to be both extremely negative and significant. This is confirmed not only by military-historical, but also by psychological analysis.

By the way, Kirill Semyonovich Moskalenko (1902-1985), the future Marshal, and in the spring of 1942 the commander of the 38th Army of the Southwestern Front, later recalled that when discussing the upcoming operation in April 1942, "a member of the Military Council N.S. Khrushchev stated that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin himself set before the troops of the front ... a task and that this alone is a guarantee of success ... "

It is indicative that further Moskalenko wrote as follows: "I must say that this message, which later, however, was not confirmed (emphasis in bold italics mine. - S.K.), then sounded very encouraging ..."

The same Moskalenko testified: "The spirit of optimism ... soared at the command post of the front ... The Military Council no longer considered the enemy dangerous." Accordingly, Timoshenko and Khrushchev actually misinformed Stalin, and even when, already during the offensive, Stalin expressed his fears regarding the Kramatorsk group of Germans, Timoshenko and Khrushchev assured him that there were no grounds for stopping the operation.

Not without reason, from the rostrum of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev outlined that situation, swapping himself and Stalin and assuring that it was he, the strategist Khrushchev, who persuaded Stalin to allow the troops to go on the defensive, and Stalin allegedly did not agree. In 1956, the thief's hat was on fire!

Khrushchev by nature was a scoundrel and an adventurer, but - it happens in the world! - brilliantly knew how to hide it! To hide it so that neither Stalin nor Beria, nor the future supposedly "anti-party" group of Molotov, Ma

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Lenkov and Kaganovich. I don't know what explains this, but perhaps the fact that Khrushchev, especially when he was still in a subordinate position, possessed - this must be admitted for him - a huge natural charm. He knew how to persuade! Even Stalin (!) succumbed to his chatter many times.

What can we say about the sluggish Marshal Timoshenko, all the more so when he was tempted by pictures of a future triumph by a member of the Politburo!

Here comes the attack. It is developing successfully, and one can understand the feelings of the Ukrainian Tymoshenko, the Ukrainian (actually) Khrushchev, the Ukrainian Kazachkovsky and, in general, everyone who attacks KHARKOV! And there is the Dnieper! But the situation is getting more complicated. Kharkov is within easy reach, but we must go over to the defensive...

It was here that Khrushchev's charm, combined with his very high political status, could have influenced the position of Marshal Timoshenko. And certainly influenced - decisively and tragically. Timoshenko was not very lucky in that war. Two of the three former Commanders-in-Chief of the Strategic

in 1941 marshals Voroshilov and Budyonny were already written off by the war by the spring of 1942 "in circulation".

Timoshenko remained, and humanly one can understand how he did not want to go on the defensive, when the optics could already make out the factory chimneys of Kharkov. And then there is the active pressure of Khrushchev. And the count went on for days, and then for hours ...

But who could know what was, in fact, between two people: the commander-in-chief and his member of the Military Council? If anyone could, then only an organ independent of the army command - the Special Department of the South-Western Front. An objective view was also provided by special departments of armies, corps, divisions, regiments.

And the information from the special officers went not to the NGOs and not to the General Staff, but to the NKVD, whose structure included the Special Departments. In other words, complete, accurate, impartial, that is, objective information went to Beria. And Beria objectively informed Stalin. And he could not write down something in his personal diary. And, soon

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above all, wrote it down. That is why the Khrushchevites needed gaps in the diary here too.

On the other hand, this special knowledge of Beria, due to his special systemic position, could not but cause Khrushchev's hidden irritation, which was only intensified by the fact that outwardly he was on almost friendly terms with Beria.

As we can see, Khrushchev's secret hatred for Beria, which most likely arose after the start of the war, could only grow stronger during the war.

And definitely got stronger.

The time will come, and this factor will also prove fatal for the fate of Beria.

21/U--42

Koba works as usual, but it is clear that he is worried. Let Tymoshenko and Khrushchev down. Strongly failed.

Lately, I've been visiting Koba all the time with Georgy. Vyacheslav is gone, Koba says, now you are my main support. During this time, George and I became close friends.

I spin worse than a year ago. Spinning on all lines. Koba again does not trust anyone, demands that every day I prepare data on the reports of the front-line Special Departments. Says only from
Chekists

After the departure of V.M. Molotov On May 19, 1942, for negotiations with the Anglo-Saxons, Stalin conferred with L.P. Beria and G.M. Malenkov, without taking anyone else into the conversation, on May 20, May 21, May 23, May 24, May 25, 1942. On the night of May 26-27, they were the last to leave Stalin's office together with Voroshilov - at 0.35. From 19.00 to 20.30 they took part in the meeting of the Politburo, where, in addition to them, there were Shcherbakov, Andreev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Kalinin. Then everyone except Beria, Malenkov and Voroshilov left, and Stalin held a meeting with the military. On May 28, June 1, June 2, June 4, 1942, Beria and Malenkov were the only ones whom Stalin detained when the rest were already leaving his office... Especially in 1942, this became a fairly common practice: meetings Stalin only with Molotov, Malenkov and Beria.

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you will achieve the truth (so in the text. - S.K.). Vasilevsky also praised. He says that your special officers, Lavrenty Pavlovich, help us a lot. Troops don't always tell the truth, and your people

inform accurately. Thank you.

Finally appreciated. They think my guys only write carts on them. And without them, they are like blind kittens. From Selivanovsky 'I receive reports two, or even three times a day'.

Fucking business.

30/U-42

Did you see Khrushchev for the first time today? Was with Koba. I didn't recognize him, no face, black. Twisted the man. Think it's your own fault. Say offended. Mykyta has no sense of humor, I have known this for a long time. Have him humor ambition replaces. And so he is a good friend, we are friends with him. But now it's better not to approach. He looked at me sourly. It even seemed to look evil. OK.

1 Selivanovsky Nikolai Nikolaevich (1901-1997), one of the leaders of the state security agencies. In 1930 he graduated from the Higher Special School of the OGPU and worked in the Special Departments. From October 1941, head of the Special Department of the Southwestern Front, from August 1942, head of the Special Department of the Stalingrad Front. Under Minister of State Security V.S. Abakumov was the 1st Deputy Minister of State Security. He enjoyed the trust of both Abakumov and Beria. In June 1953 he was transferred to the reserve.

2 This phrase confirms that Beria had the most accurate information about the development of the situation near Kharkov, and only through him - Stalin.

Khrushchev, having arrived from the front, was at a meeting with Stalin shortly before "his" offensive - on April 29, 1942. The next time he appeared there, at a meeting, already after the catastrophe - on May 30, 1942. Timoshenko entered to Stalin's office only on June 20, 1942.

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9/U1-42

Time flies. Every day at Koba's, Georgy too'. When Vyacheslav was there, Koba pulled less, and here you sit at all meetings. I'm getting tired. Well, Vyacheslav should arrive soon.

12/U1-42

Vyacheslav returned*. Koba says it would have been a different time, they would have been met like a hero from a flight*. Tells interesting things. Says America is strength. He says he knew that a rich country, but did not expect to see this. They live well, we will not live so soon.

And he didn't bring anything special. The main thing is that there will be no Second Front. X..evo we have to. They ration chocolate there, but we don't have enough bread. Well there is no way. We'll have to do it ourselves."

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

This entry in the personal diary of L.P. I will illustrate Beria with an entry in the official diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, Colonel General Franz Halder, about the meeting held by Hitler in Poltava on July 3, 1942 from 7.00 to 9.00. Hitler then said:

GM. Malenkov together with L.P. Beria during the war formed the most, perhaps, well-coordinated tandem in Stalin's inner circle. Only Molotov spent more time in Stalin's office during the first two years of the war than Malenkov and Beria.

Molotov returned after a flight to England and the USA. See entry dated May 14, 1942 and commentary to it.

On June 312, 1942, Molotov returned from Washington to Moscow, flying over the ocean with landings in Newfoundland, Iceland and England, and crossing the front line at high altitude already

over our territory.

"Cm. comment below.

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"...Washington only consoles and reassures. No real second front. The proposal is to count on 1943. Churchill's behavior is the best proof.

A red herring in the West? Doubtful; obviously, no serious promises will be made to Russia. Rather, they will warn of the need to fight further ... "

After Molotov returned to Moscow on June 12, 1942, an Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiqué was published on the results of negotiations between the USSR, Britain and the USA, which stated that "full agreement was reached regarding the urgent tasks of the second front in Europe in 1942". However, Hitler, as we see, understood that from the side of the Anglo-Saxons it was just chatter.

Around the same time, Churchill (naturally - not publicly) said:

"The accusations that we are "ready to fight to the last Russian soldier" have absolutely no effect on me..."

The Anglo-Saxons realized that Hitler was firmly bogged down in Russia, and now a war of attrition between Germany and Russia is starting. Regardless of the outcome of this confrontation (as well as the degree of exhaustion of England), the self-serving interests of the United States could be considered already secured. America was preparing to come to Europe as the arbiter of its destinies by the force of no longer weapons, but the dollar, fed on the blood and sweat of Europeans on both sides of the front.

Churchill himself only obediently followed the course of the United States, also because by 1942 England was completely dependent on Lend-Lease supplies, remaining in debt to the United States like silk.

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1/UP-42

A note came from Zbarsky! He asks to send an authoritative commission to control the work to preserve the body of Ilyich. "Agreed with Burdenkoz. Zbarsky will not return to Moscow soon. I told Burdenko that they should work."

13 / UP-42 A year ago, the generals suspected .. whether, and again too. We retreat again. We do not even retreat, but we roll. goli

1Zbarsky Boris Ilyich (1885-1954), biochemist, academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Hero of Socialist Labor (1945), laureate of the Stalin Prize (1944). Educated at Geneva and St. Petersburg Universities. Founder of the Biochemical Institute, head of work on embalming and preservation of the body V.I. Lenin.

2At the beginning of July 1941, in connection with the possible bombing of Moscow, it was decided to evacuate the body of V.I. Lenin from the Mausoleum to a safe place (Tyumen was chosen). B.I. Zbarsky (see note 2 to this diary entry), in a memorandum addressed to Beria, gave the appropriate explanations, and on July 4, 1941 at 19.00, the special squad, guarded by 5 officers and 15 soldiers, left the Kazan station for Tyumen. In the refrigerated car there was a coffin made of plane trees, the walls of which were impregnated with paraffin, and the sealing grooves were filled with vaseline.

Zburdenko Nikolai Nilovich (1876-1946), famous surgeon, founder of neurosurgery, academician, colonel general of the medical service (1944), laureate of the Stalin Prize (1941), Hero of Socialist Labor (1943), member of the Royal Society and many academies. Member of the CPSU (b) since 1939, since 1941 chief surgeon of the Red Army.

On July 13 and 14, 1942, a commission of academicians A.I. Abrikosova, N.N. Burdenko and A.D. Speransky, who noted the high level of work. In November 1943, the commission again arrived in Tyumen and drew up a new act. N.N. Burdenko then said: "My impression is that this is the greatest experiment in anatomy and biochemistry."

Only on March 25, 1945, a special train of 9 cars left Tyumen for Moscow and arrived in the capital three days later. September 16, 1945 Mausoleum of V.I. Lenin was reopened.

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kov! zasr..net. Timoshenko and Mykyta did not draw any conclusions either. They were lucky that Koba believes in a person to the last, if only not a traitor. And forgive fools.

Koba says: "Where can I get so many smart ones? Let x..evo command, but at least somehow. You can't immediately put a person from a division to the front; you need to have experience. Now it is not we who promote, but the war who promotes, whom it pushes."

It's a pity, but he speaks the truth.

Our people are golden if you organize them. And do not organize, the crowd. I saw in October 1941. What I saw, I will not forget until the end of my life. Moscow is a big city, every creature in pairs. A lot of sensible people, but of ... not too many. When the Germans were near Moscow, this was well manifested. The panic was very dangerous. And they got lost in the regions. Only the state of siege set things right. Stalingrad is evacuated, others

'Golikov Philip Ivanovich (1900-1980), military leader, participant in the Civil War. Graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1933, before the war - head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, in July-September 1941 was on a military mission in the USA and England. Fought near Moscow. From April 1942 - Commander of the Bryansk Front, then the Voronezh Front and Deputy Commander of the Stalingrad Front. The figure is ambiguous, from the second period of the war on the third planes. In "his" "memoirs", Khrushchev speaks badly of Golikov, but under Khrushchev, from 1958 he held the most important post of head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, in 1961-1966. - Member of the Khrushchev Central Committee of the CPSU.

2Commanding the Southwestern Front after the Kharkov disaster in 1942, S.K. Timoshenko, like N.S. Khrushchev, did not draw serious conclusions from his mistakes, and this was one of the reasons that in the summer of 1942 the German offensive in the south developed successfully again.

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goe business. They are crossing the Volga, but there is no particular panic. Chuyanov! Well done.

Koba asks: "How is it in Stalingrad? How was it in Moscow?"

I say "on the whole it's fine, Comrade Stalin. Stalingrad is not Moscow, a strong, working city. Then the name obliges.

Koba looked, grunted. He says: "This name obliges not only Stalingrad. It obliges everyone, but me first of all. You don't give me a slogan, but information."

I told him: "The information is accurate, the situation is disturbing, but calm, without much panic. Factories are working.

He says don't panic at all. I will call Chuyanov, let the production not be curtailed. Let people be evacuated, but tanks are needed, let them work. Give me the exact details.

I promised I would. Selivanovskiy must be connected."

19 / UP-42 The guys from the Special Department of the Volkhov Front came out of the encirclement and report a shitty but-

Chuyanov Alexey Semenovich (1905-1977), party leader. Graduated from the Moscow Institute of Chemical Technology of the Meat Industry. From June 1938 to April 1946, 1st Secretary of the Stalingrad Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in 1941-1943. Chairman of the Stalingrad City Defense Committee. He died in Moscow and was buried on Mamaev Kurgan in Stalingrad.

Selivanov Nikolai Nikolaevich (1901-1997), one of the heads of state security agencies. In 1930 he graduated from the Higher Special School of the OGPU and worked in the Special Departments. From October 1941, head of the Special Department of the Southwestern Front, from August 1942, head of the Special Department of the Stalingrad Front.

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vost. The commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Vlasov, behaved strangely. He was surrounded, ordered to destroy all radio stations. I didn't gather people, even the commanders dispersed in all directions.

The head of the Special Department, Shashkov, was seriously wounded and shot himself. That's right, our Chekist brother has no other choice.

There is no exact data about Vlasov. The Germans openly reported in their report that Lieutenant General Vlasov had been taken prisoner in the Volkhov Ring. Maybe they are lying, I need to clarify. I'll have to report to Kobe."

We are finishing the laying of the Pechora road. Necessary.

6/USH-42

I had to become a strategist. Not from a good life. We sit at Koba, we think. Have you lost Crimea, are the Germans advancing and going to the Caucasus? Branch to Stalingrad. And they are going well. Now the head of Lawrence came in handy. And things are x..e. I think I need to go to Tbilisi. Koba says wait, you're needed here.

I do not argue, it is needed here. And there too. Lawrence here, Lawrence there. Where are the generals? If we

ÿL.P. Beria informed Stalin about the possible capture of General Vlasov (the same, the largest open traitor of that war) in a special message dated July 21, 1942. By that time, Vlasov was really captured (more precisely, surrendered) on July 12, 1942.

Sevastopol fell after 250 days of extremely heroic defense on July 4, 1942.

On June 328, 1942, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Halder, began writing in his service diary with the words: "Operation Blau has begun. Weichs speaks... By the end of July, the Germans were at Rostov, Paulus's 6th Army was successfully advancing towards Stalingrad in the bend of the Don. In a matter of days, Stalingrad became a front-line city. By the beginning of August 1942, the Germans occupied the Kuban, went to Maikop, Novorossiysk, having Grozny and Tuapse in the short term.

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so they worked in the People's Commissariat, a German would have reached the Urals by now. They pretend to be Macedonian, but what the hell, phone in hand and swear. You swear, but for the cause. Then things will work out.

Kobe said, I believe that we have not yet selected full front-line personnel, especially in the front-army-corps link. He shrugged his shoulders, but seemed to agree. Whom I mean did not ask.

15/USh-42

Anders! finally zae..al. Churchill's arrival (so in the text. - S.K.) only warmed them up? Well, them .. with them, let them go .. to their Englishmen to some .. some mother '.

Commander of the Polish army formed in the USSR.

From 12 to 16 August 1942, Churchill was in Moscow, holding talks with Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov, with the participation of Averell Harriman as a representative of US President Roosevelt. The talks were also attended by the British Ambassador to the USSR, Sir A. Kerr, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir A. Brooke, and the Permanent Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of England (actual Minister) Sir A. Cadogan, as well as a number of Soviet figures (V.A. Malyshev, A.I. Mikoyan, A.I. Shakhurin, F.I. Golikov, etc.).

In August 1942, we allocated 181,500,000 rubles (not Putin's, but Stalin's!) for the formation of Anders' army, plus property and services – for another 5,517,348 rubles. In his circle, Anders admitted: "No other state would do for us what the Soviet state did for us..." However, Anders did not rush to the Soviet-German front, but he made plans for an armed breakthrough into Iran through the Afghan or the Iranian border in case of refusal of the Soviet leadership to release the Poles there. As a result, on August 31, 1942, an evacuation protocol was signed. At this time, on the outskirts of Stalingrad, for a month and a half (since July 17), the Battle of Stalingrad flared up. By September 1, 1942, the evacuation was completed. About 80,000 servicemen and more than 37,000 members of their families left the USSR. Many Poles from Anders' army died in 1943 in Italy near Monte Cassino, where the British let them go ahead as cheap "cannon fodder".

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Koba said so, let these Aniki warriors rush out to the e..any mother. He said, crap before the battle, so let them wipe themselves with Sikorsky's telegram!

18/USh-42

Time is not funny, but they laughed. Koba said my advice on Churchill came in handy. Churchill (so in the text. - S.K.) agreed, got drunk and swam. Koba talked and laughed. Vyacheslav also laughed and Klim also laughed.

Then Koba said: "It's good when you know the enemy's weaknesses in advance,"

Vyacheslav is now Koba's first deputy? It is clear that this is to strengthen the weight of the allies. So that they don't think that Churchill himself travels, and Roosevelt travels himself, while Stalin sits in Moscow and decides everything. Let them think that Vyacheslav is the second figure.

And so we have one figure, but this is not Churchill or Roosevelt for you. They cannot be compared to Koba. Only he can pull. No matter how you look at it, he can't live without me either.

On August 17, 1942, the London "Prime Minister of the Polish Republic", General Sikorsky, sent a telegram to Stalin on the occasion of the anniversary of the Soviet-Polish agreement, where he wrote: "...I believe that the implementation of this Agreement ... together with the brotherhood of arms uniting the Polish soldier, pilot and sailor with the Army and Navy of the USSR, will become the basis of our future neighborly cooperation within the framework of the united peoples." In the light of the treacherous flight of Anders's army from Russia, this phrase looked simply mocking.

See comment below.

This is little known, but on August 16, 1942, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, V.M. Molotov was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin.

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Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

I would hardly have been able to decipher the meaning of this entry if one day, quite by chance, I had not seen on one of the television channels a documentary about Winston Churchill's stay in Moscow in August 1942. It was said that Stalin really pestered Churchill about opening a second front. Churchill was furious and was about to break off the negotiations and leave, when Stalin suggested: "Why don't we have a drink?"

Churchill was always not a fool to drink and agreed. So the knowledge of Churchill's weakness helped Stalin save the situation.

After reading the entry in the diary of L.P. Beria, I remembered this story and thought: "How did Stalin know about this weakness of his negotiating partner? Was it not Beria who prepared the appropriate dossier for the Supreme Commander in advance? And acquaintance with him advised Stalin to make a very successful proposal to Churchill at a time when the negotiations were in jeopardy.

It looks like it was.

On August 18, 1942, when Churchill had already left for London, quite a few people passed through Stalin's office. However, from 00:30 on the night of August 18-19, 1942, only Molotov, Voroshilov (who participated both in the negotiations that had just ended and in the feast) and Beria remained in his office.

And Stalin, as we see, praised Beria and told him how the information of the NKVD helped to effectively eliminate the emerging discord between the leaders of the USSR and England.

19/USh-42 I'm leaving for the Caucasus!. Georgy has already left." The situation is difficult, Koba said: "Special powers

ÿÿ August 20 to September 16, 1942 L.P. Beria traveled as a member of the State Defense Committee to the Caucasus region.

GM. Malenkov, together with G.K. Zhukov also left for the Stalingrad region as a member of the GKO and returned to Moscow only at the beginning of October 1942.

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I do not grant you, you have enough rights as a member of the GOKO, and even without this in Tiflis, all your Life gives you all the rights. I don't ask you Lavrenty whether you will surrender the Caucasus or not, because I know you will not surrender. I ask you one thing, don't rely too much on the Center. What we can, we will give, but do it yourself. You know every hole in the Caucasus, and everyone knows you. So you don't have to look for people and reserves, you know everything. Ride, fight and win."

This is how I'll leave. Maybe I'll lay down my head, war is war. Vyacheslav said, so you had to fly.

Yes, though not across the ocean, but to fly far away." Vasily should also be dragged there, I told him so, get ready. We will fight together, a good company is picking up there, and Ivan* is already there.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Beria was sent by Stalin to the Caucasus at the moment when the Wehrmacht operation "Blau" successfully entered the phases "Blau-Y" (attack on Stalingrad) and "Blau-N" (offensive to the Caucasus from

access to Baku).

See comment below.

2From Moscow to Tbilisi, Beria and his "team" traveled on transport planes through Central Asia. A direct flight was impossible: the route would run through the zone of active hostilities.

Of course, this refers to Vasily Afanasyevich Khomenko, one of the leaders of the border troops of the NKVD, from June 22, 1941, deputy commander of the Southwestern Front for the protection of the rear. Then he commanded the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front, from December 4, 1941 - Deputy Commander of the Moscow Defense Zone. In 1942 he fought in the Caucasus. Killed in 1943

Maslennikov Ivan Ivanovich (1900-1954), one of the leaders of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union. From the beginning of the war he commanded a number of armies. From August 8, 1942, commander of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front.

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At first we lost the battles for the Caucasus. The Germans quite successfully advanced to the Caspian Sea along the North Caucasus - on the eastern side of the Caucasus Range, and to the Black Sea and the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus on the western side of the Caucasus Range. They occupied Maykop, Krasnodar, by the end of August captured Mozdok and approached Grozny. The Germans also saddled many mountain passes and created a threat to Sukhumi, in the future - Batumi and in general communications along the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.

On the Black Sea coast, the Germans captured the Taman Peninsula, Anapa, and in the first half of September, in fact, Novorossiysk, although the fighting in Novorossiysk greatly slowed down the German advance.

The situation was critical, and hardly anyone could have corrected it better than Beria. He knew the Caucasus comprehensively.

Since August 8, 1942, one of L.P. Berii - Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov, Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD for troops, hero of the battles for Smolensk and Moscow, and now commander of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front (since 1943 he became commander of the North Caucasian Front).

Soon, Vasily, mentioned in the diary entry of August 19, 1942, was also transferred to the Caucasus - V.A. Khomenko. From the end of 1941, he served as deputy commander of the Moscow Defense Zone, and on August 24, 1942, he was appointed commander of the 24th Army being formed, but already on August 28, Khomenko was ordered to transfer units and formations of the army to the 12th and 37th armies. Commander-24 himself, together with the command of the 24th Army, departed for the Transcaucasian Front at the disposal of Maslennikov. Soon the directorate of the 24th army was renamed into the directorate of the 58th army, and the task of Khomenko was to cover Makhachkala.

Beria really picked up a "good company" in the Caucasus. Soon Maslennikov and Khomenko received reinforcements not only in the person of their people's commissar himself, but also in the whole group of his active associates. Together with Beria, Merkulov, Kobulov, Sudoplatov flew to the Caucasus,

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Mamulov, Milshtein, Tsanova, Rukhadze, Vlodzimirsky, Karanadze, Kakuchaya - all of Beria's old Caucasian guard. They could get up to speed instantly. And of course, they came in, like Beria himself.

Already on August 27, 1942, at 23:20, Stalin and Vasilevsky, after the report of Beria, signed the Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No.

troops who ensured the combat operations" of the commander of the 46th Army, Major General Sergatskov and his deputy for the rear, brigade commander Kislitsyn.

The same directive appointed Major General Leselidze as the new commander of the 46th Army, and another of Beria's cadres, border colonel Piyashev, who had previously commanded the 7th division of the NKVD troops of the USSR, was appointed his deputy.

Beria had an accurate eye for footage. Both before and after being removed from the army, Vasily Sergatskov (1898-1975), a former senior lecturer at the Academy of the General Staff, fought moderately. From the post of commander of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps in January 1944, he was "for health reasons" transferred to "command" the department of general tactics of the Frunze Academy.

But the "godson" of Beria, General Leselidze (1903-1944), having started the war on the Western Front as the head of artillery of the 2nd Rifle Corps, fought bravely near Moscow, after the Caucasus he fought in the Kuban, in Ukraine, in 1943 he became a general colonel. He was mortally wounded and died on February 21, 1944. Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously).

The same age as Leselidze, the future Marshal Andrey Grechko, who was appointed commander of the 47th Army on September 8, 1942, became Beria's "godson" as well. True, later about such a "kinship" Grechko kept quiet.

I will not analyze in detail the operational situation on the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts by the time Beria appeared in Tbilisi, but simply give an assessment of the situation given by the "Khrushchev" 6-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War". There, on page 461, volume 2, it says:

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"The command of the German army group "A" believed that the Soviet troops in operations in the North Caucasus had lost their combat capability and could no longer offer significant resistance. Therefore, from mid-August, the enemy began to regroup troops in order to simultaneously develop an offensive against Baku and Batumi. The 1st Panzer Army was deploying with a front to the southeast and was supposed to advance ... in the direction of Grozny ~ Makhachkala - Baku. The 17th Army received the task of advancing from the Krasnodar region to Novorossiysk, capturing it and developing an offensive along the Black Sea coast to Sukhumi-Batumi. The 491st mountain rifle corps was supposed to strike from the Cherkessk region through the passes of the Main Caucasian Range, reach the Sukhumi region and contribute to the breakthrough of the 17th Army to the Black Sea coast.

On August 18, fighting began in the passes ... "

That was the situation when Beria was once again the first figure in Transcaucasia. He knew everyone here, and everyone knew him, so everything immediately accelerated in all directions. So, already on August 27, immediately after the removal of Sergatskov, the headquarters of the 46th Army was moved closer to the front line - from Kutaisi to Sukhumi.

Beria also shook up the 52-year-old commander of the Transcaucasian Front, General of the Army Ivan Vladimirovich Tyulenev. Tyulenev later wrote (without mentioning Beria's name, of course):

"Some of us considered the main task of the troops to be the defense of the Black Sea coast, where the main forces of the 46th Army were deployed.

Only the intervention of the Headquarters corrected our mistake. On instructions from Moscow, we developed a new plan for the defense of the passes of the Main Caucasian Range: it was divided into areas headed by experienced commanders and staffs.

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Tyulenev sets out such a concept of defense, behind which Beria is immediately visible. I think it was not without Beria that on September 1, 1942, Stalin also made the decision to unite the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian Fronts into one Transcaucasian Front.

It was necessary to create a defense in depth. And during August and September 1942, five or six defensive lines were built on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, Grozny and Makhachkala, and more than ten on the approaches to Baku. 90,000 people of the local population were mobilized for this construction every day. And everything was "tied" to GKO member L.P. Beria.

The internal troops of the NKVD today are often portrayed as a bunch of "guards" or ruthless "protectors". Historians did not really like the troops of the NKVD even earlier. However, even Brezhnev's "History of the Second World War" in 1975 could not fail to note (vol. 5, p. 227) that "Grozny, Makhachkala, Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Sukhumsкая and Tbilisi Rifle Divisions of the Internal Troops of the NKVD.

Five stable divisions! In that situation, each of them cost at least two "ordinary" ones! And Beria, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, threw them into battle.

However, as a rule, he did not get involved in operational decisions - where and what units to send, how to plan strikes, etc. He himself was so professional in what he was professional at that he always respected professionalism in others. Unless, of course, I saw a professional in a person, and not a weakling.

However, even in a purely military, partly even - military, attitude, Beria also turned out to be not bad. However, without exaggeration, the role of Beria in organizing rear support for the front was outstanding. I will again resort to an extensive quotation from the 6-volume "History of ... War" from Denmark in 1961, volume 2 (the editorial committee of which INCLUDED Beria's "godson" Grechko):

"... On September 9, martial law was declared in the republics of Transcaucasia.

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Due to the fact that the main communications connecting Transcaucasia with the industrial regions of the country were intercepted by the enemy, in Transcaucasia, on the instructions of the State Defense Committee, the plan for the production of military products was increased ... Many enterprises, especially local industries, were completely transferred for the production of ammunition, weapons and equipment for the army... The increase in the production of military materials in the Transcaucasian republics allowed the State Defense Committee to reduce centralized supplies to the troops defending the Caucasus. The troops stationed in Transcaucasia now received from the industrial centers of the country only the most important types of military equipment - aircraft, tanks, guns. Mortars, machine guns, grenades, cartridges, various equipment and uniforms were produced on the spot."

But after all, all this was done in Transcaucasia during Beria's stay there and, to a large extent, due to his stay there. Of course, we are talking about the efforts of millions of people. But the initial impetus for these efforts came from the leader. In the autumn of 1941, he was enriched with new experience as a curator of defense production, and now he used it, as they say, "to the fullest".

And now another quote. Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev, head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, writes in his memoirs:

"... Simultaneously with the Battle of Stalingrad, a grandiose battle for the Caucasus unfolded. Moreover, on a huge front stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. And if the supply of weapons and ammunition to our troops in the Stalingrad region was difficult, then the Caucasian epic in this respect was generally unsurpassed in its complexity...

The industrial enterprises of Transcaucasia also worked with a huge load. Under the direction of

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The Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (whose work was led by Beria. - S.K.), they, having switched to military production, gave the front thousands of guns, mortars and ammunition.

It's hard to believe, but it happened. Somehow I was informed that something similar to an equipment factory had been created in Baku. Moreover, on the basis of ... urban salvage. And in Tbilisi, the building of the slaughterhouse was adapted for this. And in such and such "factories", 647 thousand hand grenades, 1.2 million mines, 549.5 thousand artillery shells were equipped during five months of work!"

Yakovlev exclaims: "Is this not a manifestation of the selfless devotion of the working people of Transcaucasia to their socialist homeland!" Yes, that's right! But this is also another proof of how Beria skillfully organized these workers.

Beria was in the Caucasus for less than a month, but he ensured a turning point in the situation. It is interesting to see how the tone of the entries in the service diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, Halder, changed.

August 7, 1942: "Certain successes at the front. On the eastern flank, our troops penetrated deeply into the Caucasus.

August 22, 1942: "... our flag is raised on Elbrus."

August 25, 1942: "All Quiet in the Caucasus."

August 26, 1942: "No change in the Caucasus."

August 31, 1942: "... (in the mountains) no change."

September 8, 1942: "... The insufficient advance of Army Group A seriously disappoints the Führer ... If the commander is convinced ... that inflicting the main blow with the forces of the 4th Mountain Division, he cannot break through to the coast, then let him leave this venture ... "

September 15, 1942: "Army Group A: No progress. Kleist must pull back his strike wing, thus he will defuse the situation on the eastern wing ... "

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That is, by the end of September 1942, the situation had relatively stabilized. On September 25, the Germans wanted to break through to Tuapse, but it did not work out. On October 25, as a result of a powerful offensive in the North Caucasus, the Germans occupied Nalchik and by November 2 reached the approaches to Ordzhonikidze. However, on November 6, the reserves of the Northern Group launched a counterattack, and the situation stabilized here as well.

After about a month and a half, the defense was replaced by a confident Soviet offensive.

18 1X-42

Returned to Moscow. Things in Stalingrad are worse than ever. I make a request to the Special Department, I ask "Will the city be surrendered?" They answer: "People are burning like matches, but the city will not be surrendered."

I say, you don't give me propaganda, but information. They swear they give information. So I'll report to Kobe.

231-42

Today, for the first time in my life, I saw tears in Koba's eyes. He reported on Stalingrad how people fight. In the 13th Guards Division, General Rodimtsev had 500 active bayonets left. This is for

a week of fighting. And there were more than 10,000 bayonets. In the 10th divi

113th Guards Order of Lenin Rifle Division of General A.I. On the night of September 11, 1942, Rodimtseva made a rush by car from the Kamyshin region to the Middle Akhtuba region and at night.

On September 15, she began crossing the right bank of the Volga to the center of Stalingrad. On September 15, the division entered the battle as part of the 62nd Army of General V.I. Chuikova and by the end of the day advanced to Mamaev Kurgan, and on September 16 recaptured Mamaev Kurgan. The days from 18 to 15 September 1942 were the most difficult for Stalingraders - this was later noted by everyone, from a soldier to a marshal. And the heroic death of the 183rd Guards Division during a week of fighting speaks for itself.

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zii NEVD left 60 active bayonets. What kind of guys are dying'. I report to Kobe, I look, and his tears flow. I stand like a fool, I don't know what's next. Well, Vyacheslav came in, then Anastas and the conversation started.

I write, and again goosebumps. When I get to the point, I will mother, it's immediately easier. And he keeps the brand, but what to do with his heart? Could not resist. Well it's one on one.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

On September 23, 1942, Beria not only verbally informed Stalin about the critical situation in Stalingrad, but also sent him a summary No. 1614/B according to the Special Department of the South-Eastern Front Colonel General A.I. Eremenko - S.K.), where it was reported that by September 22, the 62nd Army of General Chuikov was cut into three parts, etc.

Here in this Stalingrad summary L.P. Beria and were placed next to each other two formations from those branches of the armed forces that, decades after the war, turned out to be stepchildren of the Khrushchev-Brezhnev military

historiography. Then L.P. Beria said:

"... Our units inflict heavy losses on the enemy. Only in one district of the city center 25 enemy tanks were destroyed.

As a result of many days of stubborn fighting, our units also suffered heavy losses, mainly from enemy aircraft (in this the report of the Special Department was hardly so accurate, since the small distance between our and German troops no longer allowed active bombing of combat orders, but once again emphasize that the Germans have superiority in the Stalingrad sky,

See comment below.

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did not interfere. - S.K.). So, in the 13th Guards Rifle Division, 500 active bayonets remained; in the 10th division of the NKVD troops - 60 active bayonets: in the 42nd brigade - 20 bayonets. A similar situation in a number of other formations of the front ... "

The name of the commander of the 13th Guards Division, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Rodimtsev, was known at one time to every Soviet schoolboy. But the fact that at the beginning of its combat path this division was part of the airborne troops was already known to a few. As for the divisions of the NKVD, they were practically not mentioned, and in perestroika times they began to portray them as formations of almost front-line executioners, called upon to carry out the "repressive policy of Stalin and Beria" at the front.

In a real war, things were different. And semi-official historiography is guilty (among other things) of belittling (and almost hushing up) the prominent role in the Great Patriotic War of two large categories of Soviet soldiers - the border guards of the NKVD Beria and Soviet paratroopers. Perhaps we should also talk about the third category - the soldiers of the divisions of the internal troops of the NKVD, who bravely fought in that war.

Well, in particular - in the battle for the Caucasus.

The border and internal troops of the NKVD were directly subordinate to People's Commissar Beria, passing under the jurisdiction of the NPO only after being reorganized into rifle divisions. However, there is reason to believe that Beria is also related to the combat affairs of the Soviet paratroopers. But about the latter - a little later.

Border troops of the NKVD of the USSR for the development and strengthening of which the People's Commissar L.P. Beria did more than all the other statesmen in the entire history of the USSR combined, played a paramount strategic role in the history of the war twice.

The first time this happened was during the border battle of 1941. At that time, many army connections

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showed low combat stability, fled, and the front collapsed. At the same time, the state of affairs was often saved by the steadfastness of the border guards.

Border troops, by definition, are not designed to conduct serious hostilities. Their task is to protect the border and ensure its impenetrability in both directions in peacetime. With the beginning of the war, the border guards had to retreat to the rear of the troops to serve in the protection of the front rear. That is, with the beginning of the war, the border guards had to give up their place in the first echelon to the army. And it turned out that from June 22, 1941, the border guards largely took the place of the army, fighting for days where the army men could not stand even a few hours.

On the western borders, the number of border troops of the NKVD reached 100 thousand people by June 22, 1941. And, thanks to the efforts of People's Commissar Beria and his border associates, these were well-trained troops. I think that in June 1941 an average NKVD border guard cost at least five (or even ten) average Red Army soldiers of the Red Army and at least three average Wehrmacht privates. It was power!

And this force stood up to meet the German force! And played a strategic role in that war for the first time.

Then came the maneuverable period of the war, and by mid-July 1941 one could speak not of the Soviet-German front line, but rather of the front area. To transform this area into a line, new super-efforts of a strategic nature were required. However, many formations of the Red Army of the USSR were still unstable. And here on June 29, 1941, signed by Timoshenko, Stalin and Zhukov, the order of the Headquarters of the High Command No. 00100 was issued on the formation of 15 rifle and mechanized divisions from the personnel of the NKVD troops. Not for barrage, but for combat operations!

The combat core of all 15 divisions of the NKVD was formed by the best personnel of the border troops of the Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Central Asian, Turkmen and Trans-Baikal districts. From distant border

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Districts in the center of Russia in a matter of days arrived 3 thousand commanders and 10 thousand sergeants and privates.

I would like to note that this seemed to be a personnel "Asian" periphery, but even at the far borders, the level of training of border guards was no worse than "European", which was quickly proved by the combat activity of the NKVD divisions.

All fifteen divisions of the NKVD, formed as rifle divisions, went to where it was most difficult. Ten divisions (243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254 and 256th) - to the Western Front, five (265, 268, 262, 257 and 259th) - to the North Western front.

And these were not just unit numbers, and not even just full-fledged military formations. In July-August 1941, the border divisions of the NKVD became the backbone of our rebuff to the Wehrmacht. In 1941, they saved the situation, for example, in the battle of Smolensk, just as in 1942 in Stalingrad, it was saved by the airborne corps reorganized into guard divisions!

And this was the second case in 1941, when the actions of the border troops of the NKVD were of strategic importance for the course of the war. The cadres of Beria won where the cadres of Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Zhukov failed.

Could the "Marshals of Victory" later honestly admit this? Yes, even after Beria was officially declared a fiend!

Just as unlucky in the history of the war, the Soviet airborne troops, which have always aroused ambiguous feelings in the "ordinary" army command. On the one hand, they were considered to be the elite. On the other hand, it was good to admire the "air warriors" during the exercises, but during the war, the landing units had to be sent in full force behind the front line, where the marshals themselves could not get.

So command these, by definition, independent, "subordinates". If anything, you can't put them at attention, and you won't even be able to curse - there is no wired connection.

No, for the marshals, as I understand it, ordinary rifle units were closer and more familiar, sitting in the trenches.

As a special branch of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army did not play in

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that war of great importance. The largest Dnieper landing operation of 1943 was unsuccessful, and the landing operations of the winter of 1941/42 were private and also not very successful, including the Vyazemsky airborne operation, during which parachutes and landings from aircraft were parachuted into German rear 15 thousand people.

However, if we have in mind not the branch of service itself, but the personnel of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army, then they, moreover, as independent military formations, as a kind of military community, also played an outstanding strategic role during the war. They ensured the salvation of the situation near Stalingrad and in the city itself in the most difficult and acute period of the Battle of Stalingrad in September and October 1942.

By the beginning of the war, the Red Army had ten airborne corps, each numbering slightly more than an army division.

Here is the military fate of the main part of these corps ...

The 1st Airborne Corps of 37-year-old (in 1942) Major General Viktor Grigoryevich Zholudev was reorganized in July 1942 into the 37th Guards Rifle Division and as part of the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front (Commander Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov). The division fought in Stalingrad from the end of September 1942. During a month of fighting, it lost 99% of its personnel. Hero of the Soviet Union Zholudev died in 1944.

The 3rd Airborne Corps of 44-year-old (in 1942) Colonel Fyodor Alexandrovich Afanasyev in February 1942 was reorganized into the 33rd Guards Rifle Division and, as part of the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front, fought on the outskirts of Stalingrad:

The 4th Airborne Corps of General Alexander Fedorovich Kazankin was reorganized into the 38th Guards Rifle Division and fought near Stalingrad as part of the 1st Guards Army. Colonel A.A. became the division commander. Onufriev. Kazankin himself began to form the 4th VDK of the second formation.

The 5th airborne corps of the second formation of 40-year-old (in 1942) Major General Stepan Savelyevich Guryev was reorganized in early August 1942

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in the 35th Guards Rifle Division and as part of the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front fought heroically in Stalingrad. Hero of the Soviet Union Guryev died in 1945.

The 6th Airborne Corps was reorganized into the 40th Guards Rifle Division and, as part of the 1st Guards Army, fought near Stalingrad under the command of Major General A.I. Pastrevich.

The 7th Airborne Corps of 46-year-old (in 1942) Major General Iosif Ivanovich Gubarevich was reorganized into the 34th Guards Rifle Division in 1942 and fought on the outskirts of the 28th Army of the Stalingrad Front. to Stalingrad. Komdiv Gubarevich died in February 1943.

The 8th Airborne Corps of 41-year-old (in 1942) Major General Vasily Andreevich Glazkov was reorganized in 1942 into the 35th Guards Rifle Division and as part of the 62nd Army of the South-East (Stalingrad)) front from August 17, 1942 heroically fought in Stalingrad. Divisional Commander Glazkov died in the battle near Kuporosnaya Balka. 160 bullet and shrapnel holes were counted in his overcoat.

The 9th Airborne Corps of 43-year-old (in 1942) Major General Mikhail Ivanovich Denisenko in August 1942 was reorganized into the 36th Guards Rifle Division and fought heavy defensive battles as part of the 57th Army of the South-Western Front near Stalingrad. Later, Denisenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The 10th Airborne Corps of 45-year-old (in 1942) Major General Nikolai Petrovich Ivanov was reorganized in 1942 into the 41st Guards Rifle Division and fought on the outskirts of Stalingrad as part of the Stalingrad and then the Don Front . Commander Ivanov died in February 1943.

These airborne formations, reorganized into army divisions, received guards ranks and guards banners even before the first battle. This emphasized Stalin's confidence that the paratroopers would

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fight only heroically. I must say, they fought like that.

I will note in brackets that already in this unusual measure one can discern the style not only of Stalin, but also of Beria. So no one else could believe in honor of ordinary people, as these two outstanding Soviet leaders could!

Finally, about the 13th Guards Rifle Division of 37-year-old Alexander Ilyich Rodimtsev, about which Beria spoke to Stalin.

Awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for Spain (he received the second Gold Star in June 1945), Rodimtsev commanded the 5th airborne brigade of the 3rd airborne corps of the first formation at the beginning of the war. In October 1941, the Rodimtsev brigade, which did not leave the battles, was reorganized into the 87th rifle division, and Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Rodimtsev was appointed its commander. For outstanding service in the battles of 1941, on March 27, 1942, the 87th division was renamed the 13th guards division and awarded the Order of Lenin. Since the summer of 1942, she had been reorganized and left Kamyshev not only for Stalingrad, but also for immortality. By the way, the famous Stalingrad house of Pavlov is also from the combat history of the 13th Guards Division.

As you can see, not being able to influence the strategic course of the war from the air, the Soviet paratroopers made their own strategic contribution to the Victory on the ground. They fought one for ten! And it would not be an exaggeration to say that it was the airborne corps of the Red Army, transformed immediately (!) into guards rifle divisions and thrown onto the Stalingrad lines, in September-October 1942 that turned the tide of the Battle of Stalingrad and thus the course of the entire war.

However, this contribution was also, as it were, "smeared" over the general background of the Battle of Stalingrad.

Why?

I think there are several reasons for this. In particular, the explanation may be as follows. As in the case of the border troops, the "marshals of Victory" could not

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point out that the point was not that they had at their disposal in 1941 and 1942. there was no human material necessary for victories... There was material! It's just that marshals of fighters in ordinary combat units didn't prepare the fighters the way they should.

Although the best were selected for the paratroopers, the system of training of the Airborne Forces was of decisive importance, which, like in Beria's border troops, did not focus on the sandy paths in military camps - as in the entire Red Army, but on everyday combat and political training and on the ongoing development of the initiative. So far, I have deliberately kept silent about this, but for many paratroopers, for example, for the future Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Denisenko, the war began only in the summer or autumn of 1942 and directly from Stalingrad. Nevertheless, the paratroopers passed this test!

In addition, I think it was beneficial for the marshals to present the airborne divisions as ordinary rifle divisions, without emphasizing their special essence. Thus, the resilience of the paratroopers in 1942, as it were, was distributed over the entire Red Army.

Now here's what...

It is possible that the role of Soviet paratroopers in the battles of 1942 is also belittled because their combat fate could be associated with the name of Beria. I don't have documentary evidence to confirm this conjecture, but someone decided to implement a very non-standard idea: to use the landing units in that combat and moral "format", as it was done in Stalingrad.

Who could have thought of this? Command of the Red Army? General base? Very unlikely. But Beria, having brilliant experience with the formation of 15 rifle divisions from border guards in 1941, could have come up with the idea of using paratroopers to eliminate the crisis of 1942. Yes, and enriched her with the idea to immediately give them guards status. He could not do this for the border guards because in July 1941 there was no Soviet guard yet. And in 1942 it was, and among the guards there were several divisions of the NKVD.

Beria, all the more, could offer Stalin such an idea,

that hardly anyone better than the People's Commissar of the NKVD, to whom information flowed from the Special Departments of the Army and Navy, knew the true moral and political state of the Soviet troops. Even in the war, political workers, like party workers before the war, tried to embellish reality and more reported on the exploits and "high patriotic spirit of Soviet soldiers." Specialists told Beria the truth.

And the truth was that the army in 1942 was different. And the airborne corps were the most devoted to Soviet power, the most patriotic and at the same time organizationally united military formations. These were ready guards - before the battle!

So let's rename them into rifle divisions (so as not to confuse army generals), honor the banners of the guards, and these guys will perform miracles of resilience in the summer of 1942, as the NKVD border guards demonstrated in the summer of 1941. The idea and actions are very in the style of Beria!

By the way, five new guards divisions (from the 37th to the 41st) were merged in early August 1942 into the short-lived (it lay down near Stalingrad) 1st Guards Army, commanded by General K.S. Moskalenko. And a little later, in October 1942, border guard general Tarasov began to form a separate army of the NKVD troops from the personnel of the border and internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR. Then this army was renamed the combined arms 70th army and fought well (see letter dated October 20, 1942 and commentary by Knei).

The handwriting, as we see, is similar in both cases - Beria's. But if the Separate Army of the NKVD troops is definitely Beria's idea, then it will not be a stretch to assume that the idea of forming the 1st Guards Army from L.P. Beria also had a direct relationship. And if this is so, then the future belittling of the Khrushchevites, etc. The role of airborne divisions in the Battle of Stalingrad is quite understandable.

Yes, the history of the Great Patriotic War is full of facts of unprecedented betrayal (their

eclipsed only

perestroika betrayals of 1985-1991. and "post-perestroika" betrayals of 1991-2010), as well as unparalleled heroism. Yes, the Red Army from the first day of the war not only suffered defeats, but also won victories from the very first days of the war. However, on the whole, it then failed, because it was morally and ideologically heterogeneous. And the level of combat training of troops and command in different formations of the Red Army was very different.

And only two types of troops - the border and airborne troops, whose cadres were the best students of the era of Stalin and Beria, went down in the history of the war as the undisputed winners always and in everything! From the very beginning! These were the golden shots of Stalin, and how they were not enough after the war to ensure sustainable peaceful prospects for socialism!

2/X-42

I saw Vaska! I visited my father with the aviation command. Stronger. How do you fight, I ask? He says: "We are fighting over Stalingrad. So, guards. I can't do otherwise."

This, of course, is about the son of Stalin - Vasily Stalin (1921-1962), a pilot. In 1941-1942. He served in the Inspectorate of the Air Force of the Red Army, during the first period of the Battle of Stalingrad he was in the area of Stalingrad. On October 2 and 6, 1942, together with a number of other front-line aviators, he took part in meetings with Stalin.

Officially V.I. Stalin had 27 sorties and 2 downed aircraft during the war. However, it is very unlikely that the son of Stalin, being an excellent pilot (even before the war, had about 3 thousand flight hours), being near Stalingrad as an inspector in the 434th aviation

fighter regiment (IAP), commanded by his friend, Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Kleshchev, just watched from the ground as his friends go into battle and do not return from battle. Of course, Vasily Stalin fought in the sky of Stalingrad, but, as follows from the entry in the diary of L.P. Beria, flew on combat missions unofficially, without records of the flight in the flight book.

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I say, you can't fly, are you flying? What if they get hit? What, Jacob! few?

He was frightened, he says, out of friendship, the guys take me into battle, and I said not to write it down in the book. Don't betray your father, Lavrenty Pavlovich.

And so he looked that I did not want to, but promised that I would not betray him. The guy is hot, should he be returned to Moscow quietly?

3/X-42

While he was in Tbilisi, Vyacheslav prepared drafts of the GOKO Decree on uranium work. Koba said, the Decree is serious, let's give the Decree for now. Carried out by Order. I say to Koba: "Comrade Stalin, we already have a lot of information on uranium. I bet it's accurate."

He said, give me a summary, although there is no time, but it's time to read'.

\ The eldest son of Stalin - Yakov, the commander of an artillery battery, was captured in 1941 and died in captivity.

2For all the strictness of attitude in aviation to such a document as a flight book (any sortie, even a five-minute one, is entered there), the sorties of Stalin's son at that moment could not be officially recorded. For officially recorded sorties, both he and Kleshchev would have "flyed". In fact, a gross violation of reporting was the only reasonable and acceptable way out.

Zvasily Stalin did not stay in Moscow. In January 1943, after the death of Ivan Kleshchev in a plane crash, Stalin Jr. was appointed commander of the 32nd Guards IAP (former 434th IAP) and fought with him on the Kalinin Front.

On September 128, 1942, the Order of the State Defense Committee No. 2352ss "On the organization of work on uranium" was adopted, with the responsibility for carrying out work on the USSR Academy of Sciences (Academician Ioffe).

October 56, 1942 LP. Beria sent Stalin a letter No. 1720/B, the draft of which was ready as early as March 1942 and even earlier - in October 1941. To the letter was attached the Certificate of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR on the material "The use of uranium as an energy source and as an explosive.

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Time x .. eve, but the main thing was won. Further than the Fritz has gone, he will not go. Koba is sure that he will roll soon and already to the end. He said, that's all, we haven't really learned how to fight yet, but we will fight seriously. From Stalingrad to Berlin.

For uranium, they really will not do anything. The Academy office is not suitable for this business. Here we need a strong organization of business, here we need to set up an entire industry. Okay, until this.

George also returned. The main thing is he's alive. Conveyed greetings from Mykyta. Maybe it won't fail here?

13/X-42

I'm sewing up. There is a lot to do, even though everyone already has a mustache, but anyway, the answer is on me, Kobe can't justify that he didn't finish watching. "It will be necessary to think, should we divide the People's Commissariats again? Vsevolod will take his old bush, it will immediately become easier. Now it is not intelligence that decides, but it takes a lot of time. Here you need not to act, but to think. And when to think?

We need to think it over and offer Kobe. Special Departments can also be distinguished, as it was. General Staff

{From the second half of August to the beginning of October 1942 G.M. Malenkov was as a member of the GKO and a representative of the Headquarters in the Stalingrad region.

2See comment below.

3Judging by this entry, already in October 1942 Beria was planning a new division of the NKVD into the NKVD and the NKGB, which became a fact in April 1943.

It seems that these thoughts of his also coincided with Stalin's desire to somewhat narrow down the tasks of the NKVD. This was necessary for Stalin both from the standpoint of the case and to prevent the repetition of sad precedents, although Stalin personally believed Beria.

On April 14, 1943, by a top secret Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the operational-Chekist structures were separated from the NEVD, and V.N. Merkulov again became People's Commissar of State Security, as he had been since February 3, 1941.

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I realized that the Specialists are doing a useful thing, so they won't look like they used to."

For now, I won't tell anyone. If we decide, no one will kick. There is experience.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

After the departure to the front of the deputies of the people's commissar I.I. Maslennikov and S.N. Kruglova People's Commissar L.P. Beria distributed the duties of monitoring the work of the departments and departments of the NKVD between himself and the remaining deputies as follows:

People's Commissar L.P. Beria: monitoring the work of the 1st Directorate (intelligence abroad, led by P.M. Fitin), the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases (led by L.E. Vlodzimirsky), the 2nd (operational equipment), the 4th (Special Technical Bureau and HF communications, separated in October 1941 into a separate structure) and the 5th (ciphers) secret departments, the Secretariat of the Special Conference (OSO, headed by V.V. Ivanov), Control and inspection group under the People's Commissar (headed by N.I. Pavlov), the Central Financial and Planning Department (CFPO) and the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR (S.S. Mamulov).

1st Deputy V.N. Merkulov: 2nd (counterintelligence) and 3rd (secret-political) departments, Office of the commandant of the Moscow Kremlin (UKMK), 3rd secret department (searches, arrests, surveillance), 1st department affairs (government protection) and the Mobilization Department.

B.Z. Kobulov: Transport and Economic Department and the 6th secret department (Gokhran).

V.S. Abakumov: Directorate of Special Departments (UOO).

I.A. Serov: Main Directorates of the Police (GUM), Fire Protection (GUPO), Local Air Defense (GUMPVO), 1st Secret Department (Accounting and Statistics), Prison Directorate, Directorate for

On April 121, 1943, by the top secret (of particular importance) Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 3222ss / ov, an independent Main

counterintelligence department "SMERSH" - "Death to spies" (in the beginning they wanted to call it "Smerinsh" - "Death to foreign spies"), headed by V.S. Abakumov.

Prisoners of War and Internees Affairs (UPVI) and the State Archives (UGA), as well as the Headquarters of Extermination Battalions.

A.N. Apollonov: all military departments.

V.V. Chernyshov: Main Directorate of Camps (GULAG), Main Directorate of Railway Construction Camps (GULZhDS), Directorate of Forest Industry Camps (ULLP) and Logistics (UMTS), Economic Directorate (HOZU), Department of Railway and Water transportation.

L.B. Safrazyan: Main Directorates of Aerodrome Construction (GUAS) and Highway Construction (GUSHOSDOR), Glavgidrostroy.

A.P., Zavenyagin: Main Directorate of Camps for the Mining and Metallurgical Industry (GULGMP), Glavpromstroy, Directorate of Camps for the Construction of Kuibyshev Plants and Dalstroy.

B.P. Obruchnikov: personnel department.

At the same time, the overall control of all the activities of the NKVD remained with Beria.

20/X-42

We form a whole army of the NKVD. Tarasov will be in command. Koba said that the Chekists are fighting perfectly, and most importantly, reliably. Persistent guys. He said that we would really need such an army in the new year. Let's put it where the German should not go through.

I conveyed Koba's words to Tarasov and Sharapov. They promised not to disgrace the title of Chekists.

Koba ordered Selivanovsky's data? give it to him immediately.

See comment below.

2Selivanovsky Nikolai Nikolaevich (1901-1997), one of the leaders of the state security agencies. From October 1941 - Head of the Special Department of the Southwestern Front, of which N.S. was a member of the Military Council. Khrushchev. From August 1942, he was the head of the Special Department of the Stalingrad Front, of which N.S. was also a member of the Military Council. Khrushchev. See also entry dated May 27, 1942.

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Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

In October 1942 - February 1943, a separate army of NKVD troops was formed from the personnel of the border and internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR under the command of border guard general German Fedorovich Tarasov (1906-1944).

The first chief of staff of the Separate Army of the NKVD troops (and then the 70th Army) until November 1943 was a Chekist from 1921, Major General Vladimir Maksimovich Sharapov (1895-1972), from 1944 Lieutenant General. Beria's colleague at work in Georgia, on March 8, 1939, he was transferred to Moscow and appointed head of the Main Directorate of Convoy Troops of the NKVD of the USSR. From June 1941 - in the Red Army. In July 1941, by order of the Stavka VK No. 00293, he was appointed chief of staff of the emerging 29th Army, then - in other staff positions, a participant in a number of strategic operations in 1943-1945.

On February 7, 1943, a separate army of the NKVD troops was reorganized into the 70th combined arms army, and in April it was taken over by the experienced lieutenant general Ivan Vasilyevich Galanin (1899-1958). In July 1943, the army actively and successfully participated in the Battle of Kursk, showing the usual fortitude for border guards and Chekists, and suffered heavy losses.

Then the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Stavka and reorganized under the command of V.M. Sharapova. After that, she participated in the liberation of Ukraine under the command of Generals I.F. Nikolaev and A.I. Ryzhov (the future Hero of the Soviet Union) and ended the war in Germany, in Rostock and Danzig, under the command of Colonel General V.S. Popov, who became a Hero of the Soviet Union in the position of Commander-70.

From the beginning to the end of the war, front-line Chekist units fought on the most difficult and critical sectors of the front. But, unfortunately, Beria did not have enough personnel for the entire Red Army.

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9/X1-42

Koba gave a couple of free days to clean the tails. I said I won't call, scurry through your bushes. Weaned, a rare day without a call. At the ceremonial meeting, he said that there were fewer slob, and more organized people. He told the truth, they pulled themselves up tightly.

He said that the reason for the failures - there is no second front. It's hard to argue. Still, I think the main reason was the military leadership at the level of fronts and armies. Many have not yet got used to once again zh..pu from the chair to tear. Well, it's better now. What we didn't clean up, the war cleaned up. I think we will soon have strong generals. Stalinist hardening. It can be said that they have learned to fight. Heavy blood, but what to do.

12/X1-42

Nikishov? presented a report on the work of Dalstroy for 10 years. This is a poem. It's a pity they won't publish it, because it's secret. Someday (so in the text. - S.K.) they will print it, I told him so, write it for history. He says I'll write for the report. I say, if you write well, it will be both for the report and for history."

They worked hard, hard. Need a good reward

November 16, 1942 Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin delivered a report at the ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Working People's Deputies in honor of the 25th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

2Nikishov Ivan Fedorovich (1894-1958), head of Dalstroy of the NKVD of the USSR, commissar of state security of the 3rd rank (from July 9, 45 - lieutenant general), Hero of Socialist Labor (January 20, 44th) - for the work of Dalstroy.

See comment below.

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dit, earned '. Reported to Kobe, he said: "We will definitely reward. They are far away, but they work like that, everyone would work like that. This is already a tradition for us, like the end of the year, so we are preparing a Decree on Dalstroy. Tell Nikishov that he will continue to work like this, we will give him a Hero of Socialist Labor."

Well done, they have fulfilled all the instructions, and they themselves are working with a twinkle. They give 200 centners per hectare of cabbage! Gold is given, tin is given, coal is given, and cabbage is also given. They make wine, cedar oil. Here are the people! We must give them what we can from American supplies. Deserved. We will give both technology and food. Consumer goods too. Deserved.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Ivan Fyodorovich Nikishov's huge report covering all aspects of Dalstroy's life can really be read like a poem. On the one hand, this is a purely business document labeled "Top Secret". At the same time, this is an exciting document of the era, and it is felt that those who wrote this report understood that they were writing a historical document.

I think that Beria could not help but read Nikishov's report without great and understandable excitement - after all, he invested a lot of his soul in the development and success of Dalstroy.

By the end of 1942, the territory of economic activity of Dalstroy covered an area of 2 million 266 thousand square kilometers and included the Northern coast of the Sea of Okhotsk from the Uda Bay to the Penzhinskaya

On January 117, 1943, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "For the exemplary fulfillment of government tasks for the construction and economic development of the regions of the Far North", 509 employees of Dalstroy were awarded, of which 16 people were awarded the Order of Lenin, 49 people were awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Badge of Honor - 117 people.

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bays, completely the basins of the rivers Kolyma, Indigirka, Yana, Eastern Khandyga and the Chukotka Peninsula.

In 1942, 202.4 thousand people worked in Dalstroy, of which 76.4 thousand were civilians, the rest were prisoners. The total number of specialists reached 20,000, of which 7,000 were specialists with higher and secondary technical education (of which 2,000 were ex-prisoners).

For 1938-1942 Dalstroy trained 25,700 skilled workers on site, including 6,000 people in mining specialties, about 7,000 in auto-tractor specialties, and 2,800 people in metalworking specialties. And it was natural: whole factories worked in the Dalstroy system. The authors of the report proudly reported that the car repair plant had mastered the manufacture of a complex two-foot Simons cone crusher, "produced in the USSR only at Uralmash from special shaped castings."

The style of the report was business-like, but can such a phrase be called dry:

"Severe climatic conditions, a short growing season, systematically repeated frosts in mid-August, a large temperature difference during the day and night make agricultural production quite complex, limit the range of agricultural crops and require the construction of a greenhouse facility on a large scale. ..."

Dalstroy published the newspaper "Sovetskaya Kolyma", 12 newspapers, multi-circulation newspapers and the monthly production and technical magazine "Kolyma", 287 libraries worked.

Only glamorous girls and polished residents of supposedly business offices can remain indifferent when reading Dalstroy's report of November 1, 1942. But L.P. Beria was a man of a different formation and could fully appreciate the work of his employees.

In 1942, Dalstroy fulfilled the production plan for sludge gold by 107.4%, and for tin in concentrates by 102.3%. Of course, it was a feat.

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15/X1-42

It was reported that Sajaya had died a heroic death at the front. Too bad, old friend. How many have already died, you will not return. The war will end, how will it be missed.

Well we knew people. Who was appreciated, who was not appreciated. Koba told Georgiy and me (most likely, he means G.M. Malenkov. - S.K.), yes, we are to blame before the people. They planted some, but it was necessary to plant others. And they did not always shoot those who needed to be shot.

Koba was right. It is now clearly visible. We released a number of Chekists, and now they are heroes in the rear of the Germans °. Harsh times are a good test.

I told Kobe that the enemies had brought many under the monastery. And then we cleared out these enemies, but you can't bring back the shot ones. Koba paused, then waved his hand and said, let's work.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

This post is interesting in every way. The war really quickly put a lot in its place. Some of the first secretaries of city committees and district committees fled from the Germans, abandoning their duties, someone remained on

'Sadzhaya Aleksey Nikolaevich (1897-1942), one of the heads of the state security agencies, commissioner of the 3rd rank State Security Service, an old associate of L.P. Beria, in the bodies of the Cheka since 192] In 1935-1938. 1st Secretary of the Poti, Kutaisi city committees and the Adjara regional committee of the CP(b) of Georgia. During the war - First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Georgian SSR, member of the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front. He died on November 12, 1942 during the Nalchik defensive operation.

Together with Sadjaya, the chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Front, Lieutenant General P.I. Bodin.

3See comment below.

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his post until the end, and then went to the partisan detachment.

In this regard, a number of fates of the Chekists are interesting, for one reason or another they were imprisoned before the WAR.

Thus, Konstantin Klyukvin and Leon Agabekov from the NKVD of Uzbekistan were convicted in 1937 (and then in 1938) and 1939, respectively.

From September 1941, Klyukvin completed a number of special tasks of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, but even on May 5, 1944, the Party Control Commission (CPC) refused to reinstate him in the CPSU (b).

Agabekov was released in October 1942, and in 1943 he was parachuted into the German rear as the head of a task force with an unexpunged (!) conviction. The conviction was removed only on August 19, 1944, and on March 30, 1945, by the decision of the Communist Party of China, Agabekov was reinstated in the party, but with a break in membership from January 26, 1939 to March 1945, Agabekov was awarded the Order of the Red Star and the medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" of a rather rare 1st degree.

In the special detachment of Dmitry Medvedev, three Chekists fought worthily in command positions at once - former "penalty boxers"!

Viktor Vasilievich Kochetkov, former head of the Road and Transport Department of the Ordzhonikidzevskaya Railway, was sentenced by the NKVD Military Tribunal in 1940 to 5 years "for violations of the law." At the request of the NKVD of the USSR, he was released on October 9, 1941, immediately - with the removal of a criminal record. From May 1942 he was behind enemy lines, but he was reinstated in the party only on February 23, 1944. For the war, Colonel Kochetkov was awarded the Order of Lenin, two - the Red Banner, two Orders of the Patriotic War, the Order of the Red Star and five medals.

On July 30, 1940, Medvedev's deputy for undercover (!) intelligence, the captain of the State Security Service (equivalent to an army lieutenant colonel) Alexander Aleksandrovich Lukin, was expelled from the party, and from the end of June 1942 he was already in the rear of the Germans. Reinstated in the party on 11 October 1944

Vladimir Grigorievich Frolov, head of department

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of the operational apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR, was arrested in June 1938 on suspicion of espionage and as a socially dangerous element and sentenced to three years. After serving his term, he turned to the NKVD with a request to be sent to the front, from May 1942 - in the deep German rear in Medvedev's special detachment. He graduated from the war as a lieutenant colonel.

There were many such destinies, but they prove not "Stalin-Beria" or even "Yezhovsky" "arbitrariness", but the complexity of that era when everything happened. A person could stumble, and then ~ atone for guilt and gain recognition of merit. And it happened that a hidden enemy had the opportunity to slander an honest person and cover another hidden enemy from punishment. Some were exposed later on, while others managed to contrive, make a career and calmly educate future "foremen of perestroika".

20/XE-42

It started off well in Stalingrad." Finally, Mykyta can expose Kobe not with his neck and f..pu, but with his chest. We prepared hard, there should not be a misfire.

14/HP-42

We work with George (G.M. Malenkov. - S.K.) like damned. And I get buried. I tell him that after the war we will also go together. Like thread and needle. Laughs, says, from me and the thread is nowhere and does not look like a needle. And you, Lavrenty, too.

Yes, where is my waist. He was thin and slender. We don't get fat from a good life. How do these British and Americans get it? All dry, skinny. And to think, give these sirs and misters my load, they or

On November 119, 1942, the offensive phase of the Battle of Stalingrad began. Soon the 6th Army of Paulus was surrounded. On December 12, the Germans attempted to deblockade and heavy fighting in the Kotelnikovo area continued until about December 24. By December 30, 1942, it finally became clear that the complete defeat of Paulus was a matter of the near future.

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they will stretch their legs in a month, or they will be asked to retire. They can do it. And you Lavrenty pull and pull.

23/HP-42

Through my guys, Kobe was given a Polish report on the post-war structure of Europe. There are arrogant people, but I have never seen a more arrogant Pole. After the war, they will be in zh..ne. Maybe in the West, maybe in ours, most importantly, they will not play an independent role. And they write as if everything in Europe depends on them. Germany was disarmed, Germany's industry was taken away, the borders changed.

For us, the main thing is that they consider the borders in the east to be the same. They write that Russia and Poland must mutually recognize that they are great powers and have their own spheres of influence. Bastards! They surrendered the country without a fight, without Churchill (as in the text. - S.K.) they cannot fart, but climb into the great nations.

Koba read it and got angry. He said: "I thought it was possible to have a neutral Poland. I see not out children. We will reach Poland, we will Sovietize. Otherwise, we won't have peace."

Commentary by Sergei Kremler

Today it is clear which report is referred to in this entry. In December 1942, the Czech President in exile, Eduard Beneš (1884-1948), through I.A. Chichayev handed over to Stalin for review the report of the Polish "minister" and the chairman of the Polish Commission for Post-War Reconstruction, Dr. Marian Seid.

The 35-page report with four maps was written in English (!) language. And Beneš clearly knew to whom he was passing it on. The fact is that Ivan Andreevich Chichayev

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ev (1896-1984), although he had the diplomatic status of an adviser, in reality he was a Chekist since 1919 and an experienced career Soviet intelligence officer. At one time he worked (including under diplomatic cover) in Mongolia, Tuva, Korea, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden. Since September 1941, Colonel Chichayev was a liaison officer between the NKVD intelligence and the special services of England and the United States, about which Beneš, apparently, was informed. Therefore, Seid's report went to Moscow not to the NKID, but to the NKVD, and before getting to Stalin, it was not on the table of Molotov or Vyshinsky, but Beria.

Seid's report was simply imbued with immeasurable political arrogance and impudence.

Here are some "pearls" from it:

"... Poland should receive (on account of reparations from Germany. - S.K.) the majority of industrial enterprises. Germany must transfer to her most of the equipment of railways, sea and air communications ... "

"... Polish-Russian border. Poland must retain its former frontiers in the east. Only long-term friendly cooperation between Poland and the USSR can ensure their security against Germany. But before that (emphasis in bold italics - SK) both countries must recognize the principle that they are great nations with their own spheres of influence. The relationship between them must be based on complete equality. Any ideas of "patronage" or "leadership" must be discarded..."

"... The best form for central and southeastern Europe would be a federation of Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania (with the supremacy of Poland, of course. - S.K.), and for the Balkans a federation of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and, possibly, Turkey (here, you can't cover everything, the Anglo-Saxons should have played the first violin. - S.K.)".

"The Anglo-Saxon powers must play you

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given role in maintaining security not only in the west, but also in central and southeastern Europe ... "

Chatted Seid and about the "Baltic states: Latvia and Estonia". Lithuania was not mentioned because it was supposed to be subject to Poland.

All these "calculations" were not even based on sand, but on a pile of historical garbage. Really "great" Poland was not even allowed into the front of those two union conferences, where Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in Yalta, and Stalin, Truman and Churchill (and then Attlee) in

In Potsdam, issues of reparations, the post-war European order, the fate of Germany and Poland, European borders, etc. were resolved.

Thanks to Stalin, the Poles (but not those who were oriented towards London and Washington, but those who were oriented towards Moscow) received huge territorial increments at the expense of Germany. But instead of erecting a monument of pure gold to Stalin, the Poles preferred to douse him (albeit not immediately) with mud. There is no talk at all about the "Katyn" "executioner" Beria...

However, two points are interesting!

Polish ideas, expressed in English in 1942 regarding the need to deindustrialize and agrarianize Germany, were later reflected in the ideas of the memorandum of the American Jew Henry Morgenthau and the Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and England No. 1067 of May 11, 1945, based on this memorandum. .

And the Polish ideas of 1942 regarding the expediency of certain European federations were tried to be promoted in 1945 at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences by Churchill.

Stalin, knowing about these "ideas" since the end of 1942, resolutely but very cleverly ridiculed them and rejected them.

1943

14/1--43

The whole end of December is one park. Well, at least Koba let go to celebrate the New Year at home. But the soul rejoices. Here is the attack! The soul rejoices. Koba frowns, but we see that it is him so that they do not bloom. And you can see that he is very pleased. We fight hard. A year ago in the winter they hit and again in the winter.

Koba says that's it, we'll win back the winter, we'll strengthen ourselves in the summer, we'll wear it out and then we'll go forward to the west. He said that by the summer the army would receive everything in abundance. He says the factories are set up, work.

Oh how we work now!

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

The entry dated January 14 opens the diary of L.P. Beria for 1943. At the same time, the entry dated December 23, 1942 turned out to be the last. Long breaks in the entries in the diary of L.P. Beria is not uncommon. Moreover, they can be explained both by the loading (or rather, even overloading) of the author of the diary, and by the erasures and lacunae of the Khrushchevites (I wrote about this in the comments to the first publication of the diaries under the title "Stalin Does Not Believe in Tears").

However, in this case, one can hardly doubt that Beria was simply not up to the diary.

I will not say, but, most likely, the period from the second half of November to mid-December 1942 was

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for Stalin and his associates, as well as the period from the second half of October to the beginning of December 1941, one of the most intense in their lives.

On the other hand, the period from the end of December 1942 to mid-January 1943 was for them, perhaps, almost the happiest period in their lives.

Before that, all of them knew the joy of great victories in politics, in the economy, they were active participants and even creators of the epoch-making events of the revolution and the civil war... And even in the ongoing war a year ago they rejoiced at the victory of the Moscow battle and other military

success. Ahead of them were the victories of 1943, ten Stalinist blows in 1944, the Victory of 1945 and victories in restoring and strengthening the power of Russia.

But it was precisely at the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 that they: Stalin, Beria, Molotov, Malenkov and other members of the Politburo, marshals, generals, people's commissars, could not help but breathe truly freely and confidently, because they understood: IN THE WAR, REALLY THERE HAS BEEN A CRUCIFICATION. Windows considerate!

They say that happiness is in the struggle for happiness. So, at the beginning of 1943, they realized with all their being that their struggle would be crowned with success. That their struggle is a struggle for the future happiness of the state. The feeling of victory is a great happiness. But perhaps even more joyful is the foretaste of victory, when you already know for sure that it will definitely come, although so far it is only coming to you, and you are going to meet it!

This is a very rare moment in the life of even very important historical figures...

On November 19, 1942, the offensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad began with a powerful artillery preparation (later this day would become Artillery Day).

On December 12, 1942, Manstein made a powerful attempt to deblockade the 6th Army of Paulus with a counterattack from the Kotelnikov group. And the scales fluctuated until December 24, when the decisive defeat of Manstein's troops began, ending on December 30, 1942.

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The fate of the Battle of Stalingrad was decided.

On January 1, 1943, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front went on the offensive against the 1st German Tank Army. The North Caucasian operation of the troops of the Southern and Transcaucasian fronts began.

Mozdok was liberated on January 3, Nalchik on January 4, Kislovodsk on January 10, Mineralnye Vody and Essentuki on January 12.

On January 12, 1943, the offensive operation of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts began, the blockade of Leningrad was broken.

The liberation of Velikiye Luki, Stavropol, Armavir, Voronezh, Maikop was a matter of a matter of days...

And it was clear that now it would be so until the end of the war - only forward and only to the West! Before the diary was Beria then?

I think it was a period of such unprecedented, euphoric happiness, when you don't want to write down anything, you don't want to be alone even with the closest person, but you want to be on people and with people.

Then life again enters into the usual track, if one can call the usual state-scale work during the dynamic Great War, until the end of which there was not one more year, but two and a half.

17 /1-43

Do not forget to give instructions to remove their rag from Elbrus and put up our flag. Forever!

I was at Koba, I say, there are medals for the cities!, We need a medal for the defense of the Caucasus. Koba says you clean it first. I say, there is already a hot one for Stalingrad.

On December 122, 1942, the medals "For the Defense of Leningrad", "For the Defense of Odessa", "For the Defense of Sevastopol" and "For the Defense of Stalingrad" were established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

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Koba looked, said: "Wait, and the Caucasus will be" '.

Germany introduces total mobilization. Good sign. Now they will be angrier, but they realized it too late. They thought to take the Russians on fu-fu. It didn't work out right away, but now x..y will come out. Koba hesitated last year, can go to the frontiers and offer peace. Now it won't work. By the time we get there, we and they will already be in the heat of the moment. Do not finish them off, this hurdy-gurdy will be again. We'll have to hit to Berlin. Now let's beat it for sure. But less than a year will not come out. And we won't be able to.

Press hard on the metal. We handed over a blast furnace at the Chusovoy plant in 7 months. Record! It is necessary to build new facilities, Koba agreed (as in the text. - S.K.), said, prepare a Resolution. I say, it is necessary immediately and through the mines. We are liberating the Donbass, the mines must be put in order. Nod your head?

20/143

People were awarded for tanks. The result is, it is necessary to reward. It's good to represent people. The point is that we will reward for restoration, for coal and for new construction projects. This year new

'The medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus" was established on May 1, 1944. In total, about 870 thousand people were awarded this medal.

On February 27, 1943, the State Defense Committee adopted a Decree on emergency measures for the ferrous metallurgy, and on February 22, 1943, a State Defense Committee Decree on the restoration of coal mines in Donbass.

On January 320, 1943, a large group of workers in the tank industry were awarded for achievements in ensuring the production of tanks, tank diesel engines and armored hulls.

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We will certainly expand the construction along all lines. Tevosyan said! and Vakhrushev ?, get ready?

31/1-43

Suggested to Kobe by the end of the year to allow the celebration of Christmas. By that time, we will have liberated many new territories, the Germans opened churches there, and the priests supported them where and how. If we return and the temples remain, it will be appreciated. And we'll add Christmas. It will turn out well. Allies will also appreciate.

Koba listened, said, what, on the road, the rope will come in handy, come on.

The guys, together with the Intelligence Agency*, summarized the materials on the situation in the occupied territories. Goering prepared a green folder before the war on how they would carry out economic work after the occupation. Now the Germans are working on this folder and strong material has already crept up. They have a green folder, and we will prepare a Black Folder, we won't forget anything. There will be a full account, they will not get away.

'Tevosyan Ivan Fedorovich (Tevadrosovich) (1901-1958), a major statesman. In 1918-1920 at underground work in Baku, in 1919-1921. Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee. WITH

May 1940 - People's Commissar (Minister) of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR, from June 1949 Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Vakhrushev Vasily Vasilyevich (1902-1947), statesman, from October 12, 1939 People's Commissar of the coal industry, Hero of Socialist Labor (1943). Buried in Red Square in Moscow.

On April 319, 1943, two State Defense Committee resolutions were adopted on the plan for the construction of new facilities for ferrous metallurgy and new mine construction.

"Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Red Army.

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5LU-43

Something tired. It was better in the south!. Although it is difficult there, but rested a little. Even slept off. And today is Comrade Stalin today? exploded in the presence of Vyacheslav, Anastas and Georgy*, called him a snake with glasses. He's not the first. It's a shame. Well, at least he scolded me in Georgian. Only Anastas and Understood.

Understood, understood, but did not object. And Anastas has known me since Baku, and he could have stood up. From the age of twenty you work like a donkey, and then someone reduces their grievances. Possibly Vyacheslav. He cannot forgive that Comrade Stalin took the tanks from him in 1942 and handed them over to me. The tankers themselves asked for it."

George was silent. I also rescued him many times. And who I just did not help out. Without thanks.

It's the third year of the war. The end is in sight, but far away. This summer will be a turning point. Gradually we learn to manage and fight. In the Caucasus, things will go right now.

I've been on this damn carousel for three years. People's Commissariat,

From about March 7 to March 31, 1943, L.P. Beria was absent from Moscow. As a member of the State Defense Committee, he traveled to the Caucasus and the Kuban to help prepare for the offensive operation in the spring of 1943. It was that spring that the Soviet Air Force won air superiority in the skies of the Kuban for the first time.

2So in the text, with repetition.

ZVyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov and Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov.

I remind you that every time "Vyacheslav", "Anastas", "Georgy" or "Klim" is mentioned in the notes, it is Molotov, Mikoyan, Malenkov and Voroshilov who are meant, unless otherwise stated.

Just like "Nikolai" is always N.A. Bulganin, "Vsevolod" - People's Commissar of the State Security Service of the USSR V.M. Merkulov, and "Igor" - I.V. Kurchatov.

"The reader will find an explanation of the essence of this phrase in the comment below.

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Headquarters, Koba, telephones, sleep, Koba, People's Commissariat, Koba, telephones. Everyone chooses his own. And I didn't even choose. It just works out.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlen

If we keep in mind Beria during the war, especially before February 1943, then during this period he was a "multi-station operator" to the greatest extent than ever before or after that. As a Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and a member of the State Defense Committee from the moment of its formation on June 30, 1941, he was responsible for controlling a number of purely national economic and defense sectors.

In the autumn of 1942, as a member of the State Defense Committee and a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, he played an outstanding role in organizing the defense of the Caucasus.

Diverse and great were his duties as People's Commissar of the united NKVD of the USSR.

With all this, Beria had to insure several of his colleagues in the country's top management in the production of weapons, aircraft, tanks at once.

So, for example, officially tank building through the State Defense Committee was supervised by V.M. Molotov. However, Molotov, due to his businesslike qualities, was ill-suited for operational leadership, especially in the technical sphere of state activity. And the leadership of the tank building industry often turned to Beria for help. He quickly got to the heart of the matter, in his people's commissariat - the NKVD, information and performance discipline were well established. The role of Beria in providing the Red Army with tanks was always highly appreciated by professionals, especially in real time during the war. Molotov, on the other hand, was an outwardly modest man (this was also manifested in his everyday life), but he had considerable hidden pride and could not help but envy himself how famously Beria coped with what Vyacheslav Mikhailovich himself was given with difficulty or was not given at all. .

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11/TU-43

A week has passed and I wanted to talk to my friend. It becomes easier, as you dump from the soul.

It flies out of my head for two days to remind Sasha! about HF for "godchildren"? Once you promised to help, you need to help. From requests to help with HF already tired. We tried it. Even the armies want to have it, but the fronts cannot work without HF. And how much energy I put into this business before the war. Comrade Stalin did not believe, everyone doubted that they could overhear. And how can I prove that I am not a scientist, not even an engineer. You can't get the truth out of fear, you have to believe.

Comrade Stalin believes until the first time. And it takes a long time. I believe until the second. If a person is needed, I believe until the third time, and sometimes even up to the fourth time. But after the second time, a person for me as a reliable employee ends. They know it, so they don't let me down. And who fails, regrets. Koba is true, too.

But they did not disappoint with HF, everything works as it should. Good thing.

George was also at the front, they are preparing hard."

Tomorrow at Headquarters we will discuss the plan for the summer offensive. Our business is the rear. And the rear of the front, and the rear in general. What rear is he? At the front they kill you, and you can kill. And my guys have no right to kill. I said this to Comrade Stalin. my rear

An unknown person, apparently one of the employees of the apparatus or the GKO, or the NKVD of the USSR, responsible for high-frequency communications, for the introduction of which into the practice of state and military administration, Beria personally did a lot before the war.

20 whom speech specifically - it is not clear. Perhaps, they mean new front-line acquaintances of L.P. Beria from the front command or commanders who turned to him with a request for the allocation of high-frequency communication devices, which is increasingly popular among the high command of the Red Army.

ZG.M. Malenkov in March 1943 traveled to the area of the Kursk ledge as a member of the GKO together with representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

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worse than the front. Silent. Thank you for agreeing to take some of the burden off me.

It is necessary to accumulate strength for the summer, the work in the factories has been adjusted, but they are beginning to calm down. We are advancing almost everywhere, Vsevolod says that, according to his data, there are sentiments in the rear that we will win this (as in the text. - S.K.) year. Like, a second front will open.

Fools and stupid.s.

What a second front!

Allies will now pull to the last. They need to shake us, and shake the Germans too. For mutual exhaustion. So this year there will be no second front, this is clear. And Vsevolod's agents also report.

19 /TU-43

After the Caucasus, a lot of things have accumulated, I can hardly keep up. Every day, what day? Every night, not a day, I wanted to record something, and did not choose the time. Chose today.

After returning, almost every day of the meeting at Koba. In the summer we are going to attack, we need a lot of ammunition, I press on Novikov? and Vannikov? Ho

On April 114, 1943, the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted on the separation from the NKVD of the USSR of operational security departments and departments and the formation on their basis of a separate from the NKVD of the USSR People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR - the NKGB of the USSR under the leadership of V.N. Merkulov.

Novikov Vladimir Nikolaevich (1907-?), in 1941-1948. Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Armaments of the USSR, Major General of the Engineering and Artillery Service (1944). In the memoirs of the "perestroika" times, he described Beria in exclusively negative tones with obvious bias.

Zvannikov Boris Lvovich (1897-1962), three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1942, 1949, 1954), colonel general of the engineering and artillery service (1944). In 1919-1920, he participated in underground work in the Caucasus, from 1939 he was the People's Commissar of Armaments, was arrested, from 1941 he was the Deputy People's Commissar of the Armed Forces.

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It's good that the People's Commissariat was taken away. Just today they were talking about this at Comrade Stalin's, were Vsevolod sitting? and Abakumov. This one is satisfied - he will get his piece:. A week ago, we finally discussed everything, Special Departments were allocated to SMERSH. The name was invented! But it sounds menacing, it will do.

When everyone dispersed, Koba shouted again. Again there were George and Vyacheslav with Klim. And again Vyacheslav was pleased, I can see. OK.

Now it will be easier. Vsevolod will take away all Intelligence, and all directly Operative Chekist work.

Today we talked about a new offensive. Business for the summer.

It would be nice to go to the sea or at least go fishing. Koba shouted, and then remembered how we ate trout, how I chopped firewood. As it was a long time ago, and we were different. He looked at himself - the belly.

Then he was slender, the girls loved him. I don't get fat from a good life. You should at least swim more often. It doesn't work, there's no time. Looks like this year will be a turning point. I saw people in the Kuban.

Wow! I didn't notice how much I rolled. And you need to sleep. It's already three o'clock in the morning, April 20. Just ro

zheny, in 1942-1946. People's Commissar of Ammunition, since 1945 head of the "atomic" First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, chairman of the Technical Council of the Special Committee, in 1953-1958. First Deputy Minister of Medium Machine Building of the USSR.

See note 3 to the previous entry, 11 April 1943.

Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich (1895-1953), party member since 1925, member of the Central Committee from 1939 to 1952, in 1952-1953. Candidate member of the Central Committee, from April 1943 People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR. Arrested in September 1953, shot in December 1953.

On April 321, 1943, the GKO Decree was adopted on the creation on the basis of the former Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR of a separate counterintelligence department of the People's Commissariat of Defense "SMERSH" ("Death to Spies") under the leadership of V.S. Abakumov.

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hitler. Vyacheslav once said that he does not eat meat and drinks mineral water. Well, let him drink. For our health.

20/GU--43

Koba had another unpleasant conversation late at night. Short, but annoying. Vyacheslav was. At two I went out, Vyacheslav stayed, and Anastas went to Kobe. What are they talking about there?

21/GU--43

I returned from Comrade Stalin late. And I wanted to write again. You dictate, you dictate, you read, you impose visas. You swear. So what to do. Every day there is nothing but rest, that you will sleep until the morning. Getting ready for the summer. Now it won't be like a year ago. Let's not ride. Mykyta boasts that he will celebrate the October anniversary in Kyiv. Maybe it will. Strategist x..ev.

But Kyiv was not. Where was I? And I haven't been anywhere. I was in Odessa, I was in Bessarabia. No, he was in Kyiv, at night, when he made his way from Bessarabia to Baku. How did I survive then?

There is a town near Yass called Bacau. Almost Baku. Cheerful town.

Yes Baku. How is it now? It's already warm there, but in our country, only the kidneys swell. Now to Sevan, fire, ear. Or in Sukhumi.

22/1U--43

We dined at Comrade Stalin's. Lenin Day. In the Kremlin, a narrow circle gathered at Koba: Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov and Anastas. Koba held a small meeting, then went to have dinner. Of all, only George does not seem to have known Lenin personally. Even though he pretends to know. I was with him when

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traveled from the Caucasus, once. But I remember very well. Iron Man, and entered everything instantly. Koba was sad, he kept remembering how he was with Lenin when he was ill. Rare case, Koba drank too much.

23 /TU—43

The Germans transmitted a message about the discovery of the graves of Polish officers shot by the NKVD in 1940. Bullshit, but Koba was furious, because the Poles in London immediately jumped on it, made their statement. It can be assumed that this was agreed with the Germans. And with Churchill (so in the text. - S.K.) for sure. That's Koba and angry."

It looks like these are the Poles who fled from us when we left Smolensk. They had to go to the rear on their own, and they remained with the Germans. Well, they got theirs. This public has always said that it is better to be dead than red.

The noise is great, Koba decided to break off relations with the London government. Right. When we formed the army of Anders, everything became clear to me personally. Emigrant Poles will never be friends with us. The Germans are better for them than the Russians. And also red.

I know this trash from the Caucasus. They are similar in mood, Poles and Mensheviks. Mensheviks
the most

'
The fact of Beria's meeting with Lenin has not been established for certain, but Beria could come from the Caucasus as a secret person. There is deaf evidence in this regard, and if the published diary of L.P. Beria is authentic, the fact of a personal meeting with V.I. Lenin with young L.P. Beria is very interesting.

An important confirmation of the fact that this is the case, however, is clear today to any objective analyst: Polish prisoners of war were shot not by the NKVD in 1940 by the decision of the Politburo, but by the Germans in 1941 in order to provide themselves with a convenient moment, a strong propaganda lever for complicating Soviet-Polish relations and discrediting the Soviet Union in the outside world.

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smelly public, worse than the Dashnaks. You can try to talk once or twice, if someone has something masculine in their character, you can convince them. After the arrest, of course. But few people. It's like a mad dog ~ you can't prove it. And who breathes what, too, can be seen immediately. You can convince a person. I convinced him in Tiflis." But you can't convince a rabid dog.

The Poles are worse, we had many examples with Anders.

Now we will form a Polish division under the command of Berling? It's not the same as with Anders. We will cement our personnel, and the selection will be stricter.

The Dashnaks are members of the Armenian bourgeois-nationalist party "Dashnaktsutyun" ("Union"), which arose in 1890 in Tiflis. From May 1918 to November 1920 Dashnaktsutyun was the ruling party in the bourgeois Republic of Armenia. They tried to focus on the US, but the US Senate did not accept a mandate to govern Armenia. After the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia in November 1920, the Dashnaks operated underground and in exile.

Beria, when he was the head of the Secret Political Department of the Georgian Cheka, really knew how to very effectively find such arguments that contributed to the moral disarmament of a number of leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks arrested by the Cheka, including couriers arriving from abroad from the emigrant leadership.

When Anders' army fled to the British, several officers, led by Colonel Berling, remained in the USSR. Six months before Anders left, Berling declared: "I remain true to my convictions to beat the Germans at any opportunity, and if necessary, then from under the banners of the white eagle I will go under the red banners and will beat the Germans in a cap with a star."

Soon, the formation of the Polish Army began in the USSR, one of the organizers of which was Colonel Zygmunt Berling (1896-1980), later General of Armor (see also note 2 to the entry of June 24, 1944). By the beginning of 1945, only the costs of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR for the Army

Polish amounted to four hundred and thirty-two million five hundred and sixty-nine thousand and fifty-nine rubles.

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25/GU--43

I spoke with Koba in Poles. He asked to be reminded how we acted then. I reported that we had detailed data on the Poles in all k-r!, accounting cases were well worked out.

Then they separated the gendarmes and established police officers who carried out anti-Soviet propaganda in the camps. "Who was given a sentence, who was given a CMN. Now they are clarifying, but in total there were about a thousand and a half of them in all camps. No one was shot near Katyn, I'm Kobe I reported orally and tomorrow we will submit the documents to the NKID.

He reminded Kobe that the Poles had taken over the nationalist underground in the Caucasus before the war. I had to deal with this back in Tiflis, when I was in the Cheka. The threads went straight to Warsaw from Baku, from the Armenians and from Tiflis too. Even the Germans did not warm Caucasians as much as Poles.

Then they slaughtered the Poles in Lvov.

I talked a lot with Koba and Anastas, and with George,

1 K-r - abbreviated as "counter-revolutionaries".

Here are the typical statements of the Poles Anders, given in the report of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria to GKO Chairman I.V. Stalin dated March 14, 1942 on the formation and moral and political state of the Polish army of Anders. General Volkovitsky: "I consider the clash between Poland and the USSR after the defeat of Nazi Germany inevitable...". Colonel Dombrovsky: "I will calm down only when the Bolshevik general on my estate works with a wheelbarrow twice as much as I worked in the Soviet camp" (although senior officers were not involved in labor at all. - S.K.). Captain Mirsky: "I will never forgive the Soviet government...and I will have to take revenge." Lieutenant Kozlovsky: "We will go to the front when England finds it necessary." Lieutenant Zelitsky: "Eastern borders will be the same as in 1939." Soldier Vzhitz: "America is with us!.. Above your head! Poland will be from sea to sea!! ("From sea to sea" is from the Baltic to the Black Sea, that is, to the Black Sea waters off the Ukrainian coast of the Soviet Union. - S.K.)".

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there was a separate conversation with the guys from the People's Commissariat, who deal with the Poles. Officially, everything goes through Vyacheslav, but Koba blames me a lot. We have to involve Vsevolod as a member of the GOKO.

29 /1U-43

Good fights are going on in the Kuban. Our aviation is fighting hard. My contribution is also there, worked well.

A month has passed since I entered my forty-fifth year! Met him on the road. If the guys hadn't reminded me, I wouldn't have remembered. The man is in the color of his years, but "in color", as the wards of my guys say, I don't get. Koba will always push me at least a little. He believes, believes, then - how conjured.

Things are going well in the Caucasus.

20-483

The month flew by like a day. Every day at Koba. What a day! A day at the People's Commissariat and the Council of People's Commissars, and a night at Koba. Every night.

There is no time, but strength comes from somewhere. It's a shame that we often spend them foolishly. As enough dolbo .. bov, they remained. Less, but enough. So the second such war I will not stand. There will be no more like this.

"L.P. Beria was born on March 29, 1899.

An interesting point ~ the use of L.P. Beria of the slang expression "in color".

"In color" in thieves' jargon means approximately "to the point", "successfully". Beria dealt with criminals only in the initial period of his activity in the bodies of the Cheka, when he himself carried out investigative actions of a diverse nature. The expression "in color" was common among the employees of the OGPU and the NKVD, and Beria could have known him from the Transcaucasus. In addition, he had to sit in Menshevik Georgia and in prison, so that he could know the thieves' jargon, and the expression itself was juicy, colorful. Beria possessed a sense of language.

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There was a moment, I thought I could not stand it and cry. Byliu Koba at the dacha, they worked. Everyone left, Vyacheslav, Georgy, Anastas and I remained ... And someone else, I don't remember. Then he turned on me again. He shouted in Georgian. People from the Caucasus are complaining about you - in 1942 he prepared surrender, selected agents. "Surrender, of course, is nonsense. But you, Comrade Beria, are an experienced Chekist and an old Caucasian. How could you leak information. Then the rumors were worse than the German.

Well, I picked it up, as we agreed with Koba. And I'm to blame. He says: "I should have done it thinner."

He would have seen the situation there. Panic did not reach his office even at the very beginning, Zhukov burst into tears once, and that was it. And then in Tbilisi it was - everyone went crazy. Worse than Moscow. No. The Caucasus is a reason. Someone said something to him seriously. Who and what? Vyacheslav sat and his glasses shone contentedly. Of course, I did not understand what Koba was saying, but I understood that he was scolding.

Okay, don't get used to it. It was reported that during my absence, Vyacheslav and Anastas were especially often at Koba, often there were three of us. The rest will come out, but Koba delays these. What's the matter? Of course, he has known them since tsarist times, from the underground. With them and also with Klim.

Anastas is smart. Vyacheslav is also a tough nut to crack. George is easier. But not always, though how much together already.

3/U-43

Arseny Filippovich's field bag was delivered yesterday. The boy brought it to the partisan detachment, told how he got it. Arseniy Filippovich went missing in August 1941. According to the boy, he was spinning around our artillery positions and suddenly German tanks appeared, a lot. Behind them is the infantry. Some fight has begun

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the commander with a machine gun was on a high-rise, mowed down the infantry. When the artillery was broken, the commander began to withdraw into the forest, at the edge of the ravine. The boy saw it and ran up. A puddle of blood, documents are burning down nearby. The boy was dragged into the bushes, and the Germans walked by, did not go deeper into the forest. He says that the commander had four "sleepers" in his buttonholes. This is true. He left in the uniform of an artillery colonel. He was dying, he said, the boy learned by heart. He said: "Remember and pass it on to ours. Let Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria be told that Arseniy is dead. Silly, I couldn't get out. Destroyed personal documents and other things. Papers in the bag to destroy

did not. It's a pity. Let Lavrenty Pavlovich read. Let them not open the bag, I sealed it with my finger. Let the Lubyanka first check the impression."

The boy kept the bag, buried it. Didn't open it. The bag was handed over sealed with resin, Arseniy's thumbprint on the resin. After the examination, I opened it myself. Papers for sure Arseniy Filippovich. Good papers. And the man was good. I'll have to show it to Comrade Stalin."

5/U-43 Spring. Walked through the forest. Warm, sun. I don't even remember when I saw him. Probably in the Caucasus.

About whom and what is said in this entry, it is not clear. Perhaps this could be clarified by the FSB archives, if the papers referred to in the entry have been preserved. If we venture into the area of assumptions, we can make the following conjecture. Perhaps we are talking about a trusted employee of L.P. Beria, who before the war was sent by Beria or even jointly by Beria and Stalin incognito to one of the border military districts - Western Special General Pavlov or Kiev Special General Kirponos with the task of collecting objective information about the situation.

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I love nature, fishing, but when can you afford it now? Reminded me of our picnics with Koba in the mid-thirties. He has a drooping mustache, I am young, thin, in a tunic with an open collar, chopping brushwood for a fire. And fresh trout. It was good then. We laughed a lot, we built a lot. And no war. Let's finish the war, we'll build something that America will envy.

How people work. It's hard, but the mines in the Donbass are already producing coal here and there.' And there is still a front nearby.

1/Y--43

Today I met with the writer Wanda Vasilevskaya at Koba's. A Polish woman knows how to present herself. I tell her: "In this office all the time there are only men around, and here is the charming lady Vasilevskaya." Like, a pleasant surprise, otherwise they are all General Vasilevsky and General Vasilevsky. Vasilevskaya is nicer. Laughs.

I immediately thought of Nino. Haven't seen her for a long time. Of course, I am guilty before her, but she is also guilty. Or maybe none of us is to blame, but the war and my stupid life, when you have not belonged to yourself or your family for a long time, are to blame.

Yes, we have lost the habit of women, not up to them. It is easier for marshals and generals - they carry them with them. This is called PI Zh, a marching field wife. Well, to hell with them. Let e..utsya, if only they fought well.

On February 122, 1943, the Decree of the State Defense Committee on the restoration of coal mines in Donbass was adopted.

Nino Teimurazovna Beria (maiden name Gegechkori) (1905-1991), wife of L.P. Beria since 1922, researcher at the Agricultural Academy. K.A. Timiryazev.

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My girl!, of course, good, but bored. And there is no time for it?

9/\%1-43

Haven't picked up a "buddy" for a long time. A lot of work on armament, on the rear and on the liberated territories. I traveled to the Bryansk region, where the situation is difficult. On the way back, he caught a cold.

The second day I sit at home more, Koba allowed me to rest a bit and get medical treatment. Eat lemons, drink tea. I even read a little. I slept off.

Almost two years have passed since the beginning of the war. Seems like it all started yesterday. And it seems that we have been fighting for a hundred years, otherwise it is impossible to live. A hard war, hard even for us, for the leaders. And people in the rear are often worse off than at the front. In direct war as in war, as the French say. He died, so he died, but while he is alive, he is so alive. The front is stable, they survived the most difficult, they will be fed with rations. And rest at least when, but they will give. And in the rear, without a break, they pull the strap and pull. Women, children. And hungry. From the Bryansk places the impression is very bad - devastation. But people live in hope, people are good, Soviet people. And I saw it myself

1 It is difficult to say exactly who we are talking about. Perhaps this refers to the notorious Valentina Drozdova, who is presented as a victim of violence by L.P. Beria, but, as can be assumed, from 1942 she was in fact the common-law wife of L.P. Beria. In this case, Drozdova was by 1953 much older than is believed.

This record shows that L.P. Beria had a young mistress. But, judging by the letter of Nino Beria to Khrushchev, written in 1954 and, no doubt, genuine, this was then the only mistress of Beria, the existence of which he himself informed his wife already in 1942 or 1943.

In more detail about this dramatic collision in the life of L.P. Beria can be found in a letter from Nino Beria to Khrushchev dated January 7, 1954.

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me still Medvedev! I reported when I left the German rear with a detachment in 1941. It was a very long time ago, even a small success was glad.

There are a lot of bad messages coming from places. In some areas, people are starving, especially the workers. And there is nothing to feed. And help is needed immediately. Hard.

Vyacheslav says that Lenin somehow expressed himself in his presence in the sense that, here, you want to feel sorry for people, stroke them on the head, but you have to hit them on the head with a stick. What to do, if you are kind now, the country will collapse. But she won't collapse.

When you fall out of the rut of life for a while, you immediately relax. You can't sleep, you can't sleep for days. And you can sleep, you just want to sleep all the time. I'll sleep as long as I can.

The Germans are heavily bombing Gorky, they report that there is heavy destruction there. "It's bad.

1/UP-43

In the morning I returned to Moscow. Tired as hell. Koba decided how in 1941 to check everything personally through me, sent to the front with a check. Only George and Vyacheslav knew. And also Zhukov and Vasilevsky? Vasilev-

\Undoubtedly, this refers to Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev, major of state security (equivalent to the military rank of "colonel"), Hero of the Soviet Union, who during the war commanded special detachments of the NKVD operating deep behind enemy lines.

On June 4, 1943, the German Air Force carried out a series of raids on Gorky's enterprises, especially on GAZ, and on rubber industry plants in Yaroslavl.

Vasilevsky Alexander Mikhailovich (1895-1977), Soviet commander and military figure, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945). Since June 1942, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, at the same time since October 1942, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin. See also note 4 of the February 17, 1951 entry.

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he personally informed the commanders under strict secrecy. We agreed with Zhukov at Koba that I would go without publicity, on my own line. Powers as a member of the GOKO and a representative of the Headquarters.

In public he was not in pince-nez, but in ordinary glasses and with a mustache. Didn't recognize. Did you grab Bogdan?, he officially called everyone. And he also invited everyone from the rear guard. I spoke. Even those who know me did not immediately recognize me, they were surprised. But no one began to crawl, a good sign.

Everyone reported that everything was ready. They don't seem to lie. Everyone is in a confident mood, I think they will not falter. So Kobe reported:

This is a very interesting entry, and it may shed light on some mysterious meeting with Stalin on June 21, 1943. The meeting took place from 0.45 to 1.45 in an extremely narrow and not quite usual composition: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and Zhukov. Perhaps the meaning of the meeting was that Stalin informed the top army leadership that he was sending Beria with an inspection to the fronts in the Kursk Bulge region. Stalin could not help informing the army, otherwise Beria's train would have looked like distrust of the army. But the trip should not have been advertised, including in order not to attract too much attention of the Reich secret services. If my re-construction is correct, then the discussion at the meeting was about this. See also entry dated February 3, 1944.

Possibly Bogdan Kobulov (1904-1953), a close collaborator of L.P. Beria still in Transcaucasia, in 1941-1943. Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, in 1943-1945. First Deputy People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR.

ZAs evidenced by the "Journal of visits to the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin", after the meeting on June 21, Beria was not in the Kremlin from June 22 to July 1, 1943, although when Beria was in Moscow, Stalin invited him to his place almost every time he assembled the leadership. Beria appeared at Stalin's only on July 2, and on July 5 the Battle of Kursk began.

Beria's unspoken departure with an inspection to the fronts fits perfectly into the "drawing" of the situation in the summer of 1943, when Stalin decided on a strategic defense with a transition then to a possible counteroffensive. In 1941, it was the people's commissar of internal

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5/UP-43

Returned from Headquarters. Antonov reported! and Vasilevsky. The German offensive has begun, ours are standing strong. There are no doubts about the choice of the plan (so in the text. - S.K.). Comrade Stalin is pleased, you can see right away. But there are doubts. If our plans are fulfilled, the war will be a real turning point. The Germans put everything into this blow. And we are accumulating technical reserves.

15/UP-43 Traveled to the Kursk area again? Now without disguise. Everything is going great. Germans

wedged into

Of the affairs of the USSR, Beria ensured, through the border troops of the NKVD, the prompt collection of information from Colonel Zakharov, whose flight along the borders was "ordered" by Stalin's Air Force command. Now Stalin could well have sent Beria himself in advance with an inspection of the general state of affairs. In addition, a number of details of the pre-war situation suggest that Beria himself, immediately before the war, visited the border zone on the western border of the USSR with a covert inspection on the instructions of Stalin.

! Antonov Aleksey Innokent'evich (1896-1962), general of the army (1943), holder of the Order of Victory. In 1943-1945. first deputy, in 1945-1946. Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

2 The sources recorded Beria's front-line trips to the Caucasus at the height of the German offensive in 1942 and to the Kuban in the spring of 1943. Beria played an outstanding role in the success of the battle for the Caucasus and was the first figure in this battle - a gift that later it was hushed up. In the spring of 1943, the trip was also quite successful and, so to speak, legal. But here are the short inspection trips of L.P. Beria to the area of the Kursk Bulge, which are mentioned above, never and were not mentioned anywhere.

It is possible that the fact of these trips today cannot be established even with a careful study of the archives of the NKVD of the USSR and the State Defense Committee. On the one hand, as follows from the text of the diary, these trips of Beria to the front were not advertised, on the first trip even a light make-up was used. On the other hand, the fact of such trips gives the appearance of Beria additionally

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our defense on both sides and stuck. Losses are heavy, but the Germans have even more. The main thing is that their offensive failed. Traveled in uniform, with Orders. He immediately warned that he did not come with checks, but for prompt assistance. Everyone perceived it correctly, in a businesslike way. When I was leaving, on July 12, our counteroffensive began. At last we have learned to fight!

The trip was beneficial. Now back to your strap. And at the front even rested a little.

In Central Asia, with the beginning of the war, the Basmachi become more active. I think that now, when our successes have begun, the British are slowly helping them. Britain always puts its eggs in different baskets, I saw this well in Baku and later. We are here to study and study. Immediately upon arrival, I was informed that a gang had been liquidated in Turkmenistan, the leader was a deserter, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I'll have to report to Koba!

National politics is a complex thing. And you can't not trust local personnel, and you need to trust

positive coloration. Accordingly, all archival information about the secret trips of the GKO member L.P. Beria to the front in the area of the Kursk Bulge could be destroyed by both Khrushchev and Gorbachev-Yeltsin falsifiers of archives. Traces of L.P. It was impossible to completely destroy Beria, especially in the autumn of 1942. One could only distort their meaning, attributing to the Caucasian trips not positive, but negative meaning.

Beria indeed informed Stalin about this by special message 591/B dated July 14, 1943. The leader of the group was Allan Dzhumayev, born in 1902, a native of the village of Beshir, Khadzhambas district, Chardzhou region, Turkmen SSR, who deserted from the spacecraft in April 1943 He was detained on July 5, and in a special message, Beria asked Stalin to authorize the arrest of Dzhumayev. This detail, by the way, shows well that the norms of legality in the USSR were respected even during the war.

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looking back. But national feelings must not be hurt - they must be used wisely.

11/UP-43

Spoke with Vyacheslav. I ask, in Sicily? your job. Although calm, he sent away. He says it's boring without you. He says that Koba also teased Sicily, asked that, they say, this is your second front? Then he flashed his glasses and said: "They won't give us a second front until we reach Europe."

I say, you know that at the front, the second front is called stew. He says I know. And Koba knows.

I tell him, I told Kobe. Vyacheslav asks: "Well, how is he?". I say swore. Vyacheslav says, well, right. I mother myself.

I say, "Don't worry. We will celebrate Christmas this year, they will give us a present for Christmas, they will land somewhere else"?

Sent away again.

2/USh-43

Let's start a rail war. They will also work along the Ponomarenko line*. I tell him, let's be jealous. Mutters. Late..net.

'This entry is very interesting in the light of what line L.N. took in national politics, including its personnel aspect. Beria ten years after Stalin's death. The reflections of 1943 are in good agreement with the actions of Lavrenty Pavlovich in 1953.

July 210, 1943 Anglo-American troops landed on the island of Sicily.

Beria thought of the "allies" too badly. On September 3, 1943, British troops landed in the whole of southern Italy.

"Ponomarenko Panteleimon Kondratievich (1902-1984), party and statesman, in 1938-1947. 1st Secretary of the CE CP(b) of Belarus, in 1942-1944. Head of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD).

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Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

The most effective sabotage work on communications in the German rear (mainly on railways) in the first period of the war was carried out by special detachments and groups of the NKVD of the USSR. partisan commanders Medvedev, Vaupshasov, Prokopyuk and others (and together with them the combat core of their special detachments), intelligence officer and terrorist Nikolai Kuznetsov, saboteur Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya...

25 thousand people passed through the variable composition of the OMSBON, and it was a serious and at least not bad, and often well-trained force.

With the formation of the TsSHPD in 1942, its chief Ponomarenko was inclined to take all the sabotage work behind the front under his "wing", he placed emphasis on the party leadership, but Ponomarenko simply did not have the personnel to organize effective sabotage.

The NKVD handed them over to TsSHPD, however, reluctantly and to a limited extent. Beria, Sudoplatov, and all professionals in general can be understood - the amateurism of Ponomarenko and his "cadres" not only annoyed, but also interfered with the work.

Nevertheless, parallelism persisted, as did the spirit of rivalry at the "top" level. In the "lower classes", even behind the front line, a certain alienation was also often observed, but there the situation itself forced people to interact and unite their efforts on a daily basis.

10/USh-43

Signed a submission to Comrade Stalin for the rehabilitation of a group of aviation specialists who distinguished themselves for PE-2 and TU-2. Petitioned Shakhurin!, Tu-

'Shakhurin Alexey Ivanovich (1904-1975), in 1940-1946. People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR.

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Polev' and Myasishchev?. It's a pity, no Petlyakov? It's nice to sign such documents, these are not Troika death sentences, this is not a stick to the head.

In the Kremlin, Wanda Vasilevskaya came across, she was at Comrade Stalin's.

Yes, Polish affairs are becoming important. We can't come to an agreement with the London Poles, we still have to fuck them. I know this public well from the Transcaucasus, from Baku, from our Mensheviks and Dashnaks. If you rely on the support of a foreign power, you can no longer be a patriot, but you become an agent sooner or later. So it is with the Poles. We will still suffer with them when we liberate Poland.

16 /USH-43

Koba sanctioned the rehabilitation of aviators“ Release is more pleasant than imprisoning. For some reason, I remembered little Larina. Bukharin, the bastard, the old faggot, turned the girl's head, and she believed in him. How I didn't want to send her about-

Andrey Nikolaevich Gupolev (1888-1972), Soviet aircraft designer, academician, arrested in October 1937, convicted in May 1940, rehabilitated in July 1941. The creator of a large family of aircraft of the ANT and Tu series, three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1945, 1957, 1972), winner of the Lenin and four times (1943, 1948, 1949, 1952) Stalin Prizes.

2Myasishchev Vladimir Mikhailovich (1902-1978), Soviet aircraft designer, arrested in January 1938, convicted in May 1940, rehabilitated in July 1940. Major General Engineer (1944), since 1943 Chief Designer of Design Bureau, since 1956 – General Designer of the Ministry of Aviation Industry. Hero of Socialist Labor (1957).

ZPetlyakov Vladimir Mikhailovich (1891-1942), Soviet aircraft designer, arrested in October 1937, convicted in May 1940, rehabilitated in July 1940. The creator of the Pe-2 and Pe-8 bombers, winner of the Stalin Prize, was awarded two Orders of Lenin. Died in a plane crash in January 1942.

See previous entry dated August 10, 1943.

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back to the camp, but I had to. It was evident that if released, they would call all over Moscow that her Nikolai Ivanovich was an innocent victim of Stalin's crow. He will also run to foreign journalists, they loved Bukharchik. I had to leave the fool in the camp, otherwise it was impossible. It's a pity. But what to do. The unnecessary pity of the leaders hurts the honest people.

25/USh-43

We are developing an offensive. Large territories have been liberated, Kharkov has been liberated, by the end of the year we will definitely liberate Kyiv. This is good. I haven't seen Koba so happy since the beginning of the war. The Germans were thrown back from Moscow, he frowned and cursed more often. And than. And now he smiles.

Diplomats are back. Transportation and security are on me, and Vyacheslav smiles at them. He is more and more closed up by a diplomat, and I am in GOKO. And all the bumps on me.

Since May, I have been responsible for the railways. Good contact on this line with Lazar? From him
always

At the end of August 1943, the threat of bombing Moscow was completely ruled out and a decision was made to return foreign embassies to the capital. August 31, 1943

tel SNK of the USSR and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov arranged a solemn reception on the occasion of the return of the diplomatic corps from Kuibyshev to Moscow.

On May 226, 1943, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the restoration of railways. L.P. Since March 13, 1942, Beria even formally - by decision of the State Defense Committee, was included together with L.M. Kaganovich to a special group on transport - the Transport Committee. March 25, 1942 L.M. Kaganovich was temporarily removed from the post of People's Commissar of Railways and replaced by Lieutenant General A.V. Khrulyov, later head of the rear of the Red Army. In 1943-1944. Kaganovich was again appointed to the NKPS, but was again replaced, now I.V. Kova-lev. However, in matters of organizing transport, L.M. Kaganovich was not an amateur and, as far as is known, found a common language with Beria.

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yes there is help. It's good that the prisoners are arriving now. We need to move them to the east. So it's more reliable, less guarding, it's a long way to run from Siberia to Berlin.

5/1X-43

Comrade Stalin received three Metropolitans!, was Vsevolod:. He called me during the day, stopped by for advice. Karpov is planned as the curator:. I don't know him well. Vsevolod responds generally positively. The decision regarding the Church is correct, I reported to Kobe in this direction at the beginning of the year. Let's celebrate Christmas this year too.

Butts can help, especially now. While Hitler pressed, they were here and there, but mostly with the Germans. Now they will help us even in the occupied territory. And it is unprofitable for the Germans to reap them now, they will be afraid. Even if they press it, it will be worse for them. I said so to Vsevolod.

Comrade Stalin invited immediately after the priests,

September 15, 1943 Stalin in the presence of V.M. Molotov and People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR V.N. Merkulov received in the Kremlin Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna (since 1943 Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus') Sergius, as well as Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod (since 1945 Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus') Alexei and Exarch of Ukraine Metropolitan Nikolai of Galicia.

Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich (1895-1953), in 1941 and 1943-1946 People's Commissar (Minister) of State Security of the USSR.

See also note 4 to the entry of April 19, 1943.

ZKarpov Georgy Grigorievich (1897-1967), major general. Graduated from the Theological Seminary. Member of the Civil War, since 1920 a member of the RCP (b), since 1922 in the state security bodies, led the regional department of the NKVD of the Pskov Territory. Head of the "O" department of the NKVD of the USSR (operational work among the clergy), head of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR, since September 1943, chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of People's Commissars (then - the Council of Ministers) of the USSR.

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me, Anastas and George. He asked George to help with aircraft engines. Georgy denied that he could handle it himself, but it was clear that he was happy about himself. They won't come to an agreement with Shakhurin, and Shakhurin is a clumsy fellow. Looks askance at me, I understand. I never brought joy to him, but if you don't warm him up, he can screw up. And that's how you can work.

25/1X-43

Smolensk was liberated. I called and congratulated Khomenko. He said, well, Vasily, what's next, Kyiv? He says it's unlikely. We're in the wrong direction, I'd rather get to Chisinau than to Kyiv'.

We are liberating territories, some worries are gone, others have come. More has come than gone, but so be it. This concern is not a burden,

I work in the Committee for Liberated Areas. The chairman is Georgy, the members are me, Anastas, Voznesensky and Andreev. From Andreev as from a goat of milk, the genius of the State Planning Commission is always busy. Will have to force. George pulls, but more along the party line, Anastas works in his bush. And me at once on all lines. And then a sneeze from Koba?

1 Repeatedly mentioned in the diary of L.P. Beria is the same age as Beria (they were even born in the same month), Lieutenant-General Vasily Afanasyevich Khomenko before the war was the head of the border troops of the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSR, during the war he became an excellent military leader, a hero of the Smolensk and Moscow battles and the battle for the Caucasus.

2 V.A. Khomenko, commanding the 44th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front, died in battle during the Melitopol operation on November 9, 1943 in the area of the village of Velyka Lepetikh, Kherson region.

ZS On August 21, 1943, Stalin introduced Beria to the Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the restoration of the economy in areas liberated from the German invaders (chairman - Malenkov, members: Beria, Mikoyan, Voznesensky, Andreev).

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30/1X-43

Decree published! Vyacheslav received the Hero for tanks, Georgy for planes, Anastas for food. Koba listened to me, did Tevosyan and Vakhrushev get it too? I got for the guns. And if you figure it out - for everything at once. This has now improved, but then, in 1941, everything collapsed. Comrade Stalin, these are fronts, politics, general control. And I had to pull the majority of the industry, except for chemistry.

Pervukhin* works well. Pervukhin is now pulling Mimosa as well. It's an interesting thing, I reported then

On September 130, 1943, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the title of Hero of Socialist Labor was awarded to V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan, I.T. Tevosyan, P.I. Korobov, V.V. Vakhrushev.

* Judging by this entry, Beria was one of the intercessors to Stalin, who proposed to award the People's Commissar of Ferrous Metallurgy I.T. Tevosyan and People's Commissar of the Coal Industry V.V. Vakhrushev.

ZPervukhin Mikhail Georgievich (1904-1978), Soviet statesman, lieutenant general of the engineering and technical service (1944), Hero of Socialist Labor (1949). In 1940-1946. Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, in 1942-1950. People's Commissar (Minister) of the Chemical Industry of the USSR. In 1943-1944. curator of the Atomic Project under the auspices of the Council of People's Commissars, in 1945-1953. member of the Nuclear Special Committee under the SNE (CM) of the USSR, from April 30 to July 24, 1957, Minister of Medium Machine Building of the USSR. Since 1958, he worked in the State Planning Committee of the USSR and other organizations as a result of Khrushchev's disgrace.

“Judging by the context, Beria, for the sake of conspiracy, even in his diary replaced the official code name of the undercover development “Enormosis” (from the English epogtots - huge) with his personal code name “Mimosa” (according to consonance). So in the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, and then in the NKGB of the USSR, intelligence materials on the atomic bomb received from England and the USA, as well as the problem of atomic weapons in general, were designated.

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comrade Stalin a year ago. But then there was no time. Did Fitin work?,

The matter is important, Koba is interested. He said he had to work. Well, I have enough of mine. Now it is accelerating, the GOKO decision was made. But it seems to work without a spark. This is understandable, people do not know why they are given incomprehensible tasks in wartime. And scientists are scientists.

Supervised by Vyacheslav, they run to him from the academy, are they active, fussed? Maybe an information leak? Why is Joffe so active? Sorry, this time is not up to it. We must prepare for the meeting“ Everything is on me, Vsevolod and Fitin. We need to talk to the All-

'Already at the beginning of October 1941 in the 1st (intelligence) Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, on the basis of intelligence data from London, a certificate was prepared on British work on the "uranium bomb". A draft letter from L.P. Beria IV. Stalin about the content of intelligence materials and the need to organize work on atomic energy in the USSR. However, the letter was not sent then, for which there were a number of quite objective reasons.

*Fitin Pavel Mikhailovich (1907-1971), lieutenant general (1945). In 1932 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Mechanization and Electrification of Agriculture. In March 1938, he was sent to the NKVD bodies on a party recruitment basis, at first - to study at the Central School of the NKVD. From February 1941 to June 1946 he was the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR (foreign intelligence). In October 1953, he was transferred to the reserve "due to incomplete official compliance." Since 1959, director of the photographic plant of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies.

At the initial stage of the resumption of nuclear work in the USSR during the war, all organizing activities went through V.M. Molotov and People's Commissar of the chemical industry, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR M.G. Pervukhin.

*Obviously, this refers to the preparation of a meeting with I.V. Stalin, W. Churchill and F.D. Roosevelt (Big Three) in Tehran.

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Iodom. Looks like they'll put security on me.' Koba, after all, trusts me more.

Voznesensky seems to be doing the job, but mu..ak. With Georgy, we are already as one, sang together, but with this everything does not work out. George also does not favor him. Well, x .. d with him, it was out of the blue, it will remain out of sight, but work necessary.

Commentary by Sergei Kremliev

In fact, the first real work on the atomic problem began in the USSR approximately at the same time that they began in other leading powers of the world - in the USA, England, France and Germany, that is, before the war. And they had good prospects, but the war mixed up and canceled all plans in this area.

After the turning point in the war, interest in the problem in the USSR increased, which was also facilitated by intelligence information from abroad about work in the United States.

In March 1942, for the first time (judging by the diary entry of March 28, 1942), Beria reported to Stalin on the "uranium" topic.

September 27, 1942 Deputy Chairman of the GKO V.M. Molotov sent I.V. Stalin for approval the draft order of the GKO "On the organization of work on uranium", submitted on behalf of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Committee for Higher Education under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR A.F. Ioffe and S.V. Kaftanov.

On September 28, 1942, this order (not a Decree) of the State Defense Committee was adopted as No. 2352s. The Academy of Sciences of the USSR undertook to "resume work on the study of the feasibility of using atomic energy by fissioning the uranium nucleus and submit to the State Defense Committee by April 1, 1943 a report on the possibility of creating a uranium bomb or uranium fuel." On the whole, the order had a rather amorphous character.

ŸL.P. Beria was really responsible for the protection of the Soviet delegation at all allied conferences with the participation of I.V. Stalin.

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October 6, 1942 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria sent I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov his letter (in many respects repeating the draft of his letter of October 1941). It is indicative that already in October 1942, Beria proposed "to work out the issue of creating a scientific advisory body under the State Defense Committee of the USSR from authoritative persons to coordinate, study and direct the work of all scientists, research organizations USSR dealing with the issue of atomic energy of uranium".

This is Beria's style: in a new business, it is important to immediately concentrate efforts, ensure the interaction of all interested parties and comprehensiveness.

For the style of V.M. Molotov, to whom atomic scientists turned even before the war, is characterized by such a document as a note by V.M. Molotov from the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR In a note prepared no later than February 11, 1943 by Ivan Iovich Lapshov (1903-1988), the long-term assistant to Molotov, head of the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars (CM) of the USSR in 1938-1957, there was talk of unsatisfactory the working state of work on the uranium problem.

Listlessly stating that "the decisions of the GOKO on uranium are being carried out very poorly," Lapshov suggested that M.G. Pervukhin and Chairman of the All-Union Committee for Higher School Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR S.V. Kaftanov "the duty to monitor and supervise the work on uranium on a daily basis". It is clear that in the conditions of the military workload of Pervukhin and the insufficient state weight of Kaftanov, this idea was stillborn in advance. It is significant that Molotov did not react in any way to this and subsequent alarming reports of Lapshov, and all his notes were archived with a melancholic note: "Archive. Save]. I. Lapshov (1943)".

2 / X-43 It was decided that the meeting would be behind the cordon. "Security is on me. Vsevolod came, reports that Germans

The conference of the leaders of the USSR, USA and Great Britain was held from November 28 to December 1, 1943 in Teheran.

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something is being prepared. Could be a terrorist attack. We sent a smart guy to the Germans - as a relative of some big shot. Vsevolod says that he is transmitting good data on the meeting!

21/X--43

We sat at Koba's for two hours. Narkomindel, Klim, Anastas, Dekanozov. They figured it this way and that way"... Vyshinsky is a cunning man, and an intelligent one. It's difficult. Well, there are no such fortresses...

Koba called me a little earlier and talked alone for about ten minutes. He is concerned about security issues both for us and for them. From Germany there is information about the preparation of the assassination attempt. You have to choose your group. Talk to Pavel. And you-

"Certainly, this refers to the preparation by the German secret services of an assassination attempt on the Big Three. Intelligence information went through the NKGB of the USSR, that is, through the People's Commissar of State Security V.N. Merkulov and through the GRU of the General Staff. But Beria was among those informed, and Merkulov himself was, after all, Beria's "cadre", and they maintained good working contacts.

On October 220, 1943, at a reception with Stalin in his Kremlin office, there were: Beria from 23.50 to 2.00, M.M. Litvinov (NKID), K.E. Voroshilov, V.M. Molotov, V.G. Dekanozov (NKID), A.Ya. Vyshinsky (NKID), G.M. Malenkov - from 24.00 to 2.00, A.I. Mikoyan from 00.10 to 2.00. Judging by the record, the issues of preparation for the forthcoming Tehran conference were mainly discussed.

Most likely, Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov (1907-1996), well-known militant and leader of sabotage operations, lieutenant general (1945), in 1943-46. deputy head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR, simultaneously from July 1941 head of the Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, from 1942 head of the 4th (reconnaissance and sabotage) Directorate of the NKVD (NKGB) of the USSR.

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call Rezo!? We must have our guys there in parallel. It is necessary to exclude the slightest chance for the Germans. Or maybe one of the allies wants under the guise?. They're like spiders in a jar. Everything can be. We must think and take into account.

26/X-43

Adopted a new Decree on the Donbass?. The Germans were driven off well, they need to be strengthened seriously. Koba said, enough to carry coal to distant lands. Necessary

'Unidentified person. Obviously, one of the employees of the NKGB of Georgia, personally known to L.P. Beria.

"Interesting detail. Judging by this entry, I.V. Before the Tehran conference, Stalin was worried about the security issues not only for him personally, but also for Roosevelt and Churchill. Apparently, Stalin was already considering his subsequent offer to Roosevelt to stay at the Soviet embassy. At the same time, Stalin, it seems, like Beria, perfectly understood the inevitable threat of an assassination attempt by the Germans on the Big Three that had gathered together. At the same time, as we see, both of them reasonably did not rule out the possibility of organizing an assassination attempt on one of the "Big Three" not only by the Germans, but also by certain circles in the USA and England.

Stalin interfered with everyone at once. Churchill could be tried to be removed by pro-German circles in England, Roosevelt by supporters of isolationism in America. Despite the low probability of the "Anglo-Saxon" variants, it was impossible to exclude them completely. Therefore, Beria, as we see, weighed how likely these options for the assassination were.

On February 399, 1943, the Decree of the State Defense Committee on the restoration of coal mines in Donbass was adopted (see entry dated May 5, 1942). On October 26, 1943, another Decree of the State Defense Committee "On priority measures for the restoration of the coal industry of the Donetsk basin" was adopted.

In pursuance of these Decrees, a truly heroic work was carried out. In the mines of the Donetsk coal basin, 3,000 kilometers of workings had to be cleared, 500 million cubic meters of water had to be pumped out (a lake measuring 25 km by 4 km and 5 m deep). A year after the start of restoration work, coal production in the Donbass exceeded the pre-war level, and by the end of the war it reached 100 million tons per year.

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have close coal'. I say people are already working and will continue to work, Comrade Stalin. Coal will.

And they work like heroes. Where does strength come from. They live poorly, we cannot support them well, but they work like at the front. Why, the mines are also a front." Should we offer a separate medal for the mines? And separately for the restoration of metallurgy. " Tevosyan promises to give Ukrainian metal at the beginning of the new year. They are also heroes. We must encourage'.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

It is hardly possible today to establish from archival data who was the actual initiator of the establishment of such specific medals as the medal "For the restoration of coal mines in Donbass" and the medal "For the restoration of ferrous metallurgy enterprises of the South". However, as we see, this issue is clarified by an entry in the diary of L.P. Beria.

Attentive and intelligent attitude to the system of government awards was for L.P. Beria organic. He well understood the role and significance of the public moral encouragement of honest and heroic work. Therefore, it is not surprising that recovery efforts were awarded with individual medals precisely in those industries that

After the occupation of Donbass, Siberian deposits became the main sources of coal supplies: Kuzbass, the Pechora basin, etc. For the industry of Siberia and the Urals, this was quite close, but for the restored industry of the center of Russia and Ukraine, the Donbass was, of course, more convenient.

On October 220, 1943, a large group of workers in the coal industry were awarded orders and medals of the USSR.

On September 310, 1947, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal "For the Restoration of the Donbass Coal Mines".

On May 418, 1948, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal "For the Restoration of the Ferrous Metallurgy Enterprises of the South."

See comment below.

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which were supervised by L.P. Beria. Medals, for example, for the restoration of railways or the restoration of agriculture in the USSR did not appear. And in vain...

But in 1950, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal "For Distinction in the Protection of the State Border of the USSR", and then the medal "For Distinction in the Protection of Public Order". And although L.P. Beria at that time no longer had a direct relationship with the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, with a high degree of probability it can be assumed that the establishment of these medals was the result of the initiative of L.P. Beria.

Let me remind you that even before the death of Stalin, Beria was thinking about the idea of establishing a number of republican orders of the Union republics, primarily to reward cultural figures: the orders of Navoi, Nizami, Rustaveli, Shevchenko, etc. After the death of Stalin, Beria tried even more actively to put this very promising idea into practice. However, it was not implemented - the Soviet post-Stalin leadership, having got rid of Beria, rapidly began to lose dynamism and breadth of thinking.

5/X1-43

One of these days we will take Kyiv. Mykyta cuts off the HF. OK. Antonov and Shtemenko reported on the situation, Comrade Stalin was pleased. We finish the year well, and away we go! will be than brag.

Listened to the new anthem. A bit viscous, a bit like "God Save the Tsar"... "Internationale" is more cheerful. But the situation demands. In Europe, playing the International is not the best policy. And now you have to be politicians. Even me.

Thinking about security issues. The English say

At the upcoming Tehran conference.

On November 24, 1943, Sergei Mikhalkov and El-Registan reported to Stalin from 21.35 to 22.00 in the presence of K.E. Voroshilov, L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov and A.S. Shcherbakov text of the new anthem of the USSR.

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Xia neat, but in fact, raspis..yai. I remember Baku well. I don't think Americans are any better. In addition, a double game is possible. The entire calculation on themselves and on their.

1/XE-43

October anniversary. Kyiv was liberated yesterday. In the afternoon we celebrated a little at home. In the evening we sat in the Kremlin with Comrade Stalin. Until the end it was just me and George. Koba released the rest earlier, said that only questions of supplying the Air Force remained and left us and Khrulev *, and under Vyacheslav? invited Nikitin." They sat for an hour, then left, and there were three of us. Koba asked not to slow down, said that Georgy and I are now the main support for him in everything. Vyaches Lav will now have to work more with diplomats, and the economy is on us. Lazar works unevenly, sometimes breaks down. Anastas is only capable of solving limited problems. Voznesensky operative is bad. They sat together for almost two hours.

I am writing right after I returned from Comrade Stalin. I'm tired, but I can't sleep. I feel Koba is going to pile on me something else. This is a conversation

'Cm. note 4 to entry dated October 21, 1943

* Khrulev Andrei Vasilievich (1892-1962), in 1940-1941. Chief Quartermaster of the Red Army, in 1941-1943. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, in 1942-1943. People's Commissar of Railways, since 1943 the head of the rear of the Red Army, General of the Army.

Perhaps the accumulated fatigue manifested itself in the fact that even the events of the day with Beria sometimes merged, it turns out, into something inseparable. Judging by the journal of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office, General Nikitin (see note 3) was summoned to see Stalin not under Molotov, but after Molotov left Stalin. But from 23.10 on November 7 to 1.00 on November 8, Stalin really remained only with Beria and Malenkov.

"Nikitin AV. (1900-1973), colonel-general, since 1942 head of the Main Directorate for the formation and recruitment of the Air Force of the spacecraft.

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no wonder he's up to something. He doesn't want to offend Vyacheslav either, and he wants Georgy and I to pull in one direction, but I feel that he has the main reliance on me. He is right. No one passed the school that I went through.

I'll try to sleep. Tomorrow I will have to travel with Nikitin and Shcherbakov to the factories, to see what they can do.

9/XJ-43

They said that Khomenko died today. At the forefront, during shelling, with a fragment immediately to death. This is the third big loss for the Chekists. Sajaya, Rakutin, and now Vasily... Year after year with Alexei.

'We're losing footage. Eternal glory to him. I would give Khomenko a Hero, but who will write the performance? It's a pity. And they won't.

Shcherbakov Alexander Sergeevich (1901-1945), colonel-general (1943), in 1938-1945. 1st Secretary of the MK and MGK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and since 1941 Secretary of the Central Committee.

2 Lieutenant General Vasily Afanasyevich Khomenko, before the war the head of the border troops of the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSR, and during the war the commander of a number of armies, a hero of the Smolensk and Moscow battles and the battle for the Caucasus, commanding the 44th army of the 4th Ukrainian front, died in battle in during the Melitopol operation on November 9, 1943 during artillery shelling of the front line. See also the diary entry of September 25, 1943.

ZSadzhaya Aleksey Nikolaevich (1897-1942), one of the heads of state security agencies, commissar of the State Security Service of the 8th rank, an old associate of L.P. Beria in Transcaucasia. In the bodies of the Cheka since 1921, since 1935 in party work in various regions of Georgia. During the war ~ member of the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front. He died on November 12, 1942 during the Nalchik defensive operation.

Major General Konstantin Ivanovich Rakutin (1902-1941), Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously), since 1940 was the head of the Baltic Military District, after the outbreak of the war he commanded the 31st and 24th armies. In the battles near Yelnya in October 1941, he died while leaving the encirclement.

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17/ŷ1-43

According to intelligence reports from London and New York, the Allies should land in Normandy in March 1944! They want to allocate 100 divisions for the operation. Good data before the meeting. Koba doubts, maybe disinformation? Maybe they toss us before the meeting. He instructed once again to think Vsevolod with his apparatus and double-check everything. It's a serious matter."

According to reports, 100,000 pilots are graduating annually in America. Horde of idlers. We put the boys on planes, there is no time to really teach, and every year they are 100 thousand bullies, and they don't fight. I have to tell Kobe to poke them in the face.

Publisher Help

From 28/11 to 1/XN-43, a conference of the leaders of the USSR, USA and Great Britain, was held in Tehran. Although the protection of the government and the top leadership in general has always been the prerogative of the state security agencies (at that time, the NKGB headed by the narcotics

In November 1943, the NKGB Merkulov did inform I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria about the preparation of the Anglo-American armed forces for the invasion of the territory of France in March 1944. The data were obtained not legally - from the leadership of the Allies, but through agents.

Stalin's doubts were well founded. On the one hand, by the spring of 1944 the German war machine and its economy were still very strong. On the other hand, in the autumn of 1943 it became clear that the Germans were losing the war, that the Red Army was advancing at the end of 1943 and would attack powerfully in 1944, but in 1944 it would face very difficult and bloody battles and the scale it is still difficult to determine the advance of Soviet troops to the West. To alleviate the position of the Russians ahead of time and get involved in a difficult war before the general strategic situation in 1944 was determined, the Anglo-Americans had nothing to do. And Stalin understood this.

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mom V.N. Merkulov), L.P. Beria, as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and a member of the State Defense Committee, bore overall responsibility for the safety of the Tehran Conference and all other special events during it.

19/j1-43

Rezo! reported what? all is ready. Vsevolod is ready by itself. Sergei too? General guidance for me. I'm taking Naum' and Sergo with me. Sergo's trip was coordinated with Koba. There was no such responsibility, you can't take everything under control. And I still look forward to the trip to rest. Sleep on the road. I will breathe in the southern air. And mountain air for sure.

6/HP-43

I returned from Tehran and spun, spun. It's good that the boss doesn't call me anymore. Once he had dinner. And that's it. He is now resting and thinking. This is happening more and more. You can understand, now we - the value. We need to think about what will happen after the war. No wonder Comrade Stalin ... (The phrase is not finished. - S.K.)

I remember Baku. It was a good time. He lived in poverty, had to pull his mother, sister, but still

See note 3 to the entry of October 21, 1943.

2 Undoubtedly, Tehran is meant.

First Deputy L.P. Beria on the people's commissariat Sergey Nikiforovich Kruglov (1907-1977) also took part in organizing the protection of tripartite allied conferences of 1943-1945
gg.

*Possibly, the well-known militant and planner of sabotage, Major General Naum Isaakovich Eitingon (1899-1981), since 1942, deputy head of the 4th (reconnaissance and sabotage) department of the NKVD (NKGB) of the USSR P.A. Sudoplatov.

% Son L.P. Beria Sergo Beria took part in the provision of special events during the Tehran Conference in 1943.

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lived without worries. Was young. I ate simple pita bread like sugar. Ate delicious! And everything I have is connected with Baku, everything started there, and it continued there. I so want to swim in the sea. At least in the Caspian. And if you get to Sochi!

When this war ends, the devil only knows. But it is clear that next year will not end. But they, mu..aki, will open the second front. Presses.

15/HP-43

Today, for the first time, Comrade Stalin held a conference at his place. We talked for a long time, Vyacheslav and Georgiy were sitting besides me, and so they came in and left. The General Staff reported the situation. We are stuck in the Crimea, the Germans in Ukraine are trying to advance in the direction of Kyiv. Cherkassy was liberated yesterday.

Koba's birthday is coming soon. He immediately warned that he would not receive any congratulations and in general he would not accept anyone. Wants to be alone.

21/HP-43

Unexpectedly Koba invited to his place. Me, Vyacheslav, George, Lazar, Anastas. And Zhdanov was. Koba was sad, drank wine, sang a little, Anastas sang along, but I said nothing. Koba is 64 years old. Already an old man. I'm twenty years younger. But when I first saw Koba, he was about the same age as I am now. But how can you compare?

He was an eagle, life beat out of him, he laughed all the time. He joked, never lost heart. And I...

Before the war there was nothing, but now I look in the mirror, a sad picture.

What makes war.

\ Official date of birth of I.V. Stalin - December 21, 1879

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22/HP 43

Today Koba didn't receive anyone, and he talked to the three of us for an hour. He, Vyacheslav, George and me. It doesn't look like yesterday at all, but it's not the same as always. Not that it's softer, but I don't know how to say it. We talked about the state of the Home Front, about the Second Front, about the mood of the people. He said that we were tired, but there was still a lot of work ahead. He spoke about the conversation with Benes. That sly one, both ours and yours, but spoke frankly with Koba - life forces.

I understand that Koba is counting on me and Georgy, and also on Zhdanov, most of all. Vyacheslav is more of a politician. And he never had an operational acumen. Yes, and he is often a weak politician. There is no flight.

Koba said that the Allies would not open the Second Front in the spring, he understood this in Tehran. He said: "They won't start before summer."

Let's see'.

31/HP-43

The year is over. Yesterday, close to midnight, Comrade Stalin raised a toast to the New Year and its reward? Right in the Kremlin. Mykyt came from Kyiv to congratulate and report. He knows how to arrive on time. And knows how to please, damn it. How he smiles, and you don't want to, but somehow you kind to him. Can. And Comrade Stalin smiled too. Yes, and nice. Kyiv and Kharkov so far are our main achievements in the liberated cities. Koba said so.

Mykyta brought photographs. A lot is destroyed.

See note 2 to entry dated November 17, 1943.

December 230, 1943 Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces M.I. Kalinin presented Marshal of the Soviet Union I.V. Stalin was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st class, for leading the operations of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War.

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Dneproges with a broken (so in the text. - S.K.) dam. It's good that we didn't let them go to Tbilisi.

New Year meeting with Nino and Sergo. I don't want to see anyone. Close your eyes, and in front of you are faces, faces, faces. And phones.

Tired.

To run around the field now, to drive the ball, as once. The chief said that I was getting fat, and I told him. (Record cut off. - S.K.)

1944

11/E-44

They carried out an operation on the Kalmyks. Unreliable people, it is necessary to relocate, away from sin. Koba said that we would still relocate. We do not need possible bases for German sabotage. Enough, learned. As long as the hands reach, it is necessary to do.

13/144

Golden guy Amo. Called, said, Lavrenty Pavlovich, could not congratulate you on the New Year, I congratulate you on the old New Year. I promise that this year the Volga residents will celebrate the New Year ahead of schedule.

I say, dear, I also congratulate you on the Star again. You deserve it, wear it. It's a pity the second is not allowed?. And come on, countryman, more guns. To salute was so salute. Laughs, says, so exactly, salute on the first number. To Berlin.

In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated December 28, 1943, about 100 thousand people of Kalmyk nationality were evicted to the Altai and Krasnoyarsk Territories, Omsk and Novosibirsk Regions.

The precedent for awarding the second gold medal "Hammer and Sickle" and conferring the title of twice Hero of Socialist Labor was created after the successful testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 in 1949, when Heroes of Socialist Labor B.L. Vannikov, N.L. Dukhov, B.G. Muzrukov.

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I say, you can get to Minsk for now.

So talk and live more fun. There are bastards. And there are golden people. We hold on to them. Who has not yet reached the Old New Year, but Amo New celebrated for a month and a half. This guy is still going to do great things.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Knowing the history of the war, to establish who L.P. Beria, it's not that hard. This is Major General of the Engineering and Technical Service (since 1943) Amo Sergeevich Elyan (1903-1965), a bright figure in the defense industry, but with a dramatic, if not tragic, fate.

From 1923 to 1926, Yelyan studied at the same Baku Polytechnic Institute, where Beria also studied and which Beria was not allowed to graduate from. From 1928, Yelyan was the secretary of the party committee, and from 1930, the director of the plant named after. CM. Kirov in Baku. From 1931 he was the manager of the "Ne Ftemash" trust in Baku, in 1932 he was transferred to Moscow, in 1935 he was on a business trip to the USA.

In 1940, Yelyan was appointed director of the Artillery Machine Building Plant No. 92 of the People's Commissariat for Armaments in Gorky. This plant played an outstanding role in the production of artillery weapons of the Red Army, and in 1943 Yelyan became a general and Hero of Socialist Labor. It was said about Yelyan's factory that he gave the country more guns than the entire industry of Germany gave the Wehrmacht.

In 1946, Plant No. 92 was connected to work on the Soviet Atomic Project, and Yelyan did a lot of work here, ensuring the production of diffusion machines for uranium enrichment LB-7 and LB-9 (according to Lavrenty Beria). It is significant that the developers named their cars so not from

flattery, but in recognition of the merits of the curator of the Atomic Project. Even after the murder of L.P. Beria, these machines were still called "LB".

¹See comment below.

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With the formation of a special KB-1 for the development of the Moscow air defense system "Berkut" (the chief designer of KB-1 was Beria's son, Sergo), Elyan became the head of KB-1.

Since 1951 A.S. Elyan ~ Deputy Minister of Armaments of the USSR Beria, completely devoted to him. However, after the fall of Beria, Elyan, a deeply decent and principled person, was also mixed with dirt by the Khrushchevites. The result - three strokes and ten years of "vegetative" existence in bed with a complete loss

memory.

Giving military honors to the general, Hero of Socialist Labor, three times winner of the Stalin Prizes, was forbidden by the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was already degenerating from communist into bourgeois.

21/1-44

The Anthem was approved at the Plenum. Was a State, became a Party. Kobe likes the new anthem, but I don't know. The words seem to be good, the music is not very pleasant. I think it's at first. There is something in it.

¹ LI-44 The session ended. "We carried out, even though it was a war. Almost everything was in uniform, but there was a strong smell of peace. Immediately so

The new National Anthem of the Soviet Union "Unbreakable Union of the Republics of the Free" (text by S.V. Mikhalkov and El-Registan, music by A.V. Aleksandrov) was adopted by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in December 1943 to replace the old anthem "International" and was first performed on the radio on the night of January 1, 1944. Widespread performance was introduced from March 15, 1944.

The reaction of the people to the adoption of the new anthem was ambiguous, which can be clearly seen, for example, from the special message of the head of the Smersh Main Directorate of Commodity, V.S. Abakumova I.V. Stalin No. 343a of December 23, 1943 on the reaction of military personnel to the new anthem (see: Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946. M.: MD; Materik, 2006).

The old anthem "The Internationale" was approved as the party anthem of the CPSU(b).

²From January 28 to February 1, 1944, the 10th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held in Moscow.

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to women in the same room. All the Republics have come. Spoke with his. Tbilisi is even under construction. Well, yes, they now have almost peace. After the war, we need to think about how to develop the resort area. People will miss rest, but for rest you need conditions.

Comrade Stalin received the Ukrainians with Mykyta, there were their poets, Dovzhenko from the cinema. Wept. Dovzhenko was crying because Comrade Stalin crushed him. Presented the film story "Ukraine on Fire". Strong nationalism! Comrade Stalin was angry.

Nationalism in Ukraine, this is serious, we understood this immediately after the annexation of the western regions. But here we need a subtle policy, which we conducted in the Caucasus. Ruthlessly suppress those who do not lay down their arms, break up the gangs and the underground, drag the intelligentsia over to their side, trust local cadres more and convince the masses with deeds? Mykyta is always

misunderstood and now has not corrected. It is already beginning to interfere with my guys in Ukraine to carry out my instructions.

Liberal nationalist tendencies were really strong in the film story "Ukraine on Fire". In a situation where nationalist extremists have expanded their mass and organizational base during the years of occupation, propaganda of such sentiments, and even by means of cinema, would be a mistake from any point of view. Stalin was absolutely justified in his anger.

The described algorithm of actions of the competent authorities is not only correct, but was always used by Beria in his national policy, when he worked in Georgia in the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU, the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee and the first secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia. He acted in the same way in Western Ukraine and in Western Belarus, in the Baltic States during his tenure as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

He persistently tried to put the same line into practice of political work in the USSR after Stalin's death and achieved a number of reasonable resolutions on this matter.

After the arrest and extrajudicial execution of Beria, these decisions were forgotten.

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The blockade has been lifted from Leningrad. We should go there, without publicity. Check something yourself, take a look. I think I can find time and admire Leningrad. Pulls the old, I want to build. We must ask Comrade Stalin for leave. The environment allows.

3/11-44

I'm leaving for a long time. First to Leningrad, to Zhdanov! For two days. Koba agreed with Zhdanov that we will not hold any meetings in public. This is not the summer of 1943. I want to see the destruction and understand personally, and then report to Koba what needs to be done to restore the architectural monuments." Koba agreed that this was an important matter. It was time. And then I surprised him.

He says: "Lavrenty, do you read Lenin?" I say: "No, Comrade Stalin, I haven't read it for a long time, I don't have time."

And he says: "I read all the time. When you read how you talk to Ilyich, I immediately hear his voice.

"No information about the secret trip of L.P. Beria to Leningrad during the war is found in the sources. However, this does not mean that such a record casts doubt on the authenticity of the diary. Stalin, Beria and Zhdanov had personal experience of the underground, so the idea L.P. Beria's secret visit to Leningrad without an official program could well have arisen with Stalin and found support from both Zhdanov and Beria himself.

2This motive additionally explains the reason for such an unusual trip by L.P. Beria (see also entry dated February 1, 1943). Judging by the record, Beria - still an architect and builder at heart - wanted to combine what was pleasant for him with what was useful for business. Architecture has always been a kind of outlet for him, and these two days in Northern Palmyra were supposed to be, in fact, a kind of short vacation given to him by Stalin. But if Beria went to Leningrad like Beria, then no vacation would have happened. And so he was distracted a little, and with the professional eye of an architect he was able to personally assess the situation for the subsequent report to Stalin. Although, of course, the main goal was, of course, personal confidential conversations with A.A. Zhdanov.

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Then he asks, do you remember "Less is better"?

I say, I remember it well, there are useful thoughts for the Chekist!

He laughed and agreed. Then he remembered how Lenin advised sending inspectors from the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to inspections in disguise. And he said: "Shuruy on this recommendation of Ilyich, go to St. Petersburg in makeup. So that there is no extra noise, and you can see more. I'll call Zhdanov and say what I advised.

I say, and what, you need to think. I myself thought. In 1943, when I went near Kursk, did I stick mustaches on? But there they might think that he had grown. Need to think.

He says, "Think about it."

So I will go to Leningrad in civilian clothes and in full make-up, I picked up a beard and glasses, at least go on stage. Kobe appeared, approved:

In one of his last works "Better less, but better" V.I. Lenin wrote about possible approaches to the work of the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Rabkrin), in particular, about the possibility of "special tricks in order to cover up one's campaigns", about the admissibility of "half-joking tricks" and concluded: "It seems to me that that our Rabkrin will gain a lot if it accepts these considerations for its consideration, and that the list of incidents ... will be enriched with many adventures of our future "rabkrinshchiks" and "Tsekakists" (employees of the Central Control Commission under the Central Committee. - S.K. .) in places that are not quite comprehensible in ceremonial and prim textbooks.

²See entry dated July 1, 1943

It is possible that the reason for such an unusual action was that Stalin wanted to create a kind of precedent for the secret departure of Beria from Moscow. By the 1940s, besides Stalin himself, only two people from Stalin's inner circle (Mikoyan and Voroshilov) had a good secret, but pre-revolutionary experience. Beria, as a professional Chekist, was out of competition here, and the need for such actions could arise both during the war and after it. Not without reason Stalin during the war, and later even in encrypted correspondence, often used the system of code names (Stalin - Vasiliev, Druzhkov; Zhukov - Konstantinov, etc.).

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Then without makeup - to the Caucasus. There it is time to deal firmly with all accomplices, with Chechnya and Ingush. There are no disagreements between Koba and me. This must be done. We eliminate the old tumor. The situation at the Front is complicated. Success is success, and we will win, no matter what the cost. To have a hostile army in your rear is useless. And if the Germans throw them weapons through the air? They asked us for weapons in 1942. It's good that they didn't give us, even though Maslennikov asked.

No, you can't give them a chance. It's not the case, but it's real.

Temporary resettlement is not an option. The Chechens are now angry, they have understood that they will not chime with them. The agency reports that talks about eviction among the population have already begun. Some are afraid of total eviction. Others believe they will evict accomplices. Armed resistance is possible.

Not forget. We must immediately think over the operation, taking into account the fact that the experience may be useful in the Crimea. We will soon liberate Crimea, and almost all Crimean Tatars collaborated with the Germans. Crimea is even closer to the front line, which will be established by the summer. So the Tatars will also have to be relocated.

Publisher Help

From the beginning of February to the beginning of March 1944, Beria traveled to the Caucasus with several operational goals. One of them was, as can be seen from the diary entry, an operation to evict Chechens and Ingush.

On February 17, 1944, Beria informed Stalin in cipher messages that a total of 459,486 people were registered,

Obviously, this refers to the commander of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front.

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to be resettled, that preparations for the operation are being completed, and that the operation itself is scheduled for February 22-23. Given the "seriousness of the operation," Beria asked Stalin for permission to "stay in place until the operation is completed, at least in the main, i.e. until February 26-27.

The operation was really serious and, as Beria and the Chekists foresaw, it was truly combative.

Beria, as a member of the GKO, also inspected the state of affairs in the Kuban, including in connection with the preparations for the liberation of Kerch from the occupied coastal bridgeheads near Kerch, and then the complete liberation of the Crimea.

20 11-44

Well, the audience is the old intelligentsia. A group of doctors, laureates, with Academician Gamaleya (he is already over 80 years old) turned to Comrade Stalin, calls him a marshal, asks to release Professor Zilber!, they are sure of his innocence. Aha!

Koba ordered to be released immediately, we will release tomorrow. The difficult time has passed, you can
goodbye.

It is always difficult with Moscow intellectuals. They eat and drink sweetly, but still they are ready to give a shit right there... on your head. The elders called in all

'Zilber Lev Alexandrovich (1894-1966), microbiologist, virologist, immunologist, academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences (1945), laureate of the Stalin (1946) and State (1967, posthumously) prizes, was awarded the Order of Lenin.

From the family of a military musician. The elder brother of the writer Veniamin Kaverin, one of the founders of the formalist literary group "Serapion Brothers" and a Jewish nationalist. Father of Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences L.L. Kiselyov (1936), a Soviet scientist in the field of molecular biology.

In 1929 - head of the department of the Baku Medical Institute and director of the Azerbaijan Institute of Microbiology, 1930-1937. – Deputy Director of the Moscow Bacteriological Institute. Since 1939 - in the Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology named after N.F. Gamalei of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, head of department. He was arrested in 1931, 1937-1939 and 1940-1944.

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living rooms in Moscow, that the Germans would soon occupy Moscow and Leningrad, that the end of the Soviet regime, they were scamming. I had to plant. And if they kept their mouths shut, there would be famous athletes. Where were these heroes in 1941? Real people to Sudoplatov and Orlov? went. Like the Znamensky brothers.

I played against Starostin in Tbilisi. That was a long time ago. I was young, and he was generally a boy. And he became such an asshole. Well, fuck him.

And these academics. All of them are wrong. To spoil the master, but to help - no. While the collapse, they croak. Get well, they lick ass. Exactly like Bukharchik? and Radek.

4/TU-44

We liberate Ukraine, and immediately new problems. OUN, nationalists. We carry out KGB military operations. The task force in the Rivne region eliminated the gang that attacked Vatuti-

'Cm. entry dated April 4, 1942 and commentary on it.

Mikhail Fedorovich Orlov, colonel, commander of the OMSBON of the NKVD of the USSR - a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes (a special military unit of the NKVD of the USSR of the reconnaissance and sabotage direction). Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, many famous Soviet athletes-champions served in this unit, including the Znamensky brothers, the scout Nikolai Kuznetsov, the fighters and commanders of the "Winners" detachment of Colonel Dmitry Medvedev, and many others.

ZBukharin Nikolai Ivanovich (1888-1938), Soviet party leader. Convicted and shot in the case of the Anti-Soviet Right-Trotsky Bloc.

Radek (Sobelson) Karl Berggardovich (1885-1939), Soviet party leader, journalist. Convicted in 1937 in the case of the Parallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center to 10 years in prison. Died in prison (killed by criminals?).

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on the. The data is accurate, there is an entry in the diary of the murdered leader.

I am sure the same will happen in Belarus and the Baltics. It's good that they carried out a comb immediately after joining and resettlement before the war. It's still hard. So far there is no way to conduct propaganda in the required volume, but I orient people that with one weapon and repressions we We will not suppress the nationalists.

It is necessary to work with the population and with the nationalist activists. Even with a head. I learned this well in the ZakChK. Nationalists are people too, not all animals and accomplices. Someone is confused, someone speaks from ideological positions. Nationalism is such a mess, just mixed. And it sticks tight. You can't get away from this fact. This is their land, they have a mass base among the local population, albeit not the majority.

So we cannot do without ideological opposition, and without trust in local personnel. A legalized bandit is better than a dead one. The family and relatives of a legalized bandit are not embittered, as if the father and husband were killed.

This is a fight for years.

Mykyt! zasr..net. Kobe said that the issue of nationalist gangs is greatly exaggerated, he will soon put things in order in Ukraine. But you x..y you will bring soon. This is a long business, it must be done wisely.

12 / 1U-44 The Romanians turn out to be good soldiers if they want to fight. Prepared from the prisoners full-blooded

'Certainly, we are talking about Khrushchev. It was in this style that he always worked. If everything ended successfully, he knew how to present success. When he failed, he repented before Stalin so sincerely that he succumbed to Khrushchev's complaints.

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division. Half of the sergeants. Artemiev! says the impression is good, and they studied well. 500 people from the captured Romanian sergeants were taught to be lieutenants. I ask Pavel, they will fight. He says they will.

And the Poles, as they were bastards, are bastards. Prepare for operations against the Red Army after entering the territory of Poland. Poles are attributed to us in Katyn. The Germans slapped them, but the Germans slapped them correctly. We will be calmer when we enter Poland. Less shit.

15/1U-44

Difficult situation on the railroads. Military echelons get stuck, there is a lot of stupidity, you have to use the local apparatus to the fullest and control it yourself almost constantly.

The situation with the loading of products at the factories, which we evacuated in 1941, is bad. Production has been launched, but the access roads are weak, there is nowhere to load. We must take it to the Operations Bureau. Intelligent guy Kovalev, "is not afraid to aggravate.

Artemyev Pavel Artemyevich (1897-1979), one of the heads of state security agencies, colonel general (1942). From 1918 to 1921 in the Red Army, then - in the troops of the Cheka-OGPU. From February 1938 - head of the Novo-Peterhof military-political school of the border and internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR, in August 1938 - commander of a separate motorized rifle division of special purpose named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky, from March 1941 - Head of the Operational Troops Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, with the outbreak of war - Commander of the Moscow Military District.

"Kovalyov Ivan Vladimirovich (1903-1991), in 1941-1944 head of the Department of Military Communications (VOSO) of the Red Army, from December 20, 1944 to June 1948, People's Commissar (Minister) of Railways.

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29 /TU--44

A week ago, I sent to the GOKO Comrade Stalin and Molotov, to the Central Committee, to Georgy, and to the Council of People's Commissars Anastas, a report on the food situation in the Sverdlovsk region according to the NKVD data for the Sverdlovsk region. Cities in the Urals are starving. Only in March in Sverdlovsk, Nizhny Tagil and Serov more than a thousand people died of dystrophy, according to incomplete data, more than 20 thousand people suffer from dystrophy! Mostly workers. All clear. They don't have time to plant a garden and speculate. Help is needed immediately. Tonight Koba called me, Georgy, Shcherbakov and Anastas. We thought about how to help the Urals. We agreed that Moscow would help.

Hunger will torment us for a long time. We have almost liberated Ukraine, we will sow, but how much will we collect? Mouths are added more than workers.

Koba spoke of my appointment as a matter of course? Rationale: Vyacheslav needs to switch more to foreign policy. Vyacheslav's joy is not visible that such a cart will fall down. An envious person, after all. And vindictive. Why envy?

But I am pleased. Koba will be trusted (so in the text. - S.K.) more work to me than to anyone else. Means

¹These data do not interfere with comparison with the statements of current Russian historians, etc. that the resettlement of Chechens, Ingush and Crimean Tatars was accompanied by human losses due to malnutrition, etc. on my way. There really were such victims, however, against the background of starvation deaths of thousands of those who honestly worked for victory; these victims look very different from what they present today. At the same time, it becomes clearer how difficult the food problem was in those years for objective reasons.

May 216, 1944 L.P. Beria was appointed Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin, becoming, in fact, the second person in the state.

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believes in my strength and knows that I organize my work well. The main thing is to select people and give them the opportunity to work and help. What is the demand without help? Koba understands this, he knows how to do it himself. Although he scolds me more than what (so in the text. - S.K.) whom, but heaps and piles work.

OK.

1/U-44

Yesterday I drove through Moscow. Beautiful again. I remembered how the numbers of October 15 or 16, 1941, also drove through Moscow. The quilted jacket took it, got into the cab of a lorry, a dozen operatives also in quilted jackets got into the back and drove off. How panic affects people and when there is no firm hand. What I saw then I never saw. Like right before my eyes. He came to Kobe and said that a special situation should be introduced and shot on the spot. Siberians were brought in and put in order.

Prepared a note to the GOKO on cleaning up the Crimea. Crimea is free, the Germans only have Sevastopol, and we will soon liberate it.

The operational-chekist situation is complex. There are many accomplices and direct agents from Tatars, Armenians, Greeks and Bulgarians. Greeks and Armenians were more engaged in speculation. The Bulgarians were more politically active and served the occupying authorities. Worse with Tatars. They committed atrocities. A Muslim activist was arrested in Sudak; in 1942, his detachment captured 12 of our paratroopers and burned them alive.

The Tatars hid. According to the situation, everyone should be evicted, like Chechens and Ingush. Approximately 200 thousand people in total. We also need cooperating national minorities. The main thing is to ensure the tranquility of the Tatars. The agents report that the deportation should proceed calmly, for the most part, because the Tatar

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The village is paralyzed with fear. They understand that according to the laws of wartime, all male youth can be shot as deserters; in 1941, almost all of them deserted.

Established a medal for the Caucasus. Koba looked, said that you first on the chest? I say, to me, comrade Stalin, not the first, but the last will also be offended!

Laughed.

17/U-44

Tonight, Koba was in the presence of Georgy and Vyacheslav, when everyone left, congratulated me on the appointment. "Georgy sincerely congratulated Vyacheslav on the effort. Shtemenko was the last to leave? with Antonov." Then Koba invited me to dinner. He said a good toast. Just returned .

22 /V--44 Today was the day of international talks. During the day I talked with a group of captured Romanian generals.

See entry dated January 17, 1943.

On the day of the appointment of L.P. Beria as Deputy Chairman of the GKO, May 16, 1944, I.V. Stalin began to receive from 20.10 and received 13 people. L.P. Beria appeared in the office of the Chairman of the GKO at 20.35 together with G.M. Malenkov. V.M. Molotov was there from 20.10 alone with Stalin until the arrival at 20.25 A.Ya. Vyshinsky and V.G. Dekanozov. Reception lasted until 0.10, the last 15 minutes. in the office were only I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria.

3ZShtemenko S.M. (1907-1976), General of the Army (1948), from May 1943 Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, after the war from 1948 Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

'Antonov Alexei Innokent'evich (1896-1962), general of the army (1943), holder of the Order of Victory. In 1943-1945. First Deputy, 1945-46 Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

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Most were captured near Stalingrad. I spoke to each one separately. They do not know the operational situation, they have been in captivity for a year and a half. All elderly people, over 50 years old, have been serving for a long time, so the general situation was described correctly.

I think if you behave smartly with the Romanians, you can count on a quick withdrawal of Romania from the war, but only after our strikes and reaching the Romanian border. I think you can even count on military assistance. They can help a lot. The end of the war, it is necessary to atone for guilt. I think they will fight the Germans well. So I'll report to Koba. And then we'll see.

In the evening I spent three hours at Koba with the Poles. Was Wanda Vasilevskaya. Smart grandmother. And pleasant. Looks a bit like Nino.

26/U-44

Pervukhin sent Comrade Stalin a note on Mimosa? Separately, Vyacheslav and me. Prosit to take together with Kurchatov for a report. And he wants to shift everything onto me. Special Council on Uranium, I am the Chairman, Pervukhin is the deputy, members are Molotov and Kurchatov.

I don't know Kurchatov well, but I feel that I need to support him; Pervukhin is evidently afraid of sole responsibility. So far, he knows more than anyone else about these matters, and his possibilities are limited. Not even a GOKO member. I don't pull myself

'Cm. notes 2 and 3 to the entry of September 30, 1943 v.

"This refers to the NKGB Vsevolod Merkulov and his intelligence apparatus. The "emigrant" is most likely the German emigre physicist Klaus Fuchs, who was involved in work first on the English, and then on the American atomic project and transferred to Soviet Union extensive first-class information.

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no, he's right. I need to step in and take matters into my own hands. Now it is not 1941, you can deal with Uranus in earnest.

I spoke with Vsevolod, they dug up Uranus over the cordon this year. He says the Emigrant is especially helpful. We must speak with Pervukhin and have him take Kurchatov with him. We need to get to know each other better. Then I will report to Comrade Stalin.

The main thing is to choose people. Pervukhin asks Koba to create a special Council on Uranus under the GOKO with me as Chairman, and he is Deputy Chairman. Ugh, damn, I already wrote it down. I'm getting tired.

Report to Comrade Stalin as important.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

In 1943, the gradually expanding work on the uranium problem in the USSR was supervised by V.M. Molotov, as a member of the State Defense Committee and directly, as a technically more prepared leader - People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry of the USSR M.G. Pervukhin (he also knew the electric power industry well).

May 19, 1944 M.G. Pervukhin sent a memorandum to I.V. Stalin on the problem of uranium and attached a memorandum to I.V. Kurchatov - also in the name of Stalin.

On May 20, Pervukhin also sent almost the same text to V.M. Molotov, Stalin's recent deputy for the State Defense Committee, and Stalin's new deputy, L.P. Beria. Beria read the note on May 25, 1944 and noted: "Important. Submit Comrade. Stalin. Talk to Comrade Pervukh[other]. Collect everything that is available on uranium. 25.\.44" (see: Atomic project of the USSR: Documents and ma

On May 116, 1944, L.P. Beria was appointed Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin, becoming, in fact, the second person in the state.

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Materials / Under the total. ed. L.D. Ryabeva. T. J. Part 2. Doc. 234, p. 74). |

Before that, Beria periodically got acquainted with the state of the uranium problem in the USSR. Before the division of the unified NKVD into the NKVD and the NKGB in the spring of 1943, he prepared and sent Stalin an information note on atomic issues. However, after the separation of the people's commissariats and the departure from the operational leadership of foreign intelligence, L.P. Beria was not directly involved in the Soviet atomic problem, although he was informed - as a member of the GKO. Only from about May 1944 did he join it more and more actively - apparently, and in accordance with his understanding of the importance of the problem, and, willy-nilly, as the second person in the state.

This fact is reflected in the diary entry dated May 26, 1944.

Running a little ahead, it can be noted that back in July 1944, Kurchatov addressed Pervukhin as the first person in uranium. So, on July 11, he informs M.G. Pervukhin about the exceptional value of materials for uranium-graphite reactors received from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the KA, and on July 17 he even reports on such an insignificant event as a fire in laboratory No. 2 with losses of 22 thousand rubles. The resolution of M.G. Pervukhin at the report on the fire: "Comrade. Kurchatov. Precautions must be taken. Pervukhin. 17.Mb. This is a classic example of bureaucratic rather than business approach. It is not surprising that Kurchatov reacted accordingly to this "specific" lofty instruction and melancholy noted on the returned report: "I read. Kurchatov. 07/17/44.

It is interesting to compare the "resolution"-response of M.G. Pervukhin at the report on the fire and the reaction of L.P. Beria to the note of M.G. Pervukhin and I.V. Kurchatov dated July 10, 1944 "On the development of work on the problem of uranium in the USSR", sent to Beria as Deputy Chairman of the GKO. This document contains an energetic resolution: "Personally, to comrades Kovalev (an unknown person, obviously from the apparatus of L.P. Beria. - S.K.) and Kuptsov (Kuptsov Alexander

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Vasilyevich (1910-?), chemical engineer, from 22.04.42 Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on issues of the chemical industry. - S.K.) together with Comrade. Pervukhin to prepare a draft decision (Term - five days). L. Beria. 15/M!--44".

It is also characteristic that L.P. Beria addresses in his resolution to the subordinate of the Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR N.A. Voznesensky 34-year-old A.V. Kuptsov, which shows good knowledge of L.P. Beria of the executive apparatus in the sphere of public administration, even beyond the issues that were within its competence.

All this, as can be assumed, prompted Kurchatov to appeal directly to Beria. The fact that the initiative came from Kurchatov betrays the style of both the notes and the draft Resolution of the State Defense Committee, as well as a later letter from Kurchatov personally addressed to Beria (see note 1 to the entry dated 10/3/44).

21/U--44

Pervukhin's note does not get out of his head. Sam reported to Koba, but do not believe that this can be done. Sounds like nonsense, destroying an entire division with a truckload of explosives. But the Americans will not waste their money, so this is either misinformation or the truth. Scientists think it's true. The GOKO has already understood this issue, something is being done. But in any case, there is no money for this yet, and we will not be able to allocate many people!

28 /U—44

Still, the approach of the end of the war is felt. Koba often has foreigners, I begin to switch more often to work on the released

The recording is interesting as evidence of how the psychology of L.P. Beria - from the natural doubts of a man of the pre-atomic era in the possibilities of intra-nuclear energy to the active work of one of the creators of the real atomic age.

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districts. Guests came from Tbilisi, they are starting to build something new. Showed from old memory projects, potsiganili (so in the text. - SK) money. We will not give money, but let them build. We are also building a subway here in Moscow. This is politically correct, and it is necessary to build.

Koba consults with the generals every day, plans the offensive of this year. It was decided to advance and advance. For me it means: technique and technique. Factories work steadily, we let's give.

Metallurgists from Lomako are asking for help. The Stupino Plant of Light Alloys in the Urals produces aviation forgings from aluminum, but it cannot cope. It is necessary to strengthen cooperation in shaped foundries. This will also help tankers with diesel engines.

It's almost summer. It has not come yet, but consider it already gone.

2 /U1T-44

Tonight, Comrade Stalin, under Vyacheslav, said that he had read Pervukhin's note on uranium and hinted that I would probably have to get involved in this matter. The conversation was between the three of us. Vyacheslav became gloomy, grunted that he couldn't cope?

Comrade Stalin remained silent and shrugged his shoulders. The conversation was short, there was no one except us in the cabin. Then people went and never returned to the conversation.

We must immediately pick up all the materials on the line of Vsevolod and Pervukhin and talk over them separately.

See also entry dated November 12, 1944.

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but with Hovakimyan. It's time for me to educate myself on this subject.

6/V1-44 The Allies opened a second front, began landing in France. We hurried. We, too getting ready.

16\1-44

A break formed, Comrade Stalin did not call, he completely switched to Front-line affairs. Prepares an attack. I quietly clean up the tails.

We must prepare for operations against bandits in the liberated regions of Byelorussia, and especially in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. And separately in Poland, there is also a political moment. Koba is a major expert on the national question, but does not really understand the importance of prevention and

flexibility in the matter of nationalist manifestations. Nationalists must be deprived of the soil, and if you just uproot even with the roots, all the same, the roots will remain, and uproot again. You can't do without reliable, dedicated local personnel. But while my guys are more agitating av

1Ovakimyan Gayk Badalovich (1898-1967), major general (1945), doctor of chemical sciences, graduated from the Moscow Higher Technical School in 1928, postgraduate studies at the Moscow Institute of Chemical Technology in 1931 and postgraduate studies at the Military Chemical Academy. Since 1931 he was mobilized in the OGPU, worked in intelligence, since 1939 he was a resident of legal residency in the USA, in 1940 he was a graduate student at the New York Institute of Chemistry. In May 1941, he was arrested after meeting with an agent framed by the FBI. After June 22, 1941, by order of President Roosevelt, he was released. Upon his return to the USSR, since 1941 he was the head of the department of the 1st (intelligence) Directorate of the NKVD. Since 1943 - Deputy Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR, responsible for the collection of atomic information. In 1947 M.G. was invited. Pervukhin to the post of director of Research Institute No. 94 of the USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry. In 1955, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, he was deprived of the rank of major general "as having discredited himself during his work in the bodies."

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tomatoes. What to do, the rear of the Army must be clean.

I talked with Kaftanov, I'm setting aside time for conversations with Hovakimyan. It becomes clearer. If the Uranium Bomb is not a bluff, it will be a coup. You can't fall behind, but we've already fallen behind. And while you do nothing. Not good.

22 /U1-44

We've been fighting for exactly three years. What to say? Nothing. Where is happiness? He is not here.

OK.

24/U1-44

Is the offensive going on in Belarus for the second day? Comrade Stalin is determined. Did he receive Berlinga with us ?, said that we would soon enter the territory

Sergey Vasilyevich Kaftanov (1905-1978), statesman, physical chemist by training, graduated in 1931 from the Moscow Institute of Chemical Technology. From September 1937 he was a senior instructor of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, from December 1937 he was the chairman of the All-Union Committee for Higher Education under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In 1941-1945. authorized by the State Defense Committee for coordinating scientific research in the field of chemistry for the needs of defense, since 1946 Minister of Higher Education of the USSR.

On June 29, 1944, the Belorussian operation "Bagration" of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts began. It lasted until August 29, 1944. During the operation, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Minsk (July 3), Vilnius (July 13), Siauliai, Kaunas, and Brest were liberated. Our troops entered the borders of Poland. On July 27, 1944, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front liberated Lvov and Stanislaw (Ivano-Frankivsk) during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation.

ZBerling Zygmunt (1896-1980), Polish military figure. Being in the rank of colonel in the Polish army of General Anders, formed on the territory of the USSR, he refused to be evacuated with the army to the Middle East in the autumn of 1942, and remained in the USSR. In 1943, he began the formation of the Kosciuszko Polish Division, from August 1943 he was commander of the 1st Polish Corps, from July 1944 he was deputy commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, general of armor.

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riyu Poland and go further. Good mood. They noted a little at Koba, for everything at once - both for the four fronts and for the three years of the war.

15/UP-44.

Received a new note from Pervukhin and Kurchatov on Uranus!. It can be seen that the areas of work are being determined, but the organization is weak and there are few forces. They presented a draft resolution of the GOKO signed by Comrade Stalin. According to the project, I am the chairman, Pervukhin deputy, Kurchatov member. Yes, this thing needs to be done.

20/USh-44.

In two months? I completely forgot about my friend. It wasn't before him. There has never been such a summer in my life. Everything stretched out in one strip. All fronts are continuously advancing, the demand for armaments and equipment is huge, vast territories have been liberated, everything must be dealt with at once. It seems like always, but it fell.

All the liberated territories are affected by banditry. So far, it is mainly political banditry, German agents, gangs of stragglers, accomplices, nationalists, UPA", and residual groups of Germans are active. But there is already criminal banditry. We will simply liquidate criminals while the time is hot. Nationalists rarely give up, you have to beat them out.

I remind the reader that back in July 1944 Kurchatov addressed Pervukhin as the first person in uranium.

"The current large-scale events on all fronts and the emergence of a new military-political factor - the second front in Europe did not allow either Stalin or Beria to be distracted in the summer of 1944 by matters that had no immediate operational significance. The solution of the issue dragged on for another three months - until December 3, 1944

3 Obviously a typo, the previous entry was made a little over a month ago.

"Ukrainian Insurgent Army, armed nationalist formations.

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Difficult with Lviv. Poles crowded there under the Germans, up to 40 thousand, they came to live from Warsaw, Krakow. Lvov trash, speculators, fled with the Germans, but the Polish man in the street remained. Strong Polish nationalism, Polish flags hang on the streets of Lviv. With OUN! Poles are at enmity, but without shooting. They only fight against us. These are flowers, when we occupy Poland, it will be worse.

I think our propaganda will not be effective. Poles have worse nationalism than in the Caucasus. In the Caucasus, there were no big claims to foreign territories, and among the Poles, even the layman talks about Poland from sea to sea. Poles from the regional army behave impudently in Vilna." Our general at the Mass Grave of those who died for the liberation of Vilna said that they died for the liberation of the capital of Lithuania. Polish soldiers approached our officers and said that Vilna had never been and will not be Lithuanian".

I told Kobe, let him take it into account.

Organization of Ukrainian nationalists Stepan Bandera. Actively cooperated with the Germans during the entire period of preparation for the war and during the occupation.

2 Craiova Army (AK) - armed formations of the Polish government in exile in London. Both the rank and file, and especially the non-commissioned officers and officers of the AK, were anti-Russian and anti-Soviet.

The veracity of such information is beyond doubt. After the First World War during 1919-1920. there were constant military frictions between the two bourgeois "remake" states - Poland and Lithuania. As a result, by 1920 the Vilnius region was

occupied by the Poles and annexed to Poland. Polish Vilna became the Lithuanian Vilnius and the capital of Lithuania only after the Soviet-Lithuanian treaty was signed on October 10, 1939, according to which the Vilnius region of the USSR was transferred to Lithuania. In fact, declaring both this treaty and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 23, 1939 invalid from the moment of signing, the current Lithuanians deprive themselves of the rights to their own capital, since the annexation of the Vilnius region by Poland was recognized at one time by the Entente .

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2/TX--44.

Our work on the Scandinavians has been a success! Vsevolod came and boasted with a satisfied air. He says, now just have time to reap. Yes, we seem to have scared the Finns. The Swedes are also afraid, their neutrality was sewn with white thread all the time. We need to talk to Andrey, he has a bright head and a character.

8 /TX--44.

Zhdanov asked for help in working with the Finns, information and people. He told Vsevolod that he needed help.

15/1X-44.

In Ukraine, we carry out continuous KGB-military operations. UPA losses up to 30 thousand only killed. Replenished by stealing the draft contingent to the Red Army.

It's not the point.

Our losses in Ukraine in August were up to 1000 people of the operational staff and troops of the NKVD, of which up to 700 people were killed.

Koba has been feeling unwell for almost a month, rarely appears in the Kremlin, I constantly go to

From the context and dating of this entry, it follows that we are most likely talking about Finland. On September 4, 1944, she announced the severance of relations with Germany. In this diplomatic success of the USSR, the activities of a number of former employees of Beria, in particular Zoya Rybkina (Voskresenskaya), played a significant role. In 1944, foreign intelligence was no longer subordinate to Beria, referring to the NKGB of Vsevolod Merkulov. However, confidential business and personal contacts between Beria and Merkulov, of course, have been preserved, as can be seen from some of the records of L.P. Beria in his diary.

2Obviously, this refers to A.A. Zhdanov, who knew how to pursue a very effective policy towards Finland.

3See note on previous entry dated September 2, 1944

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Middle. Since he is not well, additional work falls on me, especially in the GOKO line. Reported on Slovakia and Bulgaria'. It is unlikely that we will be able to keep Slovakia, there will be no problems with Bulgaria. I spoke with Dimitrov even before our entry into Bulgaria. Vsevolod advised the Bulgarians not to disclose our agents, but to give our orientation to those whom it would be useful for Dimitrov to know.

Do you have to work with Lazar more often now? He takes it abruptly and with a voice, but there is a grip. He goes to places, I don't have such an opportunity. He says that people in the liberated territories are doing very well in the reconstruction, but the occupation is making itself felt. I tell him that although I don't go, I know from the operational reports how many trash are left, and how the people are in poverty.

Through the Operations Bureau, Lazar is a good help. But Arutyunov? reports that they have a lot of chatter in the people's commissariat, meetings with the people's commissar for three hours and to no avail, only shakes people. Maybe recommended

On August 129, 1944, German troops occupied Slovakia, and on the same day the Slovak National Uprising began. After a while it was suppressed.

On September 5, 1944, the USSR declared a state of war with Germany's ally Bulgaria; on September 8, 1944, Soviet troops entered Bulgaria; on September 9, 1944, an armed uprising began in Sofia. Bulgaria withdrew from the war.

Kaganovich Lazar Moiseevich (1883-1991), an outstanding Soviet party and statesman, member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the CPSU from 1930 to 1957, in 1941-1945. GKO member. In 1943-1944. People's Commissar of Railways, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

c Arutyunov B.N. (1889-1953), Soviet statesman, Hero of Socialist Labor. In 1939-1946. Deputy People's Commissar of Railways, in June 1941 a member of the GKO Council for Evacuation, since 1942 First Deputy People's Commissar of Railways, a native of the NKVD.

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give Kobe Arutyunov? He has been on the railroad for a long time, he knows the work. No, old, Koba prefers put the young.

23/1X--44.

Koba gathered us in the Kremlin in a small group: myself, Vyacheslav, Georgy, and Shcherbakov. Before us, he received Hariman (as in the text. - S.K.) and Kerr?, then, together with us, he heard Antonov and Shtemenko about the situation at the fronts and tasks for the future. Before the end of the year we will completely liberate our territory and enter East Prussia, and maybe even further. After the war, Koba spoke about the conversation with the allies. He said that it is necessary to prepare well for the winter offensive, because the closer to the end the allies think more not how to end the war, but what will happen after the war.

Beria treated Arutyunov with trust, and he seemed to deserve it, being one of the old "workhorses" of the NKPS. In any case, Arutyunov received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for his work in transport during the Great Patriotic War. However, in 1944, Arutyunov was already 55 years old - a bit too much by the standards of the Stalinist people's commissar, so Beria hesitated on the issue of appointing Arutyunov as people's commissar instead of Kaganovich with good reason. As a result, I.V. was appointed. Kovalev (see note 1 to the entry dated April 15, 1944).

"Harriman William Averell (1891-1985), in 1943-1946 US Ambassador to Moscow.

% Kerr Archibald John Clark (1882-1951). From January 1942 to January 1946 he was British Ambassador in Moscow.

Alexey Innokent'evich Antonov (1896-1962), general of the army (1943), holder of the Order of Victory. In 1943-1945. first deputy, in 1945-1946. Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

"Shtemenko S.M. (1907-1976), general of the army (1948), since May 1943 chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, after the war since 1948 chief of the General Staff and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

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Already when we were leaving, he detained me and warned me that Churchill would arrive soon (so in the test. - S.K.). He said we'll talk separately tomorrow.

1/X-44

Koba has Lublin Poles again! Vasilevskaya too. I need to talk to Koba about me discussing a number of issues with them separately.

3/X-44

Kurchatov again? sent a letter directly addressed to me. He writes that a concentration of scientific and engineering forces in the problem of Uranus, unprecedented in scale in the history of world science, has been created abroad. He asks for instructions on the same organization of work with us.

While things are going poorly, I know this without Kurchatov. Maybe it's time to talk to Koba. I asked Vyacheslav and Pervukhin, they somehow evade, apparently they are afraid to put the question before Koba resolutely, while Pervukhin has no opportunities. I'll have to. I'm afraid that Koba will put this on me too. OK. In the People's Commissariats, things are more or less settled, everything else, too. Turnover. After the war it will be the same (so in tech

Members of the allied USSR Polish Home Rada, B. Bierut, E. Osobka-Moravsky, V. Vasilevskaya, Rola-Zhymersky, and others.

Only one letter from Kurchatov to Beria during the war is known - dated September 29, 1944. Most likely, this is what we are talking about. Data on earlier letters are not available.

% In addition to the duties of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, during the war on L.P. Beria was entrusted with monitoring the work of the people's commissariats of the oil and coal industries and communications. He was also involved in the control of the metallurgical industries. Beria also headed the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee, which considered all current issues.

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ste. - S.K.) the best, only easier. And this case is new, big, it will suit me.

I would like to take over the construction after the war, the cities are destroyed, it is possible to re-plan and build in a new way. And in Moscow you can too. But Koba won't give me the construction. Too easy! Builders what! They build from what the industry gives them. And it is harder to make industry work than construction. So Koba is everything

'I have already reported this, however, in order to make the essence of such a statement clearer to the reader, it does not hurt to recall that the distribution of duties in the State Defense Committee (GKO, GOKO) according to the GKO Decree of February 4, 1942 was as follows.

V.M. Molotov was supposed to exercise control "over the implementation of the decision of the GOKO on the production of equipment" (primarily tanks. - S.K.).

G.M. Malenkov was supposed to personally control the implementation of the decisions of the GOKO on jet mortars and, together with L.P. Beria ~ "implementation of the decisions of the GOKO on the production of aircraft and engines" and "on the work of the Red Army Air Force (formation of air regiments, their timely transfer to the front", etc.).

Personally on L.P. Beria was entrusted with control over the production of weapons and mortars; on N.A. Voznesensky - for the production of ammunition, and on A.I. Mikoyan - "for the supply of the Red Army (clothes, food, fuel, money and artillery)..."

In reality, from the beginning of the war, Beria was engaged not only in the issues officially assigned to him then by the Decree of the State Defense Committee, but also in charge of those issues that were officially listed as N.A. Voznesensky. And soon L.P. Beria was transferred - at the request of the tank builders themselves, whom he helped a lot - and questions of tank building. It is not for nothing that among the first leaders and workers of the atomic problem of the USSR there were so many former

tank builders (suffice it to recall B.G. Muzrukov, L.N. Dukhov, A.M. Petrosyants, designers - the future Heroes of Socialist Labor V.F. Grechishnikov and D.A. Fishman).

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will still give me something difficult. And Uranus is just difficult and on a grand scale. It is necessary to think over what Kurchatov writes.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Already from the entries in the diary of L.P. Beria, one can see how Kurchatov's latent dissatisfaction grew with the way Molotov, and Pervukhin, treated the uranium problem.

As early as September 8, 1944, Kurchatov reported in writing to V.M. Molotov about the start-up of the cyclotron at Laboratory No. 2, expressed to the addressee "heartfelt gratitude for the help" and ended like this: "I would be very glad if you could devote at least a little time and get acquainted with this installation." However, Molotov, although his workload was less than that of the same Beria, did not respond to the invitation.

And on September 29, 1944, Kurchatov sent a letter to Be

Another confirmation that we are talking about a letter from Kurchatov to Beria dated September 29, 1944. There is no exact data on sending the letter, but the diary entry of L.P. Beria proves that it reached the addressee. The subsequent development of events also proves this. In particular, there is a version of the draft Decree of the GKO on uranium of November 1944, where the original form of paragraph 2 of the draft dated July 10, 1944 "Reorganize Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences into Research Institute No. 2 under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR" is - looked differently, namely:

"To reorganize Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR into the State Research Institute No. 100 and transfer this institute to the jurisdiction of the NKVD of the USSR (comrade Beria). Approve the director ... of Institute No. 100 Academician Kurchatov I.V. and Deputy Director - Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR Professor Kikoin I.K. Create a Technical Council at Institute No. 100. Instruct tt. Beria and Malenkov within 15 days to select and approve the composition of the Technical Council.

Here one can see a clear counter movement towards each other of the two future main figures of the Soviet atomic problem - the wording of paragraph 2 betrays the authorship of both Kurchatov and Beria. In fact, their active cooperation was realized within the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on Uranium.

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rii, written, obviously, by hand - due to its extreme confidentiality. It is possible that even before that he had addressed directly to Beria, but only the draft of this letter was preserved in Kurchatov's personal archive - without a formal classification stamp and without the mark "Ex[employer]. the only one", which Kurchatov usually put on his handwritten documents. The content was extremely closed.

Kurchatov informed Beria that he had become acquainted with reconnaissance materials on uranium and stated that things were going "absolutely unsatisfactorily" in our country, despite "a big shift in the development of work on uranium in 1943-1944." It also said what is reflected in Beria's diary about the concentration of forces.

An interesting ending to the letter:

"Knowing your extremely busy schedule, nevertheless, in view of the historical significance of the uranium problem, I decided to disturb you and ask you to give instructions on such an organization of work that would correspond to the capabilities and significance of our Great State in world culture."

It seems that Kurchatov already understood that in the person of Beria he was dealing with a personality of a truly historical scale.

10/X-44

I spoke with Vsevolod on Uranium affairs. Called Pervukhin. According to Vsevolod, the Uranium Bomb is a real thing and the Americans will receive it next year and use it in Europe.

Sergo is almost an adult guy. Who will he be? He has a head. I tried to accustom him to independent work, but all the same, from childhood he had something that we could not even dream of. This, of course, affects children. Take Vaska? He's a good guy, but he doesn't know how to hold back.

'Cm. note 2 to the entry dated September 30, 1943. This, of course, is about Stalin's son Vasily.

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16/X-44

Churchill has been sitting with Koba for the third day (as in the text. - S.K.). In Tehran I had to get to know each other personally, but here I take care of him at a distance. The British strongly nasr..li in Warsaw ', activated the regional army, now after the suppression of the uprising, the active core is spreading across the liberated territory. They don't meddle in the Ukraine, and in Western Belorussia one has to deal with new White Pole gangs.

It's hard in Western Ukraine. OUN is active. Heavy battles, our people are dying, there is little to confess, we get more in operations.

Lublin Poles? do not get out of Moscow and from Koba. The situation is delicate. Koba leads his line. And on my line with Poland, there are continuous problems. Sent Serov? to Lublin to strengthen the Polish organs. There are solid holes, and the London parts "will become impudent. The Germans have organized some kind of government in their part of Poland, they are releasing the Poles from the camps. So in Poland there is porridge, and who needs to slurp it?

Lawrence.

On August 11, 1944, the anti-Soviet Craiova Army, provoked by the London government in exile, raised in Warsaw an uprising doomed to failure, suppressed by the Germans (for more details, see, for example, S. Kremlev. Myths about 1945. M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2010. S. 45-79).

See note to entry dated October 1, 1944.

%Serov Ivan Alexandrovich (1905-1990), in 1941-1954. Deputy, First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, in 1954-1958. Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Hero of the Soviet Union (1945, stripped of his title in March 1963).

"I mean, of course, units of the Home Army, led from London.

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Baibak! well done, oil is going well, but there is something incomprehensible in it. Have to pull. It is a pity for him, but oil is needed, and he is executive, but the core is weak.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

In his memoirs of the Yeltsin times, Baibak-Baibakov, highly appreciating Stalin, did not find a single kind word addressed to Beria. At the same time, Baibak often simply slanders him, sometimes exposing himself in his lies. But, apparently, it was Beria, almost

who daily dealt with Baibak during the war years as the curator of the oil industry, and recommended him to the post of people's commissar instead of I.K. Gray hair.

Ivan Korneevich Sedin (1906-1972), from the Cossacks, member of the CPSU (b) since 1928, in 1939-1952. member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Hero of Socialist Labor (1944), graduated in 1937 from the Moscow Chemical Technology Institute

'Baibakov (real name Baibak, which, as we see, Beria knew about) Nikolai Konstantinovich (1911-2008), Soviet statesman, Hero of Socialist Labor (1981). Graduated in 1932 from the Azerbaijan Industrial Institute. Since 1940, deputy. People's Commissar, from November 30, 1944 to 1946 People's Commissar of the Oil Industry of the USSR. Since 1948 Minister of the Oil Industry of the USSR. After Stalin's death, since 1955 Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, in 1957-1958. was sharply demoted by Khrushchev due to fears of hidden Stalinism, but by the end of Khrushchevism he restored his position, and under Brezhnev he sharply strengthened it, becoming in 1978 again the Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR (until 1985). In 1988 he retired.

If we analyze the life path of N.K. Baibak, one can only be surprised at L.P. Beria, who recognized some hidden poor quality of the "oil" deputy commissar and people's commissar. He managed to stay afloat under Stalin, and under Khrushchev, and under Brezhnev, and under Yeltsin and Putin, having lived out his almost century-old life at the bread post of vice-president of the International Fuel Energy Association. It is interesting that Baibak became a Hero of Socialist Labor only in 1981 - on the occasion of his 70th birthday. For some reason, he did not wait for such an award from Stalin, although he worked hard and not bad.

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them. D.I. Mendeleev and soon moved from industry to party work. On July 3, 1940, he was appointed People's Commissar of the Oil Industry of the USSR and remained in this post until November 30, 1944, when Sedin was transferred to the reserve of the Central Committee, and Baibak replaced him. At that time, without the support of Beria, such an appointment could not take place in any way. Nevertheless, Baibak in 1990 only inked Beria ~ it seems, in order to please the conjuncture, which by the beginning of the 90s. quite determined.

26/X-44

Uranus is taking more and more time, and it is not there anyway. It is necessary to develop the search for and extraction of raw materials, this is the main thing at the moment. It is necessary to actively build factories. Instructed Makhnev! deal with the actual situation. An exceptionally smart worker. Voznesensky can be envied. This guy alone is worth

the whole device."

`In this entry, for the first time, two names appear that will become prominent in the history of the Soviet Atomic Project - Vasily Makhnev and Avraamy Zavenyagin.

2Makhnev Vasily Alekseevich (1904-1966), major general of the engineering and technical service, Hero of Socialist Labor (1949), laureate of the Stalin Prizes (1951, 1953). He graduated from the Agricultural College and the Institute of National Economy, then - in the system of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and State Control in Vyatka, Gorky, Leningrad, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok. Since 1940, deputy. People's Commissar of the State Control of the USSR, in 1941-1944. deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition of the USSR, at the same time in 1942-1945. deputy GKO member N.A. Voznesensky. From August 1945 to 1953 he was a member of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and head of the Secretariat of the Special Committee.

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I involve Zavenyagin, Chernyshov, Safrazyan? and Kuptsov*. Geologists should be cursed."

1/XE-44

Koba warned that he was inviting me to his house in the evening to celebrate the anniversary of October. The four of them left in faith: he, I, Vyacheslav and George. Vyacheslav received diplomats and was tipsy. Koba saw it, was also amused, and made fun of Mr. Molotstein. Then Anastas, Klim and Budyonny were added.

When we parted, I tried to talk to Koba about what I would do after the war. I ask: "Maybe construction?"

Koba looked into my eyes and directly said: "Bom-

Izavenyagin Avraamiy Pavlovich (1901-1956), statesman, lieutenant general, graduated from the Moscow Mining Academy (1930). In 1941-1950. Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs of the USSR, in 1945-1953. member of the Special Committee and the Technical Council of the Special Committee, since 1949. 1st Deputy Head of the Nuclear First Main Directorate (PGU) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in 1955-1956. Minister of Medium Machine Building of the USSR (MSM - the successor to vocational schools).

Chernyshov Vasily Vasilyevich (1896-1952), Colonel General (1945), in 1944 Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

ZSafrazyan Leon Bogdanovich (1893-1953), Lieutenant General (1945), in 1944 Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

'Kuptsov Alexander Vasilyevich (1910 -?), chemical engineer, since March 22, 1942. Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the chemical industry.

See also note 1 to the entry of 15 July 1944.

Most likely, this refers to the insufficient scope of exploration work to search for uranium deposits.

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you will fight." Then he thought and added "And to everyone else." And how cut!.

12/X1-44

Today I had a conversation with Belov, a metallurgist. Remember how I helped with the unification of factories? and boasted that they had set up such production that during the war they would raise the question in the Council of People's Commissars on the production of consumer goods from aluminum.

I ask what exactly? Says: bowls, spoons, forks. Does not rust and is medically beneficial. Tried to support. He promised to support. This is very good when we were torn away from the national economy, and now we are giving material from military production for domestic needs.

20/XT-44

Makhnev and Kurchatov prepared a draft Decree on Laboratory No. 2. It's a complete mess, the work is being carried out handicraft, they could have acted more actively. Makhnev reports that Kurchatov keeps a stock of 4 grams of radium in a potato pit. And this is a very valuable and expensive material. Makhnev says that almost everything that is in the USSR is now with Kurchatov. I asked Kurchatov, confirms.

1This entry is interesting not so much even from a historical point of view, because the very fact that Beria was assigned the leadership of uranium work less than a month after this conversation (see the second entry of December 3, 1944 and note 2 to it) proves that Stalin had already chosen Beria as the curator of the uranium problem. And this record is interesting primarily from a psychological point of view, as a detail of the personal relationship between Stalin and Beria.

2See entry dated May 28, 1944

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There is no housing for them, the Moscow City Council does not allocate premises. Mud.ki! It will be necessary to gouge Pronin."

Kurchatov is distracted for every fuck..en. He has already complained that the more the work unfolds, the more they turn him into a business executive. Makhnev confirms. This thing needs to be broken. Kurchatov needs to pick up an intelligent assistant from the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat and give him a direct connection with me.

26/ŷ1-44

Kurchatov recommends scientists for work on Uranus. Landau recommends, praises. This is a clear anti-adviser, already sat. But here at the discretion of Kurchatov. He is a pure man, although he is a scientist. Even surprising. He does not fawn, he does not build a genius out of himself. Laughs.

Tomorrow we will hear from Koba the military. We must understand when we will advance in the new year. And where to step. The offensive must be well supported materially. We will provide! Learned!

We will end the war in the new year, the question is when? I spoke with Shtemenko, the barbel sighs. He complains that the owner is pressing, he sets tough deadlines. Shtemenko and the commanders are afraid that the weather will fail in Europe in January. Now the bad weather is very hampering us, slowing down the pace. Not 1941, technicians a lot of.

2/KhP-44 Kotin out of old memory came to me with a proposal for the IS-7. Malyshev does not support him,

'Pronin Vasily Prokhorovich (1905-1993), chairman of the executive committee of the Moscow City Council, in 1944-1946. 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.

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and Kotin promises some special new tank. It will be necessary to consult with the military, is there a great need for it? It's time to think about a heavy tractor and a bulldozer, and not about a tank. But tanks too redundant

we won't.

3/HP-44

Before the meeting at Koba's, I spoke with Shtemenko and asked Chernyakhovsky about the tank. A young guy, brave, understands the matter well, judging by the results. Also, a tanker. I like the behavior, I live by business. Suggested something useful. We must also talk to Malyshev.

The French were at Koba's yesterday. Also a problem.

'At the end of 1944, the design bureau of Experimental Plant No. 100 came up with the idea of developing a new heavy tank IS-7 ("Joseph Stalin-7"). Hero of Socialist Labor Zhores Kotin - tank designer, chief designer of the Kirov plant and deputy people's commissar of the tank industry V.A. Malyshev, did not find support from the people's commissar in this matter and turned directly to L.P. Beria as Deputy Chairman of the GKO. Beria supported the idea, and the tank was quickly developed. It did not take part in hostilities - even the IS-3 heavy tank did not participate in the Great Patriotic War - however, this development had its significance for the development of Soviet tank building. And Kotin's appeal to Beria through Malyshev's head to a large extent characterizes all three.

Chernyakhovsky Ivan Danilovich (1906-1945), army general, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. From 1942 he commanded a rifle division, a tank corps, and an army. Since 1944, commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

See also note 1 to the entry of 18 February 1945.

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3/HP-44'

Just returned from the Kremlin. Koba said he approved of the GFCS resolution on Uranus, which was adopted at the Operations Bureau on November 22. He said in the presence of Georgy and Shcherbakov, without Vyacheslav?,

10/HP-44

Mykyt and Ryasnoy? again nah..eventili in Ukraine on the nationalist underground. There is already enough stupidity, but they neglect preventive measures, press hard, and hence the discrediting of the authorities and the militants become embittered. The second day I swear with Mykyta at Koba's.

'Two entries for one number are explained, presumably, as follows. The first entry, judging by its content, was made at night from December 2nd to 3rd after the return of L.P. Beria from the meeting in the Kremlin, which ended on December 3 at 00:45, and the second recording - on the evening of December 3 after the meeting, which ended at 21:30.

The top secret (Special folder) detailed GKO Decree No. 7069ss "On urgent measures to ensure the deployment of work carried out by Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences" was dated December 3, 1944. The last, tenth, paragraph of this Decree read: "10 . Assign to Comrade Beria L.P. monitoring the development of work on uranium".

Stalin did not sign the Decree, but simply agreed with it without amendments. The reason for his refusal to sign the document lay, most likely, in the fact that at that time Stalin could not afford even a minimal insight into the essence of atomic problems, and without having a clear opinion on some issue, he with his opinion on people didn't come out.

In fact, the further fate of work on uranium and the question of managing them were already predetermined on November 22, 1944. Then, in the presence of I.V. Kurchatov at a meeting of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee chaired by L.P. Beria adopted a draft Decree of December 3, 1944, and it was decided to submit it for Stalin's approval.

Zryasnoy Vasily Stepanovich (1904-1995), in 1944 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. His policy in Ukraine more often coincided with the line of N.S. Khrushchev than with the line of L. Beria.

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13/HP-44

There was a big separate conversation about Ukraine between Koba and Mykyta. We decided that they would hold a plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee, and we would conduct preparations together, and we would also work on the draft Resolution of the Central Committee of Ukraine together.

We also talked about other manifestations of nationalism and banditry. In Ukraine, this is the most widespread, but it is not good in Western Belarus, Poland and throughout the Baltic states.

Reported to Kobe about the Belopolska bandit organization of Ragner, a former Polish lieutenant. It was created by the Germans in 1943. It conducted counter-guerrilla warfare, was supplied by the Germans, and operated in Belarus. After her release, she reoriented herself to the London government and got in touch with the regional army. We recently her! eliminated, Ragner killed. But

the example speaks for itself. White Poles are ready to cooperate with anyone, only against the Soviets.

Koba listened attentively, agreed that it was necessary to act in combination, with weapons and words. It is also important (so in the text. - S.K.) the supply of the former occupied territories.

I switch more and more to the affairs of the NKVD and the national economy. And now there is a webbing on Uranus?

I mean, of course, not the entire Home Army, but specifically the Ragner gang.

2See note 2 to the diary entry of December 3, 1944.

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15/CHI-44

Today I talked about the Kotin tank! with Koba, there were only George and Anastas. Koba called Georgy and me for ten minutes.

I called yesterday at the end of work. There was no one in the office, there was only Mykyt. I wonder what they were talking about?

Koba was interested in data on the production of weapons. We are preparing for the winter offensive, ready according to the weather. We reported, and then I briefly spoke about Kotin's proposal, in front of Mykyt. Not very convenient, he is on good terms with Malyshev. But to hell with them. Koba said that he would think about it, consult, but it was evident from his appearance that he reacted positively.

Mykyta probably grimaced to himself. And I reminded him about the resolution on the nationalists. Koba looked at him and immediately nodded his head.

17/HP-44

Arutyunov reports that paralysis of the railways may occur. The wagons are idle, loading is falling, the turnover of wagons has increased sharply. And we are preparing by the end of January and not later than the beginning of February a broad offensive on all fronts. We must act urgently. Arutyunov believes that Lazar will not rectify the situation, I myself see from reports from the field. Koba is unlikely to agree with Arutyunov's candidacy for a replacement, he treats Kovalev well, especially after he got into a fight with Koba himself

'See note 1 to the first entry dated December 3, 1944. One must understand that Khrushchev nodded, Stalin had nothing to nod at.

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track width on the fronts!. The guy is young, just turned 40 years old. Arutyunov is already over 50. We will have to urgently raise the issue of the NKPS and the replacement of Lazar. We urgently need to talk to Koba one on one."

1 The essence of the conflict is not exactly clear. It can be assumed that the disagreements arose because of the different gauges on Russian (and then Soviet) railways (1524 mm) and European railways (1435 mm). The question of the track width was not idle. If on the territory of the European states occupied by the Red Army we were restoring the European gauge, then the organization of transshipment points would be required (replacement of the wheeled bogies of the wagons), which would greatly complicate the work of the People's Commissariat of Railways.

IV. Kovalev was appointed People's Commissar of Railways on December 20, 1944 at a meeting with Stalin with the participation of L.M. Kaganovich, A.A. Zhdanova, G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria. At the same meeting

Deputy I.V. Kovalev was appointed B.P. Beshchev (1903-1981), who replaced I.V. Kovalev in 1948 at the post of the Ministry of Railways and remained there until 1977.

1945

1/1-45

The New Year has begun. Surprisingly, throughout the war years I met him at home, even in 1942. Comrade Stalin understands that one cannot drag the strap indefinitely. We need rest too. When do you want to be at home the most? In the New Year.

This year should end the war. But how? And when? For me, the war never ends and never will. I can't stand the second one, but there will still be some.

I wanted to become an architect, but I became the devil knows who ... All at once, and after that there will be nothing left. No, a new

Interestingly, one of the heroes of E. Hemingway expressed similar thoughts, saying that the world was entering a period of undeclared wars for decades, and he signed the contract for the entire term.

L.P. Beria graduated from the Baku Mechanics and Technical School in 1919 as a technician-architect and received such thorough professional training that, for example, he was able to make a technical project of his own dacha.

In his autobiography of 1923, he wrote: "...in 1920, with the transformation of the technical school into a polytechnic institute, I enter the latter. From that moment on, regular education ceased and my studies at the institute continued intermittently until 1922. However, during all this time I did not lose contact with the institute, and only in 1922, in connection with the transfer of me by the Regional Committee of the RCP from Baku to Tiflis, I stop teaching, being listed by this time as a student of the 3rd year.

This is how my studies in Baku, which began here in 1915 and continued intermittently until 1922, are interrupted."

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Tiflis will remain!. And they will still forget. They didn't let me build," and they won't.

No, I'll still build! The agency reports that they have built an entire industry around Uranus. This means that we will also have to build a whole new industry and cities along with it. Is it necessary to organize a separate design institute for these purposes?

Sergo grew up, handsome. Looks like a grandfather. You look

'When he was the 1st secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and at the same time the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, L.P. Beria took an active part in the development of the plan for the socialist reconstruction of Tbilisi and in the reconstruction itself. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that Tbilisi has become the most beautiful, well-planned and harmoniously combining historical and new building city, largely thanks to the care and architectural and planning talent of Beria.

The 1923 autobiography was written by 24-year-old L.P. Beria in support of his request to let him go to study. He, by that time the Deputy Chairman of the Cheka of Georgia, a member of the Tiflis Council, wrote: "During my party and Soviet work, especially in the bodies of the Cheka, I lagged far behind both in terms of general development, and also without completing my special education. . Having a vocation for this branch of knowledge, having spent a lot of time and effort, I would ask the Central Committee to give another opportunity to give their experience and knowledge in this area to Soviet construction, and the party to use me as it sees fit.

Is it possible to call a person who thinks in this way an unprincipled careerist? Perhaps only notorious scoundrels and slanderers can be capable of this. However, today's advanced "democrats" and "reformers" only consist of them.

This idea L.P. Beria was indeed implemented later in the form of the Leningrad State Special Design Institute No. 11 (GSPI-11) of the vocational school under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, transferred to the vocational school from the People's Commissariat of Ammunition.

L.P. Beria generally attached great importance to the creation of a powerful construction base for the nuclear industry, and was also attentive to the planning and development of "nuclear" cities.

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and grandchildren will go. Koba Vaska! I lived very unevenly, I don't know if he will get better after the war. And the guy is good. Setanka? everyone looks to the side, but Vaska is direct and open. It's hard for Kobe, life didn't work out. For people like us, it cannot be asked. Do we have life? We have activities.

12/1-45

Kharchenko? - smart guy. Meticulous. Looks like Tkachenko." He'll be a good helper. And then we'll see.

15/1--45

Just returned from the Kremlin. Koba was preparing for a trip to the Crimea*, received allies, and then immediately I reported on security measures. On our own land, it is both easier and more difficult. No matter how you pull the guys up, it's more difficult to ensure vigilance at home. Considers

Vasily, son of I.V. Stalin.

2Svetlana, daughter of I.V. Stalin.

3Obviously, L.P. Beria for work in the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

"Perhaps, one of the employees of L.P. Beria according to the NEVD before the war and according to the State Defense Committee during the war, Lieutenant General I.M. Tkachenko. He was authorized by the State Defense Committee in the Urals, carried out the tasks of L.P. Beria in the liberated Baltic States, and from April 1947 he was appointed, among others, authorized by the Council of Ministers of the USSR during the construction of plant No. 817 (plutonium plant) of the CCGT under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

About the work of I.M. Tkachenko found little information, but there is reason to believe that although Beria scolded him at times, he appreciated him.

° This refers to the trip of I.V. Stalin to the Crimea for the Yalta (Crimean) conference.

On January 815, 1945, Stalin received the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe, the British Air Marshal Tedder, as well as the heads of the US and British military mission in Moscow, Generals Dean and Archer, General Ball and Rear Admiral Betts.

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Xia, houses and walls help. They help, if he himself is not a fool. I remember that it was easy to work with emigrants in Tiflis when they came from behind the cordon. They immediately relaxed, and even the Cheka under their noses did not frighten them as much as they were afraid of it in Paris!

I will not be officially part of the delegation. It's a shame... I am also Deputy GOKO, but Vyacheslav is still visible. And Lavrenty will forever remain a workhorse.

19/1-45

The chief held a short meeting and warned that it was unlikely that we would see each other before leaving. He will have a lot to do on the Fronts. We are advancing strongly, we have taken Warsaw. This year the war will end. All for that.

I will leave for Crimea a little earlier. I agreed with the Chief that everything should be checked in advance on the spot. And I will breathe mountains. At least in the Crimea.

The British will occupy the Vorontsov Palace, the Americans - Livadia, we - Yusupov.

Publisher Help

From February 4 to February 11, 1945, near Yalta in the Crimea, the Crimean Conference of the Heads of the Allied States I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, which was attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and England and a number of military leaders.

'It must be understood that Beria recalls here the times of his work as the head of the secret political department of the GruzChK, when he very skillfully, due to psychological pressure and taking into account the mood of the arrested emissaries of the Georgian emigration, achieved rapid and major success in the decomposition and liquidation of the counter-revolutionary underground.

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17/1-45

Koba collected for the first time after the Crimea. There were a lot of questions. It's good that things are going well at the Front. We are advancing.

Peace talks are already starting. After the military, they heard Lyubimov! and Smirnova'. Anastas asked. He, too, begins to move from the needs of the Front to Peaceful matters. Should agriculture be supported? Too bad there isn't the right person for the job. I would take it. I held separate plenums of the Central Committee on citrus fruits, and separate meetings on tea, which helped. But Koba won't let me go to agriculture. And I would take it. And I would!

18 Lj -45 At the meeting, Comrade Stalin announced that Chernyakhovsky had died. He was a good guy, capable.

1LP-45 Vsevolod sent the latest information on Uranus. Well done, lots of specific information.

Lyubimov Alexander Vasilievich (1898-1967) - in 1939-1948, People's Commissar (Minister) of Trade of the USSR.

Smirnov Pavel Vasilyevich (1894-1954) - in 1938-1946. People's Commissar (Minister) of the Meat and Dairy Industry of the USSR.

On February 323, 1945, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution "On the state plan for the development of agriculture in the USSR for 1945".

"Chernyakhovsky Ivan Danilovich (1906-1945), twice Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. During the fighting in East Prussia, he was seriously wounded and died on February 18, 1945.

See also note 2 to entry of 3 December 1944.

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It can be seen that our "friends" have come a long way!

Vsevolod reports that they can expect their result in two or three months. This means they can hit the Germans under the curtain. It doesn't benefit us at all. Maybe try to slow down somehow? Or maybe it's still a bluff? Can we be led by the nose? No, it's all going to that. Kurchatov is confident that America is on the right path and is close to success.

It's time to think about the issues of extraction of raw materials. New features coming soon*. We need to talk to Malyshev."

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Interesting entry. In reality, the first nuclear explosion was carried out by the United States on July 16, 1945, at the test site in Alamogordo (New Mexico), that is, about two months later than it was indicated in Merkulov's letter. How can this be explained? On the one hand, our intelligence received quite accurate information from the United States. On the other hand, one hundred

February 128, 1945 People's Commissar for State Security V.N. Merkulov sent L.P. Beria a detailed letter on the progress of atomic work in the United States. Merkulov reported that "the energy of an atomic bomb with a total weight of about 3 tons will be equivalent to the energy of a conventional explosive weighing from 2,000 to 10,000 tons," and further said: "It is believed that the explosion of an atomic bomb will be accompanied not only by the formation of an explosive wave - us, but also the development of high temperature, as well as a powerful radioactive effect, and that as a result of this, all life within a radius of up to 1 kilometer will be destroyed.

2 See comment below.

3 In a letter to VN. Merkulov reported on uranium ore deposits in Czechoslovakia - "in the Sudetenland, in the vicinity of Joachimstal on the southern slopes of Erzberg, 20 kilometers north of Karlsbad (Karlov Vary. - S.K.)."

* Malyshev Ilya Ilyich (1904-1974), from 1939 to 1946 Chairman of the Committee for Geology under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, from 1946 to 1949 - Minister of Geology of the USSR.

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crowns, the test period could not be met for objective reasons - due to the complexity of the task being solved. So, in the USSR, the initial deadlines for the development of RDS-1 were not met.

However, Beria's record suggests that some instructions could have been given to Soviet agents in the United States about the maximum delay in the American test. Stalin did not need an atomic bomb against Hitler. But the United States could have used its bomb against the Germans if it had been ready before the end of hostilities in Europe. In any case, the test of the US Bomb sometime by mid-April 1945 could have become a strong factor in political pressure on the planning by the Soviet command of the final operations of the Great Patriotic War, up to the Berlin operation.

10/1-45

Now we have to get into international affairs more often. We are now all over Europe from the Balkans to Norway. The allies are not happy about this, they are heavily bombarding those territories that will retreat to us.' It is necessary to prepare the transfer of Industry to Peaceful rails. We finish the calculations of everything that is destroyed. A lot of money. How much was built, now it is necessary to restore. And ahead of the Uranium Works, and this is also a pretty penny.

'So it was... On March 15, 1945, 1,350 American bombers, escorted by 750 fighters, made a massive raid on the Berlin area, and British aviation began to use superheavy bombs. On March 18, 1945, 1,300 American bombers escorted by 700 fighters made the largest daytime raid on Berlin, which lasted more than an hour, and dropped 3,000 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs on the city (20%

"Hiroshima norm"). By the end of March and during April, such raids became commonplace. At the same time, the purely military effect of them was incomparable with the costs, but the future Soviet zone of occupation turned into a desert.

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26/Sh-45

Had a long conversation with Koba. Just him, Vyacheslav, Georgy and me. He now discusses the most serious questions only with us. So far, the overall picture is unclear. America is finishing work on the Atomic Bomb. They have huge heavy aircraft, they bomb the Germans hard. They fight unsteadily, but the strength is great.

England has weakened, but force holds. France doesn't count, but we'll see.

Many in Europe are drawn to us, and many are afraid. Roosevelt demands three votes for America in the new International Organization. Churchill (so in the text. - S.K.) already wants to fight not with the Germans, but with us. Well, they won't let him. And we can't leave Europe either. The authority of the communists is great, can we gain influence and even power in Poland, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, for sure, in Czechoslovakia Gottwald? can too.

Hungary and Romania too. Maybe Albania and Greece. France is unlikely.

Difficult with Germany. Here we will face the allies again. Koba thinks it's better to have in the future

On March 196, 1945, Stalin talked for a long time, from 17.00 to 20.30, in the Kremlin about something with Molotov, Malenkov and Beria. The diary entry sheds light on the theme of this enigmatic conversation. Well, it was really necessary for Stalin to think over promising problems together with his most intelligent and promising employees Beria and Malenkov and his closest colleague Molotov. Another potentially relevant interlocutor, Zhdanov, was at that time in Leningrad.

On April 23, 1945, US Secretary of State Stettinius announced at a press conference that President Roosevelt was withdrawing this requirement.

ZKlement Gottwald (1896-1953), in 1929-1945 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, since 1945 Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Czechoslovak Republic, since 1948 President of Czechoslovakia.

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united Germany, but neutral and really without an army. This is true. And Germany must receive good reparations in kind. Goodness is there. The Allies will not bomb everything.

Straits issue. This is a dispute with Turkey. And Koba doesn't know if it will be possible to keep Iran? You can try to attach the Azerbaijani part to us. There are more Azerbaijanis in Iran than in our country. You can try.

Next is China. It will also be different there. But this is where America gets in the way.

Japan must be at war. Koba is determined to wash away the shame of the Japanese war. He says so. It is necessary to return Sakhalin and get the Kuril Islands.

Finland also cannot be given away. Enough, I've had enough.

Russia and Ukraine have been destroyed and must be rebuilt. Food is bad. The mood of people is different, you have to go to meet the priests. Not everyone will listen to the agitator of the Central Committee.

The war will end, trophy wares will begin, which is also a problem.

We have lagged behind in science, there was no time for science. And it is necessary to develop, especially in Atom. There is not enough personnel (so in the text. - S.K.), we need to prepare.

Lots of work, few people. And how much more will the Atom take.

We have now entered the world politics, you can't move. And the country is in ruins. After the civil war, all the work went inside, and now it is necessary on two sides.

How not to break.

The cat is worried.

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3/TU-45

Vyacheslav and Polina have completely become diplomats. Tomorrow they give breakfast in honor of Churchill's wife (as in the text. - S.K.). Polina met her at the airport and gave her flowers." I teased Vyacheslav, I said, don't forget, diplomats wipe their noses not with their left sleeves, but with their right ones.

And why offended? He will have breakfast, Nino and I will not be invited there. Well, fuck her in the mouth, this Clementine. Let him have breakfast. We are still somersaulting with this Churchill.

Vyacheslav is going to America." There he will have breakfast up to his throat.

Publisher Help

On April 5, 1945, the Soviet Union announced the denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941. Interestingly, this act was not reflected in the diary of L.P. Beria. There can be only one explanation for this - for statesmen of his level, moreover, at that time, on the one hand, it was important that it concerned primarily his problems. On the other hand, since the issue of war with Japan had long been resolved for the Soviet leaders, the formal act of denunciation no longer worried Beria very much.

1Zhemchuzhina-Molotova Polina (Peri) Semyonovna (1897-1960), Soviet statesman, wife of V.M. Molotov.

On April 22, 1945, at the invitation of the Government of the USSR and the Executive Committee of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the chairman of the British Committee of the Russian Relief Fund, the wife of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Clementine Churchill, arrived in Moscow.

April 4, 1945 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov and his wife P.S. Zhemchuzhina Molotov was given a breakfast in her honor.

3In the second half of April 1945, V.M. Molotov left for the USA. On April 21, 1945, he arrived in Washington and then left for San Francisco.

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13/1U--45

Roosevelt died. For now, Truman will be in his place. He said that he would continue Roosevelt's policy. We'll see, but it's unlikely. We need to talk to Koba and Vsevolod. It would be necessary to find out whether Roosevelt himself died, or helped. It would be easier for us to negotiate with him. Even if they have the Bomb.

21/1U-45

Koba received the Catholicos." Also the right thing to do.

Have you agreed with Georgiy? that his people will assist the physicists in the removal of people and equipment for uranium. As soon as we occupy the territory, we must immediately begin. Igor“
made lists of

'Undoubtedly, this means V.N. Merkulov, Commissar of State Security of the USSR.

On April 21, 1945, Stalin spoke with the Deputy Catholicos of All Armenians, Archbishop Georg Cheorekchyan.

ZS August 21, 1943 GM. Malenkov held, among other things, the post of chairman of the Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the restoration of the national economy in areas liberated from German occupation. The Committee also included L.P. Beria, A.I. Mikoyan, N.A. Voznesensky, A.A. Andreev.

On February 21, 1945, by a decree of the GKO, permanent commissions were created at the active fronts, with the task of ensuring future reparations. I would like to note the interesting detail that the chairman of the commission under the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front (commander G.K. Zhukov) was Pavel Mikhailovich Zernov, the future head of KB-11, the first Soviet center for the design of nuclear weapons in the village of Sarova in Mordovia.

“Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov, academician, scientific director of the Soviet Atomic Project. The figure in this project, equivalent to the figure of L.P. Beria and Beria's closest assistants - A.P. Zavenyagin and B.L. Vannikov. This name is constantly found on the pages of L.P. Beria. But I draw your attention to the fact that if at first L.P. Beria calls Kurchatov by his last name, but soon enough begins to call him in his notes by his first name. Illustrative fact!

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tsam and ours, whom to send where. The first one of these days will leave, the main group will go after the surrender of Germany. It is necessary to get ahead of the allies, they are already roaming the occupied territory.

According to Vsevolod and the General Staff, the Germans have advanced far in the Uranium affairs, although not in the same way as the Americans. We need to look for specialists and we need to export the necessary equipment.

We are ending the war, but my squirrel wheel keeps turning and will turn. Operational Bureau, Koba, People's Commissariat, Kremlin, Near and again Koba. All the time on the nerves, but getting fat. They say they lose weight from nerves. Hell no!

Life went unusual. Was at a reception in honor of Tito, today in honor of Bierut. He - Take, I Be-

‘I.V. Kurchatov already had access to intelligence materials at that time, and as a physicist he knew quite well the personal composition of the German community of physicists. Therefore, the employees of the NKVD of the USSR were engaged in the selection and invitation of German specialists not blindly. The selection of the required scientific equipment was carried out in the same way, since many leading Soviet physicists went to Germany in the spring and summer of 1945, including: A.I. Ali

khanov, I.N. Golovin, V.A. Davidenko, V.P. Dzhelepov, I.K. Kikoin, Yu.B. Khariton.

*In the USA, the search for valuable scientific information and its carriers, that is, scientists and engineers, was carried out by the so-called Alsos mission. Its capabilities and scope of action can already be judged by the fact that the Americans captured the entire top of the German Uranium project, led by Heisenberg, and the entire top of the Reich rocket men, led by General Dornberger and Wernher von Braun.

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riya, it seems like, but not like '. He would have my worries. And me him.

2/U-45

The war is almost over. Now again we have to deal with the residual effects. Did you report to Koba with Serov? There is a lot of work in Germany and Poland, and Western Ukraine is worried.

I would like to drive everywhere myself, assess the situation. But Koba won't allow it. But I will still get to Germany. Koba will go there one way or another. Will have to combine.

9/U-45

Zhukov reported that the surrender had been signed. I spent the whole evening at Koba's. He was thoughtful, but it is clear that he was pleased. Everyone looked at Klim when they left the office, even hugged him. I did not invite you to the Middle. Said he wanted to be alone. Koba had three of us, Klim, George and me. They sat for a long time, the conversation was about different things, now about the case, then Koba and Klim recalled the civilian and Tsaritsyn.

Said tomorrow night waiting for us again.

April 11, 1945 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin gave a dinner in the Kremlin in honor of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Yugoslavia, Marshal I. Broz-Tito. From the Soviet side, there were members of the Politburo and the State Defense Committee, a number of people's commissars, admirals and generals, leaders of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, etc.

April 21, 1945 I.V. Stalin gave a dinner in the Kremlin "in honor of the President of the Home Rada of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. B. Bierut, and the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic, Mr. E. Osobok-Moravsky" (Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. OGIZ: 1947.T.G]).

Serov Ivan Alexandrovich (1905-1990), in 1941-1954. Deputy, First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. See also note 3 of 16 October 1944.

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10/U-45

Another evening at Koba's. Again, the three of us, Klim, me and George. Vyacheslav is far away, in America. Once again, Koba didn't look like himself. He was even softer and even brushed away a tear. I don't recognize myself either.

All the same, they dumped such a load that it's hard to believe. What a load has been dumped!

14/U-45

Shcherbakov? died strangely. Things were on the mend, and so unexpectedly. However, he survived until the Victory. That's how, someone dies of grief, and he turns out of joy. Pity the man.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

This entry refutes another lie of Khrushchev, who "remembered": "Beria then correctly said that Shcherbakov died because he drank too much. He got drunk and died." Beria was not closely acquainted with Shcherbakov, but, as we see, he was loyal to him. But in Khrushchev's "memoirs" - in contrast to reality - everyone drank like a dead man, starting with Stalin.

But here are the dates of birth and death of Stalin's constant "drinking buddies" - according to Khrushchev - "drunkards" of Stalin: L.M. Kaganovich (1893-1991) - 98 years old; V.M. Molotov (1890-1986) - 96 years old; CM. Budyonny (1883-1973) - 90 years old; K.E. Voroshilov (1881-1969) - 88 years old; G.M. Malenkov (1902-1988) - 86 years old; A.I. Mikoyan (1895-1978) - 83 g; ON THE. Bulganin (1895-1975), 80 years old.

IV.M. Molotov returned from the USA on May 15, 1945.

Shcherbakov Alexander Sergeevich (1901 - 05/10/1945), Soviet party and statesman, secretary of the Central Committee, first secretary of the Moscow City Committee and Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, candidate for

members of the Politburo. Head of the Department of International Information of the Central Committee, Colonel General (1943), head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.

ZSm. comment below.

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Alcoholics don't live that long. And against the background of this company of Stalinist centenarians, the supposedly "teetotaler" N.S. Khrushchev (1894-1971) with his 77 years of life in a particularly outstanding way doesn't look.

But today, there is practically no doubt that Shcherbakov's early death should not be blamed on alcohol, to which Alexander Sergeevich was not committed, but on doctors from the "Kremlyovka" - the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary Department.

23/U-45

Academician Komarov! I informed Comrade Stalin about the proposal of the French professor Joliot Curie to cooperate on Atomic Energy and handed over his letter. Asks for a meeting with Comrade Stalin or Vyacheslav. Koba gave me a copy and ordered me to think it over.

Should I talk to Igor? and Vsevolod." Need a comprehensive check without haste.

I'm working on uranium more and more. Besides Borisov?

Komarov Vladimir Leontyevich (1869-1945), academician (1920), geographer, botanist, since 1936 President of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Hero of Socialist Labor (1944), winner of the Stalin Prizes (1941, 1942).

2The famous French physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie (1900–1958), later the organizer and first head of the French Commissariat for Atomic Energy, addressed such a request to V.L. Komarov during his stay at the anniversary session of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in June 1945. After careful consideration of F. Joliot-Curie's proposal, this idea, for quite understandable reasons, was rejected.

ZI.V. Kurchatov.

"V.N. Merkulov, Commissar of State Security of the USSR.

"Borisov Nikolai Andreevich (1903-1955), civil engineer, major general, since 1944 head of the ammunition department of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, since August 20, 1945 Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, head of the 1st department of the State Planning Committee, created by specifically for the uranium problem, and at the same time deputy head of the "atomic" First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

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took from Voznesensky Makhnev!. This dunduk does not appreciate him. Tough guy, even I'm jealous. Everything important will be pulled.

Voznesensky will have to work hard.

Commanders of the Fronts are coming to Moscow. Reclaimed. And I have to fight.

21/U-45

In a new business, the main thing is to select people and develop a plan. We have been working on uranium for two years, but only now will we start in earnest. Little has been done before. Scientists crept up without me. Let and

further attracts Igor. My business: the selection of leadership and control. Vannikov is a groovy man, he will work well. Zavenyagin will also be needed.

We must cleverly attract the Germans. Have you spoken to Baron Ardenne? European. It is immediately evident that he values himself, does not like us, but he will work. You just need to create good conditions for him. Directly asked where he would like

See also note 3 of the March 8, 1949 entry.

1Makhnev Vasily Alekseevich (1904-1966). Before the war, he worked in the system of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate; People's Commissar of the State Control of the USSR, in 1941-44. deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition, in 1941-45. Deputy member of the GKO N.A. Voznesensky, then until 1953 a member of the Special Committee and head of the Secretariat of the Special Committee, Hero of Socialist Labor (1949), laureate of the Stalin Prize (1951, 1953). See also note 1 to the entry of 26 October 1944.

That's right: Ardenne (Agdeppe).

Ardenne Manfred Egmont von (1907-1997) – German engineer-physicist, creator of the electron microscope, specialist in the field of electromagnetic separation of uranium isotopes. VUSSR from May 1945 to 1955. Since 1955, director of the Research Institute in Dresden (GDR), winner of the Stalin (1947, 1953) and National Prizes of the GDR (1958, 1965).

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work? Sukhum offered him. Agreed, why not? Is he a fool not to live in such places. I would like to leave tomorrow.

Hertz? let's go there.

30/U1-45

I had three visits in a month. But so what? Vyacheslav and Koba make big politics, and I provide it? And I stand aside.

On August 130, 1945, GKO Decree No. 9944ss / op was adopted on the construction of objects "A" and "G" in Sukhumi.

Object "A" - an institute in the system of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, director - Professor M. Ardenne. The institute was located in Sukhumi in the premises of the Sinop sanatorium.

Object "G" - an institute in the system of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, director - Professor G. Hertz. The institute was located in Sukhumi in the premises of the sanatorium "Agudzery".

Hertz Gustav Ludwig (1887-1975), German physicist, member of the Göttingen Academy of Sciences, Academy of Sciences of the GDR, foreign member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1958). From 1945 to 1954 he worked in the USSR. Laureate of the Nobel Prize (1925), laureate of the Stalin Prize (1951) and the National Prize of the GDR (1955).

Starting with the magnificent April receptions (see note 1 to the entry of April 21, 1945) L.P. Beria was also present at a series of dinners in 1945 in honor of the personal representative of the US President Harry Hopkins (June 1), again B. Bierut (June 23), Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic "Mr. Zd. Firlinger" (June 27), Prime Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic Marshal Choibalsan (July 7), Chairman of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China "Mr. Sun Tzu-Wen" (July 13) and in honor of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (August 13).

(Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. OGIZ: 1947. T. P).

Stalin, of course, conducted business negotiations with all these foreign guests, but only V.M. Molotov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Most likely, this offended Beria, because he had a taste for foreign policy, and a talent for it, which clearly exceeded the talent and abilities of V.M. Molotov.

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3/UP-45

I'll be Marshall soon. Special ranks are replaced by combined arms ranks. Right, but sorry. There are many marshals, but there was only one General Commissar. There were only three of them, along with me. "I have been in the Cheka for twenty-five years, but it has always been a collar for me. Put it on, you have to pull it. But mine is economics and politics. I understood this well in the Zakkraykom when I pulled zero the first violin".

And then, before the war, in the Council of People's Commissars I thought about turning around, "but the war did not give. But all the same, the war let the economy under me, and it turned out well. I can do it. Koba knows this, Uranus put me on, the Operational Bureau, and all at once.

And I could have done more if Koba had allowed me more access to external affairs. It's bad to be a gendarme, always behind the scenes. And in Tehran, and in the Crimea. And generally speaking.

There were palm trees in Iran, there were palm trees in Crimea, and there will also be a Palm tree in Berlin."

1 By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 6, 1945, the special ranks for the commanding staff of the NKVD and the NKGB, introduced on October 7, 1937, were abolished, bringing them to the combined arms. The title of General Commissar of State Security of the USSR, which in 1945 only L.P. Beria, was previously equated with the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, which explains the assignment of L.P. Beria marshal status.

2Y.G. Yag. (1891-1938), N.I. Yezhov (1895-1940) and LP. Beria (1899-1953).

This refers to the work of L.P. Beria as the 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the 1st Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia in the 30s.

*February 3, 1941 L.P. Beria was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

"Obviously, Beria is playing with words with bitter irony, because the preparations for the Berlin (Potsdam) conference were coded as Operation Palma.

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Publisher Help

From July 17 to August 2, 1945, the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the Allied States was held in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam in the Cecilienhof Palace. The USSR delegation was headed by I.V. Stalin, the US delegation - the new US President Harry Truman, the British delegation - first Winston Churchill, and from July 28 - the new British Prime Minister C. Attlee.

13/UP-45

Vsevolod reported that the first explosion of the Atomic Bomb will soon be carried out in the USA and the explosion will take place on July 10! The total weight is 3 tons, and the estimated force of the explosion is about 5 thousand tons of explosives. This is not the first message, but the war pushed back. Now it becomes the main thing. Spoke with Koba in the presence of George and Vyacheslav-vg. There was no long conversation. Koba thought for a moment, then asked, "The 10th has passed, where is the explosion?"

I say: "Probably, they will blow it up again, or maybe there was a misfire.

He asks: "Maybe a bluff?" I say: "I don't think so". He thought and said, "3 tons is a heavy truck, and 5,000 tons is five heavy freight trains."

Then he looked at us and asked, "Do you understand?"

We are leaving for Berlin soon." The conference will

See comment below.

2This refers to the trip to the Berlin Conference of the Three Allied Powers. But I will note the following... According to some data, for example, the Central Operational Archive of the FSB (see: Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials: T. G, 1938-1945. Part 2) Stalin left Moscow for Germany on July 16 1945 at 17.30. However, already on July 16, 1945, TASS officially announced the arrival in Berlin of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Generalissimo I.V. Stalin and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. (See: Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. OGIZ, 1947. Vol. II). Such a statement by TASS may be explained by the desire to misinform possible terrorists from the Bandera OUN or the Polish AK.

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in the suburbs of Potsdam (so in the text. - S.K.). I'm on guard again...

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

People's Commissar of the State Security Service of the USSR Vsevolod Merkulov, referring to information "from several reliable intelligence sources of the NKGB of the USSR", L.P. Beria in a letter dated July 10, 1945, but printed, judging by the markup of the mashburo, as early as July 6, 1945. It is not possible to establish the reason for the delay today, however, it can be assumed that Merkulov delayed the transfer of information in the hope of a quick confirmation - nie the fact of the explosion. Then his information would look more reliable.

As you can see, Beria also did not immediately report it to Stalin, already after July 10. However, both Stalin and Beria could not but treat the inaccuracies of intelligence data professionally, that is, calmly. Secretly obtaining reliable information has always been an extremely delicate matter. In reality, the United States conducted the first test nuclear explosion at the Alamogordo test site in New Mexico on July 16, 1945, but Merkulov handed over the full data on this experiment with a description of the specific details and parameters of the explosion to Beria only on October 19, 1945.

6/USH-45

On the way back? Koba said that he wanted to discuss separately the issues of the restoration of transport and the work of the NKPS. He did this yesterday. We drove all over Russia, Poland and Germany, and

\To ensure the safety of I.V. Stalin and the Soviet delegation during the Berlin conference, 7 regiments of the NKVD troops, 1500 experienced operatives were involved. The security of the Cecilienhof Palace, where the conference sessions were held, was carried by 2000 people, 150 operatives were located directly in the halls of the palace.

From Berlin.

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chatting is terrible. It is one thing to read the reports, but you can only see with your own eyes. Ruin, ruin. The Poles are better, the Germans are even better, even though Berlin lies in ruins, hard beaten.

In Berlin, Truman boasted about Bomba in front of Koba. I wanted to scare. Koba told him that he hoped that no one would fight with these weapons.

After Koba told us, "Now it is clear that this bomb is not a bluff. They have it, we don't have it. They start to scare, we are not afraid. But if we don't do it quickly, they will destroy us. Roosevelt died so quickly. I would agree with him, because behind him were people who wanted peace and trade. How it will go now, I don't know. It's good that Churchill (so in the text. - S.K.) was given a ride, because he incited Roosevelt, and now he will put spokes in the wheels. It is not for nothing that he keeps a whole armed army in Norway."

Koba is telling the truth. One war has ended, and another may begin.'

Commentary by Sergei Kremler

Immediately after the end of hostilities in 1945, Churchill instructed Field Marshal Montgomery "to carefully collect the German weapons and fold them so that they can be more easily distributed again to the German soldiers with whom we would have to cooperate if the Soviet offensive continued."

Churchill could have been more specific: "If we had to launch a joint offensive with the Germans against the Soviets."

Stalin knew about these actions of the British. On July 25, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, when Churchill complained that there were difficulties in England with coal, because

See comment below.

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ku "coal miners have not yet been demobilized," Stalin remarked: "There are enough prisoners. We have prisoners working on coal, it would be difficult without them... 400,000 German soldiers are sitting with you in Norway, they are not even disarmed, and it is not known what they are waiting for. That's your labor force."

On the same day, July 25, 1945, the USSR delegation sent a memorandum to the British delegation, which stated: "The Soviet government received information that the surrender regime was not fully applied to the German troops stationed on the territory of Norway. ..

It is reported that the German troops stationed in the area between the cities of Moe and Trondheim in the amount of about 260 thousand people and in the area of Tromso - 140 thousand people, have their own weapons and military equipment. The personnel of these troops are not interned and enjoy freedom of movement ... "

1/USh-45

The White House reported that an American aircraft had dropped an Atomic Bomb with a destructive force of 20,000 tons of explosives on the important Japanese military base of Hiroshima.

So it's not a bluff. Spoke with Koba. The Americans officially announced that they had been working with Britain since 1940, that there were two large plants and a number of smaller enterprises for the production of atomic energy in the USA. 125 thousand people worked, now 65 thousand work. Maybe they are lying, but now it is clear how much we will have to work.

We start a war with the Japanese. This one (so in the text – S.K.) will not last long.

On August 16, 1945, at 0816:20 local time, a US B-29 strategic bomber dropped a uranium bomb with a yield of

about 15 kilotons. (August 9, 1945, a plutonium bomb with a yield of approximately 21 kilotons was dropped on the city of Nagasaki.)

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12/USh-45

Kurchatov worked in Baku in the twenties. I said it myself. We even had mutual friends.

Role-Zhymersky was awarded the Order of Victory!. And they won't give me the Order of Victory, even though I'm now also a Marshal.

18/USh-45

Zimin? reports on the work of the troops? in Austria and Czechoslovakia after the war. The situation is complex. The Czech Social Democrats formally have a bloc with the Communists, but in fact they are carrying out provocative work, sowing rumors, while nationalists and Czechs and Slovaks are being legalized. It's clear! Before they hoped for Hitler, now they hope for Truman.

Bandit groups of the OUN are based on the mountain ranges of Austria and Czechoslovakia. They come from Poland, where we pinned them down. Also a problem. It is especially dangerous that the remaining Germans, the Banderists, the active agents of the Germans, who have defected to the Americans, change into our uniforms. If it's for disguise, that's fine, but in our uniform they carry out gangster actions, robberies and violence against the local population, and blame it on us.

It's handwriting. We also dressed in German

On August 19, 1945, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was published on awarding Marshal of Poland Mikhail Rol-Zhymersky with the Order of Victory "for outstanding services in organizing the armed forces of Poland and for the successful conduct of military operations of the Polish Army in the - Shaking battles against a common enemy ~ Hitler's Germany.

Perhaps one of the leaders of the NKVD troops in the Central Group of Forces, Colonel Zimin-Kovalev, is meant.

AP, taking into account the further content of the entry, it is clear that the troops of the NKVD are meant to protect the rear of the Central Group of Forces.

"OUN - "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" by Stepan Bandera.

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some form, but we never use provocation against the local population, even if we use false Bandera detachments. This is an operational measure against Bandera. Then we reveal hidden accomplices and agents in this way. But never, under the guise of Germans or Bandera, did we use violence against the civilian population as a provocation to discredit the enemy morally. |

We never act meanly, and if someone breaks down on the ground, we punish him. And they encourage provocation and rely on it.

This must be taken into account for the future, because now the dress-up provocation will be used not by the Germans, but by the OUN and the Americans.'

Comrade Stalin orients me towards the Uranium Works. He says that this is the most important thing now and must be done quickly.

It was decided to carry out all work on Uranus through the Special Committee of the GOKO. We introduce there Pervukhin ?, Zavenyagin? and Vannikov \, from scientists bu-

Interesting and accurate reasoning. Indeed, the Soviet secret services of the time of Stalin Beria could act against enemies with skillful cunning, but without using meanness and unscrupulousness as an acceptable operational method.

*Pervukhin Mikhail Georgievich (1904-1978), statesman, took an active part in the implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project.

See also note 2 to entry of 30 September 1943.

3Zavenyagin Avraamiy Pavlovich (1901-1956), statesman, took an active part in the implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project.

See also note 3 to the entry of October 26, 1944.

*Vannikov Boris Lvovich (1897-1962), Soviet statesman, colonel general of the engineering and artillery service (1944), three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1942, 1949, 1954), laureate of the Stalin Prizes (1951, 1953), was awarded five Orders of Lenin, in 1942-1946. People's Commissar of Ammunition of the USSR, since 1945 Head of the First Main Directorate (PGU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

See also note 2 to entry dated April 19, 1943.

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Det Kurchatov and Stalin recommended Kapitsa. I insisted that Makhnev enter as a Member. I can't do without him, and he needs to have the authority.

Koba invited Georgy and me to the Middle to talk separately.

24 /USH-45

Today I was busy in the Special Committee. They led (so in the text, obviously, it is necessary to "hold" – S.K.) the first organizational meeting. We will conduct all practical work through a separate Glavk?, through Vannikov. I don't know how Kapitsa will work. And fanaberiya is, and says a lot. This is not Igor. But Koba respects him. And Vyacheslav winces.

Let's see.

4/1X-45

Today we decided to abolish the GOKO." The war with the Japanese is over, we must move from emergency to normal administration, to the Council of People's Commissars.

6/1X-45 Instead of the Operational Bureau of the GFCS, it was decided to

Kapitsa Pyotr Leonidovich (1894-1984), Soviet physicist, academician (1939), Hero of Socialist Labor (1945, 1974), winner of the Stalin (1941, 1943) and Nobel (1978) prizes. In 1945 he was a member of the Special Committee and the Technical Council of the Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

See also notes 1 and 2 to the entry of 19 December 1945.

This refers to the First Main Directorate (PGU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, since March 1946 - under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the predecessor of the "atomic" Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR.

On September 35, 1945, Pravda published the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the abolition of the State Defense Committee "in connection with the end of the war and the end of the state of emergency in the country."

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call two Bureaus. One is Molotov, the other is Beria. Behind me are all the Industrial People's Commissariats and Transport. Georgy's deputy, and I asked Kosygin to see me. Kosygin is somewhat gloomy, but the worker seems to be efficient.

They adopted a resolution on a long vacation for Comrade Stalin. Who needs to rest. Yes, and it wouldn't bother me.

12/1X-45 Held a conference with Tevosyan?, Lomako?, Kovalev, and Baibak. There were Zhimerin and Vakhrushev. He said that we have known each other for a long time and well, but we will be familiar

On September 16, 1945, a decision was made to form two Operational Bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, chaired by V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

2Tevosyan Ivan Fedorovich (Tevadrosovich) (1902-1958), Soviet statesman, graduated in 1927 from the Moscow Mining Academy. In 1940-1948. People's Commissar (Minister) of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR.

Lomako Petr Fadeevich (1904-1990), Soviet statesman, graduated from the Moscow Institute of Non-Ferrous Metals and Gold in 1932. In 1940-1948. People's Commissar (Minister) of Nonferrous Metallurgy of the USSR.

'Kovalev I.V. (1901-1993), graduated in 1935 from the Military Transport Academy of the Red Army, Doctor of Military Sciences (1967). In 1944-1948 People's Commissar (Minister) of Railways of the USSR.

See also note 1 to the entry of April 15, 1944.

° Baibakov N.K. (1911-2002), graduated from the Oil Institute in Baku in 1932, Doctor of Technical Sciences (1966). In 1944-1946. People's Commissar of the Oil Industry of the USSR.

See also note 5 to the entry of 16 October 1944.

Zhimerin Dmitry Georgievich (1906–1995), Soviet statesman, power engineer, graduated from the Moscow Power Engineering Institute in 1931, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1970). In 1942-1953. People's Commissar (Minister) of Power Plants of the USSR.

"Vakhrushev Vasily Vasilyevich (1902-1947), Soviet statesman, in 1939-1946 People's Commissar of the coal industry of the USSR.

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again, because in peacetime we did not work together. Of course, for us, what is war, what is not war, we still do not get out of the offices. But now it is necessary to work without emergency work, systematically.

Nothing unexpected is foreseen, we must look at the years ahead, soon we will again live according to the Five-Year Plans, but we need to think further. You are younger people, you will live long and work long. You are not us, we did not have to learn much. Time did not allow. And you are all graduate engineers!. So the demand from you will be in full measure. But if you have any questions please feel free to contact me as I can help.

Constantly busy now with Uranium affairs. The familiar and the new mix. Koba advised me to read something, I read it. New acquaintances also help, before I had so many acquaintances among scientists and engineers.

Vsevolod? says Fitin insistently demands that the center of work on Uranus be moved from Moscow somewhere to an isolated place? There is evidence that Americans are becoming more and more interested in our

works.

V.V. Vakhrushev, a talented manager, formally graduated from a parochial school.

"Merkulov V.N., in 1943-1946 People's Commissar (Minister) of State Security of the USSR.

See also note 4 to the entry of April 19, 1943.

P. Fitin, head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR, repeatedly (for example, in a letter addressed to People's Commissar V.N. Merkulov dated March 5, 1945) raised the question "in order to ensure the strictest secrecy around all work on the uranium problem" to transfer the main work from Moscow "to any isolated region of the country".

In early April 1945, Fitin wrote a letter and L.P. Beria, but then it was not sent. Fitin, on the other hand, came out in March 1945 with an initiative to create a "special body (like the Council on Radar at the State Defense Committee of the USSR) to manage the whole business of developing and solving the problem of uranium", but this issue was practically resolved only in August 1945 after the establishment of the CCGT.

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Fitin is right, he should definitely talk to Koba before he goes on vacation. I think it should not be very far from Moscow and in the woods.'

16/1X-45

Koba received US senators' While they were driving, they behaved boorishly, Koba's got quiet. Then Kennan? at the ambassador's chattering about how limited Russians are, and Uncle Joe too. These Russians have not seen the world, they judge world politics by their illusions, build chimeras for themselves and then fight them (as in the text. - S.K.). And what Zhdanov and Beria are limited people.

Mu..ak! He sits, chatting and does not know that limited people write all his chatter on paper. And world politics is known even without their Times and skating across the ocean.

Soon after Beria's full concentration on the uranium problem, the issue of a separate isolated weapons center outside Moscow was resolved. It began to be created in 1946 in the village of Sarova, in the area of the Mordovian State Reserve, in the former Sarov Desert, 70 kilometers from Arzamas.

September 214, 1945 IV. Stalin in the presence of A.Ya. Vyshinsky from 20.00 to 20.40 received a group of US congressmen and senators (W.M. Colmer, C.R. Hope, J. Le Fevre, S. Simpson, J.P. Walcott, C. Walvertnon, O. Zimmerman, G. Adelsberg, K. Peiper), accompanied by J. Kennan.

ZKennan George Frost (1904-2006), noted American diplomat and political scientist, then Minister Counsellor, US Embassy in Moscow.

* Harriman William Averell (1891-1985), US Ambassador to the USSR in 1943-1946.

See comment below.

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Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Without a doubt, L.P. Beria is referring to the operation of the Soviet technical intelligence service, brilliant in design and technical execution. During the Yalta conference, children vacationing in the Crimea presented US Ambassador A. Harriman with a gift - the American coat of arms (white-tailed eagle) made of many precious woods. Loved the gift so much

Harriman that he hung it over his desk - after, of course, thorough checks and scans by the embassy security personnel.

However, the gift still contained a unique "bug" that was never discovered by the Americans. It was a miniature passive listening device "Zlatoust", which did not have batteries, etc. However, to accommodate the equipment that ensures the operation of this device, it was necessary to occupy the upper floors of two residential buildings in the neighborhood of the US Embassy.

Any word uttered in the office of Harriman and other successive US ambassadors to the USSR on the same day became known to Stalin, Molotov, Beria and other trusted members of Stalin's "team".

Before a defector from the GRU of the General Staff in the 50s did not give this secret to the CIA, the Soviet leadership regularly received full information about all the true intentions of the United States regarding the USSR and the outside world as a whole.

8/X-45

Koba is leaving!, leaving Georgy and me on the farm. He said that the current external affairs are primarily on Molotov, and all internal affairs are primarily on us. Voznesensky will not handle large independent issues. This is true. But he has a big fanaberia,

From October 9 to December 17, 1945, Stalin went on vacation (relative, of course) to Gagra.

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That's what I told Kobe. He grunted, "We'll cut it if it goes too far." And thanks for that.

10/X-45

Zavenyagin wrote that in April the Americans removed 1000 tons of uranium raw materials from Germany, and now this is our zone of occupation. Offers through the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to demand the raw materials back. Fool! Does he not understand that we are declassifying our interest and showing our level. It was not for nothing that Truman checked Koba in Berlin. And now we will substitute ourselves. And so many rumors have already spread. And they still won't give us anything. They are not fools.

Let him work better with the Germans, something he is slowly taking them out.'

21/X-45

Koba met with Harriman*. Notes the change in tone even with it. Harriman is a well-mannered man, but even he takes a different tone with us, even with Comrade Stalin. Delivered Truman's message. Hard.

19/XE-45

There was a message from the English Times. Reports that the atomic bombs used against Japan are already obsolete. You can create a bomb 100 times stronger.

By the autumn of 1945, the process of searching for German specialists in the "atomic" profile and German atomic scientists in the Soviet zone of occupation gained momentum. Already in May-June 1945, prominent physicists von Ardenne, Professor Riehl and others were involved. The work of German specialists took place within the framework of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD (MVD) of the USSR, which was headed by Zavenyagin.

"Stalin on "rest" on October 24, 1945, received US Ambassador Harriman, who came to Gagra with personal message

President Truman.

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Are they lying? Or are they scared? Kobe needs to be told.

9/HP-45

Koba is very unhappy with us? and Vyacheslav. Molotov, of course, is to blame, such information could not be missed. Me, too, science. External affairs concern me little, I'm still a diplomat, but here a trifle can be important.

Koba writes that with partners such as the US and England, we will get nothing if we succumb to intimidation and show hesitation. Then he called me separately and said that I would have to give half the time to Case number one? He said so. And he added that he would free me from the People's Commissariat. "I don't know whether it will be better or not.

Less than eight years after this entry was made, L.P. Beria was preparing to test the first Soviet thermonuclear ("hydrogen") bomb RDS-6s with a power of about 30 times greater than the power of the Hiroshima "Kid". RDS-BS was tested in August 1953 after Beria's arrest, and the most formidable tested Soviet superbomb was about 3,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima one.

Most likely, this refers to the leader, not counting I.V. Stalin, the "four" of 1945 in the Politburo, that is, V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria and A.I. Mikoyan.

3See comment below.

'Deserves our attention is how L.P. Beria reacted to the Stalinist "bashing" of Molotov, and indirectly to the entire "four", including Beria himself. Beria knew how to learn from mistakes, while he, as befits an intelligent person, more often learned from the mistakes of others than his own.

° The uranium problem.

This refers to the release of L.P. Beria from the duties of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, which shortly after the return of I.V. Stalin to Moscow happened.

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Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

In early December 1945, a conflict arose between Stalin and Molotov. Today it is explained by Stalin's desire to weaken Molotov's influence by picking on a trifle, but in reality there was no question of any exceptional influence of Molotov by the end of 1945, because the Operations Bureau of the Council of Ministers was headed by Beria and Malenkov. On the other hand, Stalin had reason and the need to harshly rebuke Molotov on the merits.

The fact is that on December 1, 1945, a Moscow correspondent for the British Daily Herald reported that in connection with Stalin's long vacation, Stalin's departure from the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the return of Molotov to this post can be assumed. The correspondent claimed at the same time that "... the political leadership of the USSR is in the hands of Molotov."

On the same day, December 1, The New York Times also published an article by its Moscow correspondent, where he suggested some disagreements in the Politburo between Stalin and Molotov on foreign policy issues. The simultaneity of the appearance on both sides of the ocean of two apparently similar correspondences naturally suggested the idea of a joint political sounding by Washington and London of the political situation in Moscow.

Molotov, as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, looked through the telegram reports of foreign correspondents beforehand, but missed both messages. Then he justified himself to Stalin that he "succumbed to the mood that this was not dangerous for the state."

Although Stalin "rested" in Sochi, he completely monitored both the internal and external situation - otherwise he would not have been Stalin. And he immediately realized how dangerous it is, in the conditions of the US nuclear monopoly, to give the West even the slightest reason to assume that the Soviet leadership lacked a monolithic unity on foreign policy issues. Stalin's anger manifested itself in the exchange of a number of very harsh encryptions to the "four".

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19/HP-45

Koba returned from vacation and immediately raised the question of Kapitsa. He wrote him a letter, complains about me, but asks Koba to acquaint me with the letter! And asks to be released from work in the Special Committee and the Technical Council. Koba gave it to me, I read it, and yesterday Koba asked me in front of Georgi what to do with Kapitsa.

I said bluntly, he me for these months o... b. The complete opposite of Igor. Annoying, annoying with a learned air, poking at world experience. He writes about it in a letter.

Georgy confirmed that Kapitsa was of little use. I show Kobe, he doesn't even know the exact name of the Special Committee, in the letter he calls the Special Committee instead of the Special Committee.

Koba grinned and said, well, that's why he writes like that, because he needs a Special Committee only for Kapitsa, but we need a Special Committee for the case. We decided to release Kapitzia."

Kobe said that according to intelligence data, the Americans already had 30 Atomic bombs by the autumn. He say-

'The history of the Soviet Atomic Project is really known for the letters of P.L. Kapitsa I.V. Stalin dated November 25, 1945 (Stalin was then on vacation in Sochi) and Beria dated December 1, 1945. Letter to L.P. Beria is addressed to "Chairman of the Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Comrade L.P. Beria" and is sustained in a pointing and instructive tone.

The last time P.L. Kapitsa was present as a member of the Special Committee at the meeting on December 14, 1945. G.

On December 21, 1945, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 3134-946ss, signed by Stalin, was adopted to satisfy the request of "acad. Kapitsa P.L." about his release "from work in the Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Technical Council of the Committee." Nevertheless, the minutes of the meeting of the Special Committee (SC) dated April 13, 1946 No. 19 recorded the participation of P.L. Kapitsa at the meeting, while P.L. Kapitsa is listed among the members of the UK. The fact is interesting, but I did not find an explanation for it. By Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1815-782s of August 17, 1946, Kapitsa was also relieved of the post of director of the Institute of Physical Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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hall "They still need to be delivered to us." Then he thought about it and said that we need to think about such an air defense of Moscow that not a single bastard could even fly close ...

29/KhP-45 I hand over the People's Commissariat to Sergey'. Has my Chekist work ended again? I don't think I'll be going back to her.

1A very important detail showing that immediately after the war, Stalin began to form a conviction in the need for anti-nuclear air defense of Moscow. Later, this idea became the starting point for the organization of KB-1 of the USSR Ministry of Arms

(then Design Bureau No. 1 of the Third Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, see entry dated February 3, 1951 and note 1 to it) under the guidance of Professor P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beria. This design bureau was responsible for the development of Moscow air defense based on anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) and a network of radar stations for the early detection of air targets.

January 210, 1946 Beria and the new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR S.N. Kruglov signed an act of acceptance and delivery of cases on the People's Commissariat, and on January 15, 1946, a short message appeared in the Izvestia newspaper in the Chronicle section: "The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request of the Deputy Chairman of the SNK of the USSR L.P. Beria to release him from the duties of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR due to his overload with other central work. Comrade S.N. was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Kruglov.

L.P. Beria began working in the Azerbaijan Cheka in 1921. At the end of 1922, he was transferred to the GruzChK in Tiflis and left the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU in 1931 from the post of chairman of the Transcaucasian and Georgian GPU and plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the Transcaucasian SFSR for party work after being elected secretary, and then - 1st secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b) and 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia. On August 22, 1938, he returned to the State Security after being appointed N.I. Yezhov. Since September 29, 1938, L.P. Beria also becomes the head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, and from November 25, 1938, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. The last short - before the arrest on June 26, 1953 - the return of L.P. Beria to the united Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD-MGB) of the USSR took place on March 5, 1953, after the death of I.V. St

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And do not want to. I always worked with my soul, how else, but I wanted to do something else. To result see.

And what will be the result? Make the bomb quickly. Easy to say, but how to do it?

OK.

31/HP-45

George sent a letter to a certain Vekshinsky!, writes that he knows him as a serious worker. You can see it in the letter. The nose does not tear, does not teach, like Kapitsa, but offers practical things. He writes that it is necessary to immediately start creating and equipping a new scientific and technical center in order to really work in 8-10 months. He is rowing under himself, but the idea is sensible. The Americans made their bomb in a remote place. We need that too."

'Vekshinsky Sergey Arkadyevich (1896-1974), a prominent scientist in the field of electrovacuum technology, academician (1953, since 1946 - Corresponding Member), Hero of Socialist Labor (1956), laureate of the Lenin (1962) and Stalin (1946) prizes. In 1936-39. chief engineer of the Leningrad plant "Svetlana", in 1938 he was arrested, in 1939 he was released. Member of the CPSU(b) since 1940

On March 2, 1946, in accordance with the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 494-203ss, the Central Vacuum Laboratory of the People's Commissariat of Electrical Industry was established, headed by Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences S.A. Vekshinsky.

In these reflections, the grain of the future decision to create a special center for the design and development of the design of the atomic bomb, which was implemented by organizing KB-11 in Arzamas-16 (Sarov), is seen.

See also notes 9 and 10 of the 12 September 1945 entry.

Publisher's Afterword

So, the reader got acquainted with the personal diary of L.P. Beria from the end of 1941 to the end of 1945. After reading this diary, you once again understand why its author himself believed that the second

he won't survive the war.

Even preparing the diary for publication and commenting on it took me a lot of time and effort. And how much effort did L.P. Beria performing his various duties during the war!

Perhaps, only Stalin worked more than Beria in that war. And perhaps even Stalin worked less. No wonder the director of Uralmash, Boris Glebovich Muzrukov, who after the war was attracted by Beria to the Atomic Project and received his second star of the Hero of Socialist Labor for it, recalled that he could call Beria at any time of the day, and he was always there. And this despite the fact that hardly any of the Soviet leaders sat more than Beria at meetings with Stalin during the war.

It is not only the efficiency of Beria that is striking, but also the wide range of his competence. For example, his old acquaintance from Baku, Anastas Mikoyan, worked, of course, also a lot during the war - being a member of Stalin's team, it was impossible to live otherwise. But Mikoyan had a quite clearly defined area of work, and he did not go beyond it.

And Beria during the war only in part of the tasks of the NKVD had to delve into the issues of external

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intelligence (both illegal and legal residencies), counterintelligence, radio games with the Abwehr, reconnaissance and sabotage activities of special detachments and special groups of the NKVD, the activities of Special departments in the army and navy, the fight against the "fifth column", the fight against the nationalist underground and banditry, as well as the activities of the production departments of the NKVD, not counting the organization of the work of the territorial bodies of the NKVD, including the elimination of "traffic jams" in transport, the search for lost equipment, etc.

And the People's Commissar delved into all this, and much more in the work of his People's Commissariat! And he made decisions.

But besides this, he oversaw the production of tanks, small arms, artillery, mortars, ammunition, and also often connected to the problems of the aviation industry and the Air Force.

Then - the industrial people's commissariats, primarily the oil and coal industries and metallurgical, as well as railway transport.

He was closely involved in the problems of first evacuation, and then - the restoration of the economy of the liberated territories, worked hard, leading the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee. And from the end of 1944, he officially became the first state figure in the beginning work of the Soviet Atomic Project.

Having worked on a voluminous book about Beria behind me, I had a good idea of all this even before I got acquainted with Beria's diaries. However, preparing them for publication forced me once again to sit down for documents and books. As a result, the personality of L.P. Beria acquired for me an even larger scale, although I already thought - much more?!

Interesting and even unexpected aspects of nature turned for me Lavrenty Pavlovich as a person. Like the hero of Hemingway, Beria, albeit not out of great desire, but due to a developed sense of state responsibility, also "signed a contract" for all future undeclared wars, which

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which were coming to the State at the end of the Great Patriotic War.

In 1946-1953. Beria had an enormous responsibility for the Atomic Project, for the development of rocket work, for the development of the peaceful economy. And all this was also reflected in his personal diary, which he kept almost until the last day of his so vilely cut off, sovereign activity.

In the near future, the reader will also be able to get acquainted with these records, reflecting the era of the late Stalin.

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Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich

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AND

This diary was never intended to be published. Few knew about its existence. Its original was to be destroyed on Khrushchev's personal order, but the photocopies were saved by Beria's secret supporters to see the light of day half a century after his assassination. Very personal, extremely frank (it's no secret that even extremely cautious and "closed" people sometimes trust the diary

thoughts that in no case would have dared to express aloud) notes by L.P. Beria for 1941-1945. allow you to look "behind the scenes" in fact the second person

in the country, during the war, Beria

was not only the "right hand"

Leader, but also his "wakeful

eye" - Stalin possessed all

not Sh. Shemu to the front, even in makeup. In addition, as Deputy

can be overestimated. Giving all his strength to work without a trace, Lavrenty Pavlovich admitted in his diary: "I won't survive the Second War>

the Great Patriotic War, revealing the background of the key decisions, r LAVRENTI and predetermined the Victory of the USSR. And "DNR! completeness of information before

all thanks to his drug addict

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